BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:icalendar-ruby CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:dred-scott-v-sandford DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18570306 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18570307 DESCRIPTION:People of African descent that are slaves or were slaves and su bsequently freed\, along with their descendants\, cannot be United States citizens. Consequently\, they cannot sue in federal court. Slavery in the United States cannot be prohibited in U.S. territories before they are adm itted to the Union as doing so would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. After the Civil War\, this decision was voided by the Th irteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.\n\nDecided March 6 \, 1857 (argued 1856).\nOpinion of the Court: Roger B. Taney /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/roger-b-taney-chief-justice\nDissenting : McLean\, Curtis.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-cons titutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Discrimination based on r ace and ethnicity.\n\nDred Scott v. Sandford\, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)\, was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that held that the Un ited States Constitution did not extend American citizenship to people of black African descent\, and therefore they could not enjoy the rights and privileges the Constitution conferred upon American citizens. The decision is widely considered the worst in the Supreme Court's history and is broa dly denounced for its overt racism\, judicial activism\, and poor legal re asoning. It de facto nationalized slavery\, and thus played a crucial role in the events that led to the American Civil War four years later. Legal scholar Bernard Schwartz said that it "stands first in any list of the wor st Supreme Court decisions." Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes called it the Court's "greatest self-inflicted wound".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Dred_Scott_v._Sandford SUMMARY:⚖️ Dred Scott v. Sandford END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:strauder-v-west-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18800301 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18800302 DESCRIPTION:The exclusion of individuals from juries solely because of thei r race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This was the first t ime that the Supreme Court reversed a state criminal conviction due to a v iolation of a constitutional provision concerning criminal procedure.\n\nD ecided March 1\, 1880 (argued 1879).\nOpinion of the Court: William Strong /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-strong\nDissentin g: Field.\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nStrauder v. West Virginia\, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)\, is a landmark decision of the Sup reme Court of the United States about racial discrimination and United Sta tes constitutional criminal procedure. Strauder was the first instance whe re the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision denying a defendant's motion to remove his criminal trial to federal court pursuant to Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straud er_v._West_Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Strauder v. West Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:yick-wo-v-hopkins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18860510 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18860511 DESCRIPTION:Racially discriminatory application of a racially neutral statu te violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDe cided May 10\, 1886.\nOpinion of the Court: Stanley Matthews /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/stanley-matthews\nApplied: the Fourteen th Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendme nt-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nYick Wo v. Ho pkins\, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that a prima facie race-neutral law administered in a prejudicial manner infringed upon the right to equal pr otection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\ n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yick_Wo_v._Hopkins SUMMARY:⚖️ Yick Wo v. Hopkins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:plessy-v-ferguson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18960518 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18960519 DESCRIPTION:Segregated facilities for blacks and whites are constitutional under the doctrine of separate but equal. As long as the separate faciliti es are equal in quality\, then such separation is not unconstitutional. (D e facto overruled by Brown v. Board of Education (1954))\n\nDecided May 18 \, 1896 (argued April 13\, 1896).\nOpinion of the Court: Henry Billings Br own /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/henry-billings-brown\n Dissenting: Harlan.\nOverruled by (de facto) Brown v. Board of Education ( 1954)\, and subsequent rulings{{sfnp|Schauer|1997 /travel/calendars/landma rk-supreme-court-decisions/events/brown-v-board-of-education\nApplied: the Thirteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-13\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nPlessy v. Ferguson\, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)\, was a l andmark United States Supreme Court decision ruling that racial segregatio n laws did not violate the U.S. Constitution as long as the facilities for each race were equal in quality\, a doctrine that came to be known as "se parate but equal". The decision legitimized the many "Jim Crow laws" re-es tablishing racial segregation that had been passed in the American South a fter the end of the Reconstruction era in 1877.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Plessy_v._Ferguson SUMMARY:⚖️ Plessy v. Ferguson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:missouri-ex-rel-gaines-v-canada DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19381212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19381213 DESCRIPTION:States with racially segregated educational systems cannot sati sfy the "separate but equal" provision of Plessy merely by offering to pay for black students to be educated at an out-of-state institution\; they m ust offer those opportunities in-state.\n\nDecided December 12\, 1938 (arg ued November 9\, 1938).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Hughes /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes-chief-justi ce\nDissenting: McReynolds.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimina tion based on race and ethnicity.\n\nMissouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada\, 3 05 U.S. 337 (1938)\, was a United States Supreme Court decision holding th at states which provided a school to White students had to provide in-stat e education to Black students as well. States could satisfy this requireme nt by allowing Black and White students to attend the same school or creat ing a second school for Black students.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M issouri_ex_rel._Gaines_v._Canada SUMMARY:⚖️ Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:smith-v-allwright DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19440403 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19440404 DESCRIPTION:Primary elections must be open to voters of all races\, holding unconstitutional the white primary.\n\nDecided April 3\, 1944.\nOpinion o f the Court: Stanley Forman Reed /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/stanley-forman-reed\nDissenting: Roberts.\nApplied: the Fifteenth A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1 5\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nSmith v. Allwrigh t\, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supr eme Court with regard to voting rights and\, by extension\, racial desegre gation. It overturned the Texas state law that authorized parties to set t heir internal rules\, including the use of white primaries. The court rule d that it was unconstitutional for the state to delegate its authority ove r elections to parties in order to allow discrimination to be practiced. T his ruling affected all other states where the party used the white primar y rule.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_v._Allwright SUMMARY:⚖️ Smith v. Allwright END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:steele-v-louisville-nashville-railway-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19441218 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19441219 DESCRIPTION:Imposed duty of fair representation on labor unions\, requiring that they represent all members of their bargaining unit equally\, withou t regard to race or union membership (later understood to include other pr otected categories\, and eventually all misfeasance or malfeasance in the act of representing a member).\n\nDecided December 18\, 1944 (argued 1944) .\nOpinion of the Court: Harlan F. Stone /travel/calendars/supreme-court-j ustices/events/harlan-f-stone-chief-justice\nTopic: Discrimination based o n race and ethnicity.\n\nSteele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co.\, 32 3 U.S. 192 (1944)\, is a United States Supreme Court case concerning U.S. labor law\, specifically the responsibility of every formally recognized l abor organization to equally represent all the members of their class or c raft under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Court ruled that the A ct covered employees regardless of whether they were members of duly recog nized labor union\, concluding that powers which Congress delegates to oth er organizations through statutes also delegates a duty to uphold the Cons titution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steele_v._Louisville_%26_Nashvi lle_Railway_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:korematsu-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19441218 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19441219 DESCRIPTION:President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 is const itutional\; therefore\, American citizens of Japanese descent can be inter ned and deprived of their basic constitutional rights. This case featured the first application of strict scrutiny to racial discrimination by the g overnment. (Overruled by Trump v. Hawaii (2018))\n\nDecided December 18\, 1944 (argued 1944).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/su preme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Roberts\, Murphy\, Jac kson|.\nOverruled by Trump v. Hawaii (2018) /travel/calendars/landmark-sup reme-court-decisions/events/trump-v-hawaii\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: D iscrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nFred Korematsu v. United Sta tes\, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)\, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States that upheld the exclusion of people of Japanese descent from the West Coast Military Area during World War II\, an exclusion that led to t he internment of Japanese Americans. The decision has been widely criticiz ed\, with some scholars describing it as "an odious and discredited artifa ct of popular bigotry" and "a stain on American jurisprudence". The case i s often cited as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions of all time.\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korematsu_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Korematsu v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:morgan-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19460603 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19460604 DESCRIPTION:A Virginia law that enforces segregation on interstate buses is unconstitutional.\n\nDecided June 3\, 1946 (argued March 27\, 1946).\nOpi nion of the Court: Stanley Forman Reed /travel/calendars/supreme-court-jus tices/events/stanley-forman-reed\nDissenting: Burton.\nTopic: Discriminati on based on race and ethnicity.\n\nMorgan v. Virginia\, 328 U.S. 373 (1946 )\, is a major United States Supreme Court case. In this landmark 1946 rul ing\, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7–1 that Virginia's state law enforci ng segregation on interstate buses was unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Morgan_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Morgan v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:shelley-v-kraemer DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19480503 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19480504 DESCRIPTION:Courts may not enforce racial covenants on real estate.\n\nDeci ded May 3\, 1948 (argued January 14\, 1948).\nOpinion of the Court: Fred M . Vinson /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/fred-m-vinson-chi ef-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constit utional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on rac e and ethnicity.\n\nShelley v. Kraemer\, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case that held that racially restrictive hous ing covenants cannot legally be enforced.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Shelley_v._Kraemer SUMMARY:⚖️ Shelley v. Kraemer END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:sweatt-v-painter DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19500605 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19500606 DESCRIPTION:and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents\, Segregation in higher education\, in law schools and graduate programs respectively\, violates t he Equal Protection Clause. Laid the groundwork for the desegregation of a ll schools in Brown v. Board of Education\, four years later.\n\nDecided J une 5\, 1950 (argued April 4\, 1950).\nOpinion of the Court: Fred M. Vinso n /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/fred-m-vinson-chief-just ice\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nSweatt v. Paint er\, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)\, was a United States Supreme Court case that suc cessfully challenged the "separate but equal" doctrine of racial segregati on established by the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson. The case was influenti al in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education four years later.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweatt_v._Painter SUMMARY:⚖️ Sweatt v. Painter END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:henderson-v-united-states-1950 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19500605 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19500606 DESCRIPTION:The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 makes it unlawful for a rai lroad that engages in interstate commerce to subject any particular person to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect wha tsoever.\n\nDecided June 5\, 1950 (argued April 3\, 1950).\nOpinion of the Court: Harold Hitz Burton /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events /harold-hitz-burton\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\ nHenderson v. United States\, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court decision in the jurisprudence of the United States th at abolished segregation in railroad dining cars with an 8-0 ruling.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henderson_v._United_States_%281950%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ Henderson v. United States (1950) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hernandez-v-texas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19540503 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19540504 DESCRIPTION:The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth A mendment covers any racial\, national\, and ethnic groups of the United St ates against whom discrimination can be proved.\n\nDecided May 3\, 1954 (a rgued January 11\, 1954).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nHern andez v. Texas\, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)\, was a United States Supreme Court c ase\, "the first and only Mexican-American civil-rights case heard and dec ided... during the post-World War II period." In a unanimous ruling\, the court held that Mexican Americans and all other nationality groups in the United States have equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. C onstitution. The ruling was written by Chief Justice Earl Warren. This was the first case in which Mexican-American lawyers had appeared before the Supreme Court.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hernandez_v._Texas SUMMARY:⚖️ Hernandez v. Texas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:brown-v-board-of-education DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19540517 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19540518 DESCRIPTION:Segregated schools in the states are unconstitutional because t hey violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The C ourt found that the separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy "has no place in the field of public education".\n\nDecided May 17\, 1954 (argued December 9\, 1952).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/s upreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourt eenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nBrown v. B oard of Education of Topeka\, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that ruled that U.S. state laws establ ishing racial segregation in public schools violate the Equal Protection C lause of the Fourteenth Amendment\, even if the segregated facilities are equal in quality. The decision partially overruled the Court's 1896 decisi on Plessy v. Ferguson\, which had ruled that racial segregation laws were constitutional as long as the facilities for each race were equal\, a doct rine that had come to be known as "separate but equal". The Court's unanim ous decision in Brown and its related cases paved the way for integration and was a major victory of the civil rights movement\, and it became a mod el for many future impact litigation cases.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/Brown_v._Board_of_Education SUMMARY:⚖️ Brown v. Board of Education END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bolling-v-sharpe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19540517 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19540518 DESCRIPTION:Segregated schools in the District of Columbia violate the Equa l Protection Clause as incorporated against the federal government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\n\nDecided May 17\, 1954 (argue d 1952).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/supreme-cour t-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nBolling v. Sharpe\, 347 U.S . 497 (1954)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Constitution prohibits segregated public schools in t he District of Columbia. Originally argued on December 10–11\, 1952\, a year before Brown v. Board of Education\, Bolling was reargued on December 8–9\, 1953\, and was unanimously decided on May 17\, 1954\, the same da y as Brown. The Bolling decision was supplemented in 1955 with the second Brown opinion\, which ordered desegregation "with all deliberate speed". I n Bolling\, the Court did not address school desegregation in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause\, which applies only to the states\, but rather held that school segregation was unconstitutio nal under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United Stat es Constitution. The Court observed that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution lacked an Equal Protection Clause\, as in the Fourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However\, the Court held that the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exc lusive\, establishing the reverse incorporation doctrine.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Bolling_v._Sharpe SUMMARY:⚖️ Bolling v. Sharpe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gomillion-v-lightfoot DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19601114 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19601115 DESCRIPTION:Electoral district boundaries drawn only to disenfranchise blac ks violate the Fifteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided November 14\, 1960 (argued 1960).\nOpinion of the Court: Felix Frankfurter /travel/calendars/supreme- court-justices/events/felix-frankfurter\nApplied: the Fifteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-15\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nGomillion v. Lightfoot\, 3 64 U.S. 339 (1960)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the Un ited States that found an electoral district with boundaries created to di senfranchise African Americans violated the Fifteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gomillion_v._Lightfoot SUMMARY:⚖️ Gomillion v. Lightfoot END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:boynton-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19601205 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19601206 DESCRIPTION:Racial segregation in all forms of public transportation is ill egal under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.\n\nDecided December 5\, 19 60 (argued October 12\, 1960).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Whittaker.\ nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nBoynton v. Virginia \, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court. T he case overturned a judgment convicting an African American law student f or trespassing by being in a restaurant in a bus terminal which was "white s only". It held that racial segregation in public transportation was ille gal because such segregation violated the Interstate Commerce Act\, which broadly forbade discrimination in interstate passenger transportation. It moreover held that bus transportation was sufficiently related to intersta te commerce to allow the United States federal government to regulate it t o forbid racial discrimination in the industry.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Boynton_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Boynton v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:garner-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19611211 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19611212 DESCRIPTION:Peaceful sit-in demonstrators protesting segregationist policie s cannot be arrested under a state's "disturbing the peace" laws.\n\nDecid ed December 11\, 1961 (argued 1961).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nA pplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination bas ed on race and ethnicity.\n\nGarner v. Louisiana\, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)\, i s a landmark case argued by Thurgood Marshall before the US Supreme Court. On December 11\, 1961\, the court unanimously ruled that Louisiana could not convict peaceful sit-in protesters who refused to leave dining establi shments under the state's "disturbing the peace" laws.\n\nhttps://en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Garner_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Garner v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:loving-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670613 DESCRIPTION:Laws that prohibit interracial marriage (anti-miscegenation law s) are unconstitutional.\n\nDecided June 12\, 1967 (argued April 10\, 1967 ).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nLoving v. Virginia\, 388 U. S. 1 (1967)\, is a landmark civil rights decision of the United States Sup reme Court which held that laws banning interracial marriage violate the E qual Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Loving v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:swann-v-charlotte-mecklenburg-board-of-education DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710420 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710421 DESCRIPTION:The busing of students to promote racial integration in public schools is constitutional.\n\nDecided April 20\, 1971 (argued October 12\, 1970).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme- court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nSwann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of E ducation\, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with the busing of students to promote integration in public schools. The Court held that busing was an appropriate remedy for the prob lem of racial imbalance in schools. This was done to ensure the schools wo uld be "properly" integrated and that all students would receive equal edu cational opportunities regardless of their race.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Swann_v._Charlotte-Mecklenburg_Board_of_Education SUMMARY:⚖️ Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:griggs-v-duke-power-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710308 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710309 DESCRIPTION:Interpreted the federal statute prohibiting employment discrimi nation to also prohibit "disparate impact\," meaning employer policies tha t generate unequal employment outcomes regardless of whether the employer provably intended for them to do so\, if those policies are not necessary for the employer's business purposes.\n\nDecided March 8\, 1971 (argued De cember 14\, 1970).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nTopic: Dis crimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nGriggs v. Duke Power Co.\, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)\, was a court case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on December 14\, 1970. It concerned employment discriminati on and the disparate impact theory\, and was decided on March 8\, 1971. It is generally considered the first case of its type.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Griggs_v._Duke_Power_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Griggs v. Duke Power Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lau-v-nichols DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740122 DESCRIPTION:The lack of supplemental language instruction in public school for students with limited English proficiency violates Title VI of the Civ il Rights Act of 1964.\n\nDecided January 21\, 1974 (argued December 10\, 1973).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /travel/calendars/supreme -court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nTopic: Discrimination based on r ace and ethnicity.\n\nLau v. Nichols\, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)\, was a landmar k United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously decided that the lack of supplemental language instruction in public school for st udents with limited English proficiency violated the Civil Rights Act of 1 964. The court held that since non-English speakers were denied a meaningf ul education\, the disparate impact caused by the school policy violated T itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the case was remanded to the D istrict Court "for the fashioning of appropriate relief".\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Lau_v._Nichols SUMMARY:⚖️ Lau v. Nichols END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:runyon-v-mccrary DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760626 DESCRIPTION:Private schools that discriminate on the basis of race or estab lish racial segregation are in violation of federal law.\n\nDecided June 2 5\, 1976 (argued April 26\, 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart / travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: White.\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nRunyon v. M cCrary\, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)\, is a landmark case by the United States Sup reme Court\, which ruled that private schools that discriminate on the bas is of race or establish racial segregation are in violation of federal law . Whereas Brown v. Board of Education barred segregation by public schools \, this case barred segregation in private schools. This decision is built on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. another landmark civil rights case that a ffirmed the federal government's ability to penalize racist acts by privat e actors.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runyon_v._McCrary SUMMARY:⚖️ Runyon v. McCrary END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:regents-of-the-university-of-california-v-bakke DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780629 DESCRIPTION:Racial quotas in educational institutions violate the Equal Pro tection Clause\, but a more narrowly tailored use of race in admission dec isions may be permissible. (Partially overruled by Students for Fair Admis sions v. Harvard (2023))\n\nDecided June 28\, 1978 (argued October 12\, 19 77).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell (Parts I and V–C)\nApplied: the Fourt eenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nRegents of the University of California v. Bakke\, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)\, was a landm ark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that involved a dis pute over whether preferential treatment for minorities could reduce educa tional opportunities for whites without violating the Constitution. It uph eld affirmative action\, allowing race to be one of several factors in col lege admission policy. However\, the court ruled that specific racial quot as\, such as the 16 out of 100 seats set aside for minority students by th e UC Davis School of Medicine\, were impermissible.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Regents_of_the_University_of_California_v._Bakke SUMMARY:⚖️ Regents of the University of California v. Bakke END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:batson-v-kentucky DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860430 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860501 DESCRIPTION:Prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to dismiss jurors based on their race.\n\nDecided April 30\, 1986 (argued December 12\, 198 5).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: Burger\, Rehnquist.\nApplie d: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n \nBatson v. Kentucky\, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge in a criminal case—the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so—may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race. The Court ruled that this practice violated the Equal Prote ction Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case gave rise to the term B atson challenge\, an objection to a peremptory challenge based on the stan dard established by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. Subsequent jurisprudence has resulted in the extension of Batson to civil cases and c ases where jurors are excluded on the basis of sex.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Batson_v._Kentucky SUMMARY:⚖️ Batson v. Kentucky END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:adarand-constructors-inc-v-pena DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950613 DESCRIPTION:Race-based discrimination\, including discrimination in favor o f minorities (affirmative action)\, must pass strict scrutiny.\n\nDecided June 12\, 1995 (argued January 17\, 1995).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra D ay O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-c onnor\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter\, Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendm ent /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApp lied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity .\n\nAdarand Constructors\, Inc. v. Peña\, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)\, is a lan dmark United States Supreme Court case which held that racial classificati ons\, imposed by the federal government\, must be analyzed under a standar d of "strict scrutiny"\, the most stringent level of review\, which requir es that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opi nion of the Court\, which effectively overturned Metro Broadcasting\, Inc. v. FCC\, in which the Court had created a two tiered system for analyzing racial classifications. Adarand held the federal government to the same s tandards as the state and local governments through a process of "reverse incorporation"\, in which the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was hel d to bind the federal government to the same standards as state and local governments are bound under the 14th Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Adarand_Constructors%2C_Inc._v._Pe%C3%B1a SUMMARY:⚖️ Adarand Constructors\, Inc. v. Peña END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gratz-v-bollinger DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20030623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20030624 DESCRIPTION:The University of Michigan's “points system” of undergradua te affirmative action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Decided alongs ide Grutter v. Bollinger\, which held constitutional the University of Mic higan Law School's affirmative action program.\n\nDecided June 23\, 2003 ( argued April 1\, 2003).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nDi ssenting: Stevens\, Souter\, Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nGratz v. Bollinger\, 539 U .S. 244 (2003)\, was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Univ ersity of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy. In a 6–3 decision announced on June 23\, 2003\, Chief Justice Rehnquist\, w riting for the Court\, ruled the University's point system's "predetermine d point allocations" that awarded 20 points towards admission to underrepr esented minorities "ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed" and was therefore unconstitutional. It w as the companion case to Grutter v. Bollinger.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Gratz_v._Bollinger SUMMARY:⚖️ Gratz v. Bollinger END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:grutter-v-bollinger DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20030623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20030624 DESCRIPTION:A narrowly tailored use of race in student admission decisions may be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause because a diverse stu dent body is beneficial to all students. This was hinted at in Regents v. Bakke (1978). (Overruled by Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) )\n\nDecided June 23\, 2003 (argued April 1\, 2003).\nOpinion of the Court : Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/sand ra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Kennedy.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment -14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nGrutter v. Boll inger\, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)\, was a landmark case of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning affirmative action in student admissions. The Court held that a student admissions process that favors "underrepresente d minority groups" did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec tion Clause so long as it took into account other factors evaluated on an individual basis for every applicant. The decision largely upheld the Cour t's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)\, which allowed race to be a consideration in admissions policy but held rac ial quotas to be unconstitutional. In its companion case\, Gratz v. Bollin ger (2003)\, the Court struck down a points-based admissions system that a warded an automatic bonus to the admissions scores of minority applicants. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grutter_v._Bollinger SUMMARY:⚖️ Grutter v. Bollinger END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:schuette-v-coalition-to-defend-affirmative-action DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140422 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140423 DESCRIPTION:A Michigan state constitutional amendment that bans affirmative action does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided April 22\ , 2014 (argued October 15\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissentin g: Sotomayor.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-cons titutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nSchuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action\ , 572 U.S. 291 (2014)\, was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of th e United States concerning affirmative action and race- and sex-based disc rimination in public university admissions. In a 6-2 decision\, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does not prev ent states from enacting bans on affirmative action in education.\n\nhttps ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schuette_v._Coalition_to_Defend_Affirmative_Actio n SUMMARY:⚖️ Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:students-for-fair-admissions-v-harvard DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230630 DESCRIPTION:Race-based affirmative action programs in civilian college admi ssions processes at colleges and universities receiving federal funds viol ate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided June 29\, 2023 (argued October 31\, 2022).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme -court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Sotomayor\, Jackson (as it applies to University of North Carolina).\nApplied: the Fo urteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/a mendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on race and ethnicity.\n\nStudent s for Fair Admissions v. Harvard\, 600 U.S. 181 (2023)\, is a landmark dec ision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that race-based affirmativ e action programs in most college admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. With its companion case\, Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina\, the Supreme Court effec tively overruled Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)\, both of which validated some affirmative action in college admissions provided that race had a limited role in deci sions.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Students_for_Fair_Admissions_v._Ha rvard SUMMARY:⚖️ Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:muller-v-oregon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19080224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19080225 DESCRIPTION:Oregon's restrictions on the working hours of women are constit utional under the Fourteenth Amendment because they are justified by the s trong state interest in protecting women's health.\n\nDecided February 24\ , 1908 (argued January 15\, 1908).\nOpinion of the Court: David Josiah Bre wer /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/david-josiah-brewer\nO verruled by Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923)\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nMuller v. Oregon\, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)\, was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court. Wome n were permitted by state mandate fewer working hours than those allotted to men. The posed question was whether women's liberty to negotiate a cont ract with an employer should be equal to a man's. The law did not recogniz e sex-based discrimination in 1908\; it was unrecognized until the case of Reed v. Reed in 1971\; here\, the test was not under the equal protection s clause\, but a test based on the general police powers of the state to p rotect the welfare of women when it infringed on her fundamental right to negotiate contracts\; inequality was not a deciding factor because the sex es were inherently different in their particular conditions and had comple tely different functions\; usage of labor laws that were made to nurture w omen's welfare and for the "benefit of all" people was decided to be not a violation of the Constitution's Contract Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Muller_v._Oregon SUMMARY:⚖️ Muller v. Oregon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:glasser-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19420119 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19420120 DESCRIPTION:The exclusion of women from the jury pool\, other than members of the League of Women Voters who have attended a jury training class\, vi olates the fair cross-section requirement of the Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Noteworthy for being the first majority opinion of th e Court to use the phrase "cross-section of the community" and the first j ury discrimination case to invoke the Sixth Amendment rather than Equal Pr otection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided January 19\, 1942 (argued 1941).\nOpinion of the Court: Frank Murphy /travel/calendars/supre me-court-justices/events/frank-murphy\nDissenting: Frankfurter.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-6\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nGlasser v. United Stat es\, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court o n two issues of constitutional criminal procedure. Glasser was the first S upreme Court decision to hold that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment required the reversal of a criminal defendant's convictio n if his lawyer's representation of him was limited by a conflict of inter est.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glasser_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Glasser v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:phillips-v-martin-marietta-corp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710125 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710126 DESCRIPTION:An employer may not\, in the absence of business necessity\, re fuse to hire women with preschool-age children while hiring men with such children.\n\nDecided January 25\, 1971 (argued December 9\, 1970).\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nPhillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.\, 400 U .S. 542 (1971)\, is a United States Supreme Court landmark case in which t he Court held that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964\, an em ployer may not\, in the absence of business necessity\, refuse to hire wom en with pre-school-age children while hiring men with such children. It wa s the first gender-discrimination case under Title VII to reach the Court. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_v._Martin_Marietta_Corp. SUMMARY:⚖️ Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:reed-v-reed DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19711122 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19711123 DESCRIPTION:Administrators of estates cannot be named in a way that discrim inates on the basis of sex\; the first time the Equal Protection Clause ha d been read by the Supreme Court as applying to sex.\n\nDecided November 2 2\, 1971 (argued October 19\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burg er /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-j ustice\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nReed v. Reed\, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that the administrators of estates cannot be named in a way that d iscriminates between sexes. In Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court ruled for th e first time that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited differential treatment based on sex.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reed_v._Reed SUMMARY:⚖️ Reed v. Reed END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:stanley-v-illinois DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720403 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720404 DESCRIPTION:Laws that automatically make the children of unmarried fathers wards of the state after their mother dies\, but not the other way around\ , are unconstitutional. The first case in which the Supreme Court found me n faced sex discrimination.\n\nDecided April 3\, 1972 (argued October 19\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court -justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Burger.\nTopic: Discrimination b ased on sex.\n\nStanley v. Illinois\, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the fathers of children born out of wedlock had a fundamental right to their children . \nThe US Supreme Court found that\, as a matter of due process\, unwed f athers ought to be guaranteed the same rights as married or divorced fathe rs\, who have a right to a hearing. The Court also held that Illinois' den ial of unwed fathers a hearing\, while extending that right to all other p arents\, violated the equal protection of the laws.\nUntil the ruling\, wh en the mother of a child born out of wedlock was unable to care for the ch ild\, through death or other circumstances\, the child was made a ward of the state and either placed in an orphanage or foster care or for adoption .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_v._Illinois SUMMARY:⚖️ Stanley v. Illinois END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:frontiero-v-richardson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19730514 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19730515 DESCRIPTION:Sex-based discriminations are inherently suspect. A statute tha t automatically extends military benefits to the spouses of male members o f the uniformed services\, but requires the spouses of female members to p rove they are dependent on the servicemember's income\, is unconstitutiona l.\n\nDecided May 14\, 1973 (argued January 17\, 1973).\nOpinion of the Co urt: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/wi lliam-j-brennan\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Disc rimination based on sex.\n\nFrontiero v. Richardson\, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)\ , is a landmark United States Supreme Court case which decided that benefi ts given by the United States military to the family of service members ca nnot be given out differently because of sex. Frontiero is an important de cision in several respects\, including the fact that it informed the milit ary establishment that in terms of pay\, allowances and general treatment\ , women must be considered on an equal plane as men. However\, the Court d id not issue a broad decision requiring the military to prove in the court s its reasons for excluding women from combat positions.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Frontiero_v._Richardson SUMMARY:⚖️ Frontiero v. Richardson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:taylor-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19750121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19750122 DESCRIPTION:Systematic exclusion of women from jury service on the basis of having to register for jury duty violates a criminal defendant's Sixth an d Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\nDecided January 21\, 1975 (argued Octobe r 16\, 1974).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme -court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the F ourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nTaylor v. Louisiana\, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court whic h held that systematically excluding women from a venire\, or jury pool\, by requiring (only) them to actively register for jury duty violated the d efendant's right to a representative venire. The court overturned Hoyt v. Florida\, the 1961 case that had allowed such a practice.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Taylor v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:craig-v-boren DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19761220 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19761221 DESCRIPTION:Setting different minimum ages for females (18) and males (21) to be allowed to buy beer is unconstitutional sex-based discrimination con trary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecid ed December 20\, 1976 (argued October 5\, 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: Wi lliam J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j -brennan\nDissenting: Burger\, Rehnquist.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendme nt /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTop ic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nCraig v. Boren\, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that statutory or administrative sex classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The case was arg ued by future Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg while she was work ing for the American Civil Liberties Union\, who later wrote for the major ity in United States v. Virginia.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Craig_v ._Boren SUMMARY:⚖️ Craig v. Boren END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mississippi-university-for-women-v-hogan DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820701 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820702 DESCRIPTION:The single-sex admissions policy of the Mississippi University for Women's School of Nursing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided July 1\, 1982 (argued March 22\, 1982).\n Opinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Burger\, Blackmun\, Powel l.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional- amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nMis sissippi University for Women v. Hogan\, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)\, is a landma rk decision of the Supreme Court of the United States\, decided 5–4\, wh ich ruled that the single-sex admissions policy of the Mississippi Univers ity for Women violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend ment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M ississippi_University_for_Women_v._Hogan SUMMARY:⚖️ Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:price-waterhouse-v-hopkins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19890501 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19890502 DESCRIPTION:Discrimination against an employee on the basis of sex stereoty ping—that is\, a person's nonconformity to social or other expectations of that person's gender—constitutes impermissible sex discrimination\, i n violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer bea rs the burden of proving that the adverse employment action would have bee n the same if sex discrimination had not occurred.\n\nDecided May 1\, 1989 (argued October 31\, 1988).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /tr avel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting : Kennedy.\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nPrice Waterhouse v. Hop kins\, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Cour t on the issues of prescriptive sex discrimination and employer liability for sex discrimination. The employee\, Ann Hopkins\, sued her former emplo yer\, the accounting firm Price Waterhouse. She argued that the firm denie d her partnership because she did not fit the partners' idea of what a fem ale employee should look and act like. The employer failed to prove that i t would have denied her partnership anyway\, and the Court held that const ituted sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_Waterhouse_v._Hopkins SUMMARY:⚖️ Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:j-e-b-v-alabama-ex-rel-t-b DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19940419 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19940420 DESCRIPTION:Prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to dismiss jurors based on their sex.\n\nDecided April 19\, 1994 (argued November 2\, 1993) .\nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/harry-blackmun\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Scalia.\nApplied: th e Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nJ. E. B. v. Alabam a ex rel. T. B.\, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)\, is a landmark decision of the Supr eme Court of the United States holding that peremptory challenges based so lely on a prospective juror's sex are unconstitutional. J.E.B. extended th e court's existing precedent in Batson v. Kentucky (1986)\, which found ra ce-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials unconstitutional\, and E dmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company (1991)\, which extended that princip le to civil trials. As in Batson\, the court found that sex-based challeng es violate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J .E.B._v._Alabama_ex_rel._T.B. SUMMARY:⚖️ J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19960626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19960627 DESCRIPTION:Sex-based "separate but equal" military training facilities vio late the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided June 26\, 1996 (argued Januar y 17\, 1996).\nOpinion of the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/ruth-bader-ginsburg\nDissenting: Scalia.\nA pplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amend ments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sex.\n\nUnited S tates v. Virginia\, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)\, is a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the long-standing male-only admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in a 7–1 deci sion. Justice Clarence Thomas\, whose son was enrolled at the university a t the time\, recused himself.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stat es_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:oncale-v-sundowner-offshore-services DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19980304 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19980305 DESCRIPTION:The protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aga inst workplace discrimination "because of... sex" applied to harassment in the workplace between members of the same sex.\n\nDecided March 4\, 1998 (argued December 8\, 1997).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/ calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nTopic: Discriminat ion based on sex.\n\nOncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services\, 523 U.S. 75 ( 1998)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court. The case arose out of a suit for sex discrimination by a male oil-rig worker\, who claimed t hat he was repeatedly subjected to sexual harassment by his male co-worker s with the acquiescence of his employer. The Court held that the protectio n of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against workplace discrimin ation "because of... sex" applied to harassment in the workplace between m embers of the same sex.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oncale_v._Sundown er_Offshore_Services SUMMARY:⚖️ Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:burlington-northern-santa-fe-railway-co-v-white DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20060622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20060623 DESCRIPTION:The anti-retaliation provision under Title VII of the Civil Rig hts Act of 1964 does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace.\n\nDecided June 22\, 2006 (argued April 17\, 2006).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stephen-breyer\nTopic: Di scrimination based on sex.\n\nBurlington Northern & Santa Fe (BNSF) Railwa y Co. v. White\, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)\, is a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court on sexual harassment and retaliatory discrimination. It was a landmark case for retaliation claims. It set a precedent for cla ims which could be considered retaliatory under Title VII of the Civil Rig hts Act of 1964. In this case the standard for retaliation against a sexua l harassment complainant was revised to include any adverse employment dec ision or treatment that would be likely to dissuade a "reasonable worker" from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Burlington_Northern_%26_Santa_Fe_Railway_Co._v._White SUMMARY:⚖️ Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:one-inc-v-olesen DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19580113 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19580114 DESCRIPTION:Pro-homosexual writing is not per se obscene. This was the firs t Supreme Court ruling to deal with homosexuality and the first to address free speech rights with respect to homosexuality.\n\nDecided January 13\, 1958.\nTopic: Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identi ty.\n\nOne\, Inc. v. Olesen\, 355 U.S. 371 (1958)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court for LGBTQ rights in the United States. It was the first U.S. Supreme Court ruling to deal with homosexuality and the first to address free speech rights with respect to homosexuality. The Supreme C ourt reversed a lower court ruling that the gay magazine ONE violated obsc enity laws\, thus upholding constitutional protection for pro-homosexual w riting.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One%2C_Inc._v._Olesen SUMMARY:⚖️ One\, Inc. v. Olesen END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bowers-v-hardwick DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860701 DESCRIPTION:A Georgia law that criminalizes certain acts of private sexual conduct between homosexual persons does not violate the Fourteenth Amendme nt. (Overruled by Lawrence v. Texas (2003))\n\nDecided June 30\, 1986 (arg ued March 31\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Blackmun\, Stevens .\nOverruled by {{ussc\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.\n\nBowers v. Hardwick\, 47 8 U.S. 186 (1986)\, was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld\, in a 5–4 ruling\, the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy la w criminalizing oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults\, i n this case with respect to homosexual sodomy\, though the law did not dif ferentiate between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy. It was overturned i n Lawrence v. Texas (2003)\, though the statute had already been struck do wn by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1998.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Bowers_v._Hardwick SUMMARY:⚖️ Bowers v. Hardwick END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:romer-v-evans DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19960520 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19960521 DESCRIPTION:A Colorado state constitutional amendment that prevents homosex uals and bisexuals from being able to obtain protections under the law is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\ nDecided May 20\, 1996 (argued October 10\, 1995).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-ke nnedy\nDissenting: Scalia.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/cale ndars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Discriminat ion based on sexual orientation or gender identity.\n\nRomer v. Evans\, 51 7 U.S. 620 (1996)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the Uni ted States case which held that a state constitutional amendment in Colora do preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality vio lated the Equal Protection Clause. The majority opinion in Romer stated th at the amendment lacked "a rational relationship to legitimate state inter ests"\, and the dissent stated that the majority "evidently agrees that 'r ational basis'—the normal test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause—is the governing standard". The state constitutional amendment fa iled rational basis review.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romer_v._Evan s SUMMARY:⚖️ Romer v. Evans END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lawrence-v-texas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20030626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20030627 DESCRIPTION:A Texas law that criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduc t furthers no legitimate state interest and violates homosexuals' right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This de cision invalidates all of the remaining sodomy laws in the United States.\ n\nDecided June 26\, 2003 (argued March 26\, 2003).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-k ennedy\nDissenting: Scalia\, Thomas.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /t ravel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: D iscrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.\n\nLawrence v. Texas\, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)\, is a landmark decision of the United Stat es Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that U.S. state laws criminalizi ng sodomy between consenting adults are unconstitutional. The Court reaffi rmed the concept of a "right to privacy" that earlier cases had found the United States Constitution provides\, even though it is not explicitly enu merated. It based its ruling on the notions of personal autonomy to define one's own relationships and of American traditions of non-interference wi th any or all forms of private sexual activities between consenting adults .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas SUMMARY:⚖️ Lawrence v. Texas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-windsor DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20130626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20130627 DESCRIPTION:Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ()\, which defines—f or federal law purposes—the terms "marriage" and "spouse" to apply only to marriages between one man and one woman\, is a deprivation of the equal liberty of the person protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Am endment. The federal government must recognize same-sex marriages that hav e been approved by the states. The legal provision of the Defense of Marri age Act which was the issue in this case was eventually repealed by sectio n 3 of the Respect for Marriage Act and replaced by section 5 of the Respe ct for Marriage Act ().\n\nDecided June 26\, 2013 (argued March 27\, 2012) .\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-j ustices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Roberts\, Scalia\, Alito.\nApp lied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-5\nTopic: Discrimination based on sexual orientation or ge nder identity.\n\nUnited States v. Windsor\, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)\, is a la ndmark United States Supreme Court civil rights case concerning same-sex m arriage. The Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOM A)\, which denied federal recognition of same-sex marriages\, was a violat ion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Windsor SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Windsor END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:obergefell-v-hodges DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20150626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20150627 DESCRIPTION:The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex with all the accompanying rights and r esponsibilities and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state. \n\nDecided June 26\, 2015 (argued April 28\, 2015).\nOpinion of the Court : Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony- kennedy\nDissenting: Roberts\, Scalia\, Thomas.\nApplied: the Fourteenth A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1 4\nTopic: Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.\n \nObergefell v. Hodges\, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)\, is a landmark decision of t he United States Supreme Court which ruled that the fundamental right to m arry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Stat es Constitution. The 5–4 ruling requires all 50 states\, the District of Columbia\, and the Insular Areas under U.S. sovereignty to perform and re cognize the marriages of same-sex couples on the same terms and conditions as the marriages of opposite-sex couples\, with equal rights and responsi bilities. Prior to Obergefell\, same-sex marriage had already been establi shed by statute\, court ruling\, or voter initiative in 36 states\, the Di strict of Columbia\, and Guam.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obergefell _v._Hodges SUMMARY:⚖️ Obergefell v. Hodges END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bostock-v-clayton-county DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200615 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200616 DESCRIPTION:Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees ag ainst discrimination due to their sexual orientation or gender identity.\n \nDecided June 15\, 2020 (argued October 8\, 2019).\nOpinion of the Court: Neil Gorsuch /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/neil-gorsuch \nDissenting: Alito\, Kavanaugh.\nTopic: Discrimination based on sexual or ientation or gender identity.\n\nBostock v. Clayton County\, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court civil rights decision i n which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prot ects employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation o r gender identity.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bostock_v._Clayton_Cou nty SUMMARY:⚖️ Bostock v. Clayton County END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:civil-rights-cases DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18831015 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18831016 DESCRIPTION:Neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment empower Con gress to safeguard blacks against the actions of private individuals. (Par tially overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.)\n\nDecided October 15\, 1883.\nOpinion of the Court: Joseph P. Bradley /travel/calendars/supreme-c ourt-justices/events/joseph-p-bradley\nDissenting: Harlan.\nOverruled by { {ussc\nApplied: the Thirteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitution al-amendments/events/amendment-13\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Powe r of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\nThe Civil Rights Cases\, 109 U.S . 3 (1883)\, were a group of five landmark cases in which the Supreme Cour t of the United States held that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not empower Congress to outlaw racial discrimination by private indivi duals. The holding that the Thirteenth Amendment did not empower the feder al government to punish racist acts done by private citizens would be over turned by the Supreme Court in the 1968 case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. The Fourteenth Amendment not applying to private entities\, however\, is s till valid precedent to this day. Although the Fourteenth Amendment-relate d decision has never been overturned\, in the 1964 case of Heart of Atlant a Motel\, Inc. v. United States\, the Supreme Court held that Congress cou ld prohibit racial discrimination by private actors under the Commerce Cla use.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Cases SUMMARY:⚖️ Civil Rights Cases END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:heart-of-atlanta-motel-inc-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19641214 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19641215 DESCRIPTION:The Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to places of public accomm odation patronized by interstate travelers by reason of the Commerce Claus e.\n\nDecided December 14\, 1964 (argued October 5\, 1964).\nOpinion of th e Court: Thomas Campbell Clark /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ev ents/thomas-campbell-clark\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil righ ts.\n\nHeart of Atlanta Motel\, Inc. v. United States\, 379 U.S. 241 (1964 )\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holdi ng that the Commerce Clause gave the U.S. Congress power to force private businesses to abide by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964\, which pr ohibits discrimination on the basis of race\, religion\, or national origi n in public accommodations.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heart_of_Atla nta_Motel%2C_Inc._v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Heart of Atlanta Motel\, Inc. v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:katzenbach-v-mcclung DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19641214 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19641215 DESCRIPTION:The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends t o a restaurant that is not patronized by interstate travelers but which se rves food that has moved in interstate commerce. This ruling makes the Civ il Rights Act of 1964 apply to virtually all businesses.\n\nDecided Decemb er 14\, 1964 (argued October 5\, 1964).\nOpinion of the Court: Thomas Camp bell Clark /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thomas-campbell -clark\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\nKatzenbach v. McClung\, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Suprem e Court which unanimously held that Congress acted within its power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in forbidding racial discrimination in restaurants as this was a burden to interstate commerce .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katzenbach_v._McClung SUMMARY:⚖️ Katzenbach v. McClung END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:south-carolina-v-katzenbach DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660308 DESCRIPTION:The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided March 7\, 19 66 (argued 1966).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fifteen th Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendme nt-15\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\nSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach\, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)\, is a landmark decision of the Unite d States Supreme Court that rejected a challenge from the state of South C arolina to the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965\, which required that some states submit changes in election districts to th e attorney general of the United States. The preclearance provisions were ruled constitutional and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enforced in ful l.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Carolina_v._Katzenbach SUMMARY:⚖️ South Carolina v. Katzenbach END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:katzenbach-v-morgan DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660613 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660614 DESCRIPTION:Congress may enact laws stemming from Section 5 of the Fourteen th Amendment that increase the rights of citizens beyond what the judiciar y has recognized.\n\nDecided June 13\, 1966 (argued April 18\, 1966).\nOpi nion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteent h Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendmen t-14\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\nKatzenbach v. M organ\, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the power of Congress\, pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment\, to enact laws that enforce and interpret provisions of the Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katzenbac h_v._Morgan SUMMARY:⚖️ Katzenbach v. Morgan END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:jones-v-alfred-h-mayer-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680617 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680618 DESCRIPTION:Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes\, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866\, is constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment and prohib its all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property.\n\nDecide d June 17\, 1968 (argued 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: Ha rlan.\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\nJones v. Alfre d H. Mayer Co.\, 392 U.S. 409 (1968)\, is a landmark case in which the Uni ted States Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate the sale of pri vate property to prevent racial discrimination: "[42 U.S.C. § 1982] ba rs all racial discrimination\, private as well as public\, in the sale or rental of property\, and that the statute\, thus construed\, is a valid ex ercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment."\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jones_v._Alfred_H._Mayer_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:city-of-boerne-v-flores DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970626 DESCRIPTION:Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit Congress to substantially increase the scope of the rights determined by the judici ary. Congress may only enact remedial or preventative measures that are co nsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment interpretations of the Supreme Cour t.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1997 (argued February 19\, 1997).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ant hony-kennedy\nDissenting: O'Connor\, Souter\, Breyer.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-a mendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil r ights.\n\nCity of Boerne v. Flores\, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)\, is a landmark d ecision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the scope of Congress's power of enforcement under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmen t. The case also had a significant impact on historic preservation.\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_Boerne_v._Flores SUMMARY:⚖️ City of Boerne v. Flores END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:shelby-county-v-holder DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20130625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20130626 DESCRIPTION:Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 () is unconstitution al\; its coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 19 65\, which contains the coverage formula that determines which state and l ocal jurisdictions are subjected to federal preclearance from the Departme nt of Justice before implementing any changes to their voting laws or prac tices based on their histories of racial discrimination in voting\, is unc onstitutional because it no longer reflects current societal conditions.\n \nDecided June 25\, 2013 (argued February 27\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Cour t: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-rober ts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nAppli ed: the Fifteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-15\nTopic: Power of Congress to enforce civil rights.\n\ nShelby County v. Holder\, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the constitutionality of two provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Section 5\, which requir es certain states and local governments to obtain federal preclearance bef ore implementing any changes to their voting laws or practices\; and subse ction (b) of Section 4\, which contains the coverage formula that determin es which jurisdictions are subject to preclearance based on their historie s of racial discrimination in voting.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/She lby_County_v._Holder SUMMARY:⚖️ Shelby County v. Holder END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:pierson-v-ray DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670411 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670412 DESCRIPTION:Police officers are protected from being sued for civil rights violations under Section 1983 by the doctrine of qualified immunity.\n\nDe cided April 11\, 1967 (argued January 11\, 1967).\nOpinion of the Court: E arl Warren /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chi ef-justice\nDissenting: Douglas.\nTopic: Immunity from civil rights violat ions.\n\nPierson v. Ray\, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)\, was a United States Suprem e Court case in which the Court first introduced the justification for qua lified immunity for police officers from being sued for civil rights viola tions under Section 1983\, by arguing that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause\, and being mulcted in d amages if he does."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierson_v._Ray SUMMARY:⚖️ Pierson v. Ray END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:stump-v-sparkman DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780328 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780329 DESCRIPTION:A judge will not be deprived of judicial immunity because the a ction he took was in error\, was done maliciously\, or was in excess of hi s authority. He will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.\n\nDecided March 28\, 1978 (argued Jan uary 10\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Stewart\, Powell.\nTopi c: Immunity from civil rights violations.\n\nStump v. Sparkman\, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)\, is the leading United States Supreme Court decision on judici al immunity. It involved an Indiana judge who was sued by a young woman wh o had been sterilized without her knowledge as a minor in accordance with the judge's order. The Supreme Court held that the judge was immune from b eing sued for issuing the order because it was issued as a judicial functi on. The case has been called one of the most controversial in recent Supre me Court history.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stump_v._Sparkman SUMMARY:⚖️ Stump v. Sparkman END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:monell-v-department-of-social-services-of-the-city-of-new-york DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780606 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780607 DESCRIPTION:Municipalities can be held liable for violations of Constitutio nal rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. §1983 claims against munici pal entities must be based on implementation of a policy or custom.\n\nDec ided June 6\, 1978 (argued November 2\, 1977).\nOpinion of the Court: Will iam J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-b rennan\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/ calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Immunit y from civil rights violations.\n\nMonell v. Department of Social Services \, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)\, is an opinion given by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape by holding that a local government is a "person" subject to suit under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code: Civil action for deprivation of rights. Additiona lly\, the Court held that §1983 claims against municipal entities must be based on implementation of a policy or custom.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Monell_v._Department_of_Social_Services_of_the_City_of_New_York SUMMARY:⚖️ Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New Y ork END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:griswold-v-connecticut DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19650607 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19650608 DESCRIPTION:A Connecticut law that criminalizes the use of contraception by married couples is unconstitutional because all Americans have a constitu tionally protected right to privacy.\n\nDecided June 7\, 1965 (argued 1965 ).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /travel/calendars/supreme-cou rt-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDissenting: Black\, Stewart.\nApplie d: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-1\nApplied: the Third Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitu tional-amendments/events/amendment-3\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-5\nApplied: the Ninth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional- amendments/events/amendment-9\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/c alendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Birth co ntrol and abortion.\n\nGriswold v. Connecticut\, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled tha t the Constitution of the United States protects the liberty of married co uples to use contraceptives without government restriction. The case invol ved a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of "any drug\, medicinal art icle or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception". The court he ld that the statute was unconstitutional\, and that its effect was "to den y disadvantaged citizens ... access to medical assistance and up-to-date information in respect to proper methods of birth control." By a vote of 7 –2\, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on the grounds that it violat ed the "right to marital privacy"\, establishing the basis for the right t o privacy with respect to intimate practices. This and other cases view th e right to privacy as "protected from governmental intrusion".\n\nhttps:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griswold_v._Connecticut SUMMARY:⚖️ Griswold v. Connecticut END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:eisenstadt-v-baird DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720322 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720323 DESCRIPTION:A Massachusetts law that criminalizes the use of contraception by unmarried couples violates the right to privacy established in Griswold as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDe cided March 22\, 1972 (argued 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Bre nnan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDi ssenting: Burger.\nApplied: the Ninth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-9\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic : Birth control and abortion.\n\nEisenstadt v. Baird\, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) \, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that established the r ight of unmarried people to possess contraception on the same basis as mar ried couples.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenstadt_v._Baird SUMMARY:⚖️ Eisenstadt v. Baird END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:roe-v-wade-2fc636 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19730122 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19730123 DESCRIPTION:Laws that restrict a woman's ability to have an abortion prior to viability are unconstitutional. Most restrictions during the first trim ester are prohibited\, and only health-related restrictions are permitted during the second trimester. (Partially overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and fully overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organ ization (2022))\n\nDecided January 22\, 1973 (argued December 13\, 1971).\ nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/harry-blackmun\nDissenting: White\, Rehnquist.\nOverruled by P lanned Parenthood v. Casey (1992\, in part)\; Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Hea lth Organization (2022\, in full) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court -decisions/events/planned-parenthood-v-casey /travel/calendars/landmark-su preme-court-decisions/events/dobbs-v-jackson-women-s-health-organization\n Applied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amen dments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nRoe v. W ade\, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)\, was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Co urt in which the Court ruled that the Constitution of the United States pr otected the right of pregnant women to choose to have an abortion before t he point of fetal viability. The decision struck down many state abortion laws\, and it sparked an ongoing abortion debate in the United States abou t whether\, or to what extent\, abortion should be legal\, who should deci de the legality of abortion\, and what the role of moral and religious vie ws in the political sphere should be. The decision also shaped debate conc erning which methods the Supreme Court should use in constitutional adjudi cation. Amid years of sustained opposition from the anti-abortion movement and many legal conservatives\, the Supreme Court overruled Roe in 2022 in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Roe_v._Wade SUMMARY:⚖️ Roe v. Wade END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:carey-v-population-services-international DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19770609 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19770610 DESCRIPTION:Laws that restrict the sale\, distribution\, and advertisement of contraception to both adults and minors are unconstitutional.\n\nDecide d June 9\, 1977 (argued January 10\, 1977).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-bren nan\nDissenting: Burger\, Rehnquist.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel /calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the F ourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-14\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nCarey v. Population Se rvices International\, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court held that it was unconstitutional t o prohibit anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute nonprescr iption contraceptives to persons 16 years of age or over\, to prohibit the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives by any adult to minors und er 16 years of age\, and to prohibit anyone\, including licensed pharmacis ts\, to advertise or display contraceptives.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Carey_v._Population_Services_International SUMMARY:⚖️ Carey v. Population Services International END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:planned-parenthood-v-casey DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19920629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19920630 DESCRIPTION:A woman is still able to have an abortion before viability\, bu t several restrictions are now permitted during the first trimester. The s trict trimester framework of Roe is discarded and replaced with the more f lexible "undue burden test". (Overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022))\n\nDecided June 29\, 1992 (argued April 22\, 1992).\ nOpinion of the Court: O'Connor\, Kennedy\, and Souter (Parts I\, II\, III \, V-A\, V-C\, and VI)\nOverruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organ ization (2022) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/d obbs-v-jackson-women-s-health-organization\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-14\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nPlanned Parentho od v. Casey\, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)\, was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court upheld the right to have an aborti on as established by the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade (1973) and iss ued as its "key judgment" the restoration of the undue burden standard whe n evaluating state-imposed restrictions on that right.\n\nhttps://en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Planned_Parenthood_v._Casey SUMMARY:⚖️ Planned Parenthood v. Casey END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:stenberg-v-carhart DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20000629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20000630 DESCRIPTION:Laws that ban partial-birth abortion are unconstitutional if th ey do not make an exception for the woman's health or if they cannot be re asonably construed to apply only to the partial-birth abortion procedure a nd not to other abortion methods.\n\nDecided June 29\, 2000 (argued April 25\, 2000).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/stephen-breyer\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Scalia\, K ennedy.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\ nStenberg v. Carhart\, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)\, was a landmark decision of th e United States Supreme Court dealing with a Nebraska law which made perfo rming "partial-birth abortion" illegal\, without regard for the health of the mother. Nebraska physicians who performed the procedure contrary to th e law were subject to having their medical licenses revoked. The Court str uck down the law\, finding the Nebraska statute criminalizing "partial bir th abortion[s]" violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Const itution\, as interpreted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Roe v. Wade.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stenberg_v._Carhart SUMMARY:⚖️ Stenberg v. Carhart END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gonzales-v-carhart DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20070418 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20070419 DESCRIPTION:The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is constitutional be cause it is less ambiguous than the law that was struck down in Stenberg. It is not vague or overbroad\, and it does not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.\n\nDecided April 18\, 2007 ( argued November 8\, 2006).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/ calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Ginsb urg.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-ame ndments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nGonzales v. Carhart\, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Sup reme Court that upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. The cas e reached the high court after U.S. Attorney General\, Alberto Gonzales\, appealed a ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in f avor of LeRoy Carhart that struck down the Act. Also before the Supreme Co urt was the consolidated appeal of Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\, whose ruling had the same e ffect as that of the Eighth Circuit.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonz ales_v._Carhart SUMMARY:⚖️ Gonzales v. Carhart END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:whole-woman-s-health-v-hellerstedt DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160628 DESCRIPTION:Clarified the undue burden standard\,- which was developed in t he 1983 case City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and app lied in the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey. (Overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022))\n\nDecided June 27\, 2016 (arg ued March 2\, 2016).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/stephen-breyer\nDissenting: Thomas\, Alit o.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional- amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nWhol e Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt\, 579 U.S. 582 (2016)\, was a landmark dec ision of the United States Supreme Court announced on June 27\, 2016. The Court ruled 5–3 that Texas cannot place restrictions on the delivery of abortion services that create an undue burden for women seeking an abortio n. On June 28\, 2016\, the Supreme Court refused to hear challenges from W isconsin and Mississippi where federal appeals courts had enjoined the enf orcement of similar laws.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whole_Woman%27s _Health_v._Hellerstedt SUMMARY:⚖️ Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:dobbs-v-jackson-women-s-health-organization DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220625 DESCRIPTION:The constitution does not confer a right to abortion\, overruli ng both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.\n\nDecided June 24\, 2022 (argued December 1\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alito /trav el/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting: Breye r\, Sotomayor\, Kagan.\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us- constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nApplied: the Fourteenth Ame ndment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\ nTopic: Birth control and abortion.\n\nDobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org anization\, 597 U.S. 215 (2022)\, is a landmark decision of the United Sta tes Supreme Court in which the court held that the United States Constitut ion does not confer a right to abortion. The court's decision overruled bo th Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)\, recognizing the authority of state governments to regulate any aspect of abortion tha t federal law does not preempt.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobbs_v._ Jackson_Women%27s_Health_Organization SUMMARY:⚖️ Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cruzan-v-director-missouri-department-of-health DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19900625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19900626 DESCRIPTION:When a family has requested the termination of life-sustaining treatments for their vegetative relative\, the state may constitutionally oppose this request if there is a lack of evidence of a clear earlier wish by said relative.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1990 (argued December 6\, 1989).\n Opinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nDissenting: Brennan\, Steve ns.\nApplied: the Ninth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amen dments/events/amendment-9\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calen dars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: End of life. \n\nCruzan v. Director\, Missouri Department of Health\, 497 U.S. 261 (199 0)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States invo lving a young adult incompetent. The first "right to die" case ever heard by the Court\, Cruzan was argued on December 6\, 1989\, and decided on Jun e 25\, 1990. In a 5–4 decision\, the Court affirmed the earlier ruling o f the Supreme Court of Missouri and ruled in favor of the State of Missour i\, finding it was acceptable to require "clear and convincing evidence" o f a patient's wishes for removal of life support. A significant outcome of the case was the creation of advance health directives.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Cruzan_v._Director%2C_Missouri_Department_of_Health SUMMARY:⚖️ Cruzan v. Director\, Missouri Department of Health END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:washington-v-glucksberg DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970627 DESCRIPTION:Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide is constitutional. \n\nDecided June 26\, 1997 (argued January 8\, 1997).\nOpinion of the Cour t: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/willi am-rehnquist-chief-justice\nTopic: End of life.\n\nWashington v. Glucksber g\, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court \, which unanimously held that a right to assisted suicide was not protect ed by the Due Process Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_ v._Glucksberg SUMMARY:⚖️ Washington v. Glucksberg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:vacco-v-quill DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970627 DESCRIPTION:New York's prohibition on assisted suicide does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided June 26\, 1997 (argued January 8\, 19 97).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteen th Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendme nt-14\nTopic: End of life.\n\nVacco v. Quill\, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the right to die. It ruled 9–0 that a ban in the State of New York ban on ph ysician-assisted suicide was constitutional and that preventing doctors fr om assisting their patients\, even those terminally ill and/or in great pa in\, was a legitimate state interest that was well within the authority of the state to regulate. In brief\, this decision established that\, as a m atter of law\, there was no constitutional guarantee of a "right to die."\ n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vacco_v._Quill SUMMARY:⚖️ Vacco v. Quill END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gonzales-v-oregon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20060117 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20060118 DESCRIPTION:The Controlled Substances Act does not prevent physicians from being able to prescribe the drugs needed to perform assisted suicides unde r state law.\n\nDecided January 17\, 2006 (argued October 5\, 2005).\nOpin ion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Scalia\, Thomas.\nTopic: End of life. \n\nGonzales v. Oregon\, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)\, is a landmark decision of t he US Supreme Court which ruled that the United States Attorney General ca nnot enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act against physicians who prescribed drugs\, in compliance with Oregon state law\, to terminally ill patients seeking to end their lives\, commonly referred to as assisted su icide. It was the first major case heard by the Roberts Court under the ne w Chief Justice of the United States.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gon zales_v._Oregon SUMMARY:⚖️ Gonzales v. Oregon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:elk-v-wilkins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18841103 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18841104 DESCRIPTION:The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not giv e citizenship at birth to Native Americans born on Indian reservations.\n\ nDecided November 3\, 1884 (argued April 28\, 1884).\nOpinion of the Court : Horace Gray /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/horace-gray\ nDissenting: Harlan.\nTopic: Citizenship.\n\nElk v. Wilkins\, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that held that Native Americans born on Indian reservations were not entit led to birthright citizenship under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteen th Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Elk_v._Wilkins SUMMARY:⚖️ Elk v. Wilkins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-wong-kim-ark DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18980328 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18980329 DESCRIPTION:With only a few narrow exceptions\, every person born in the Un ited States acquires United States citizenship at birth via the Citizenshi p Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided March 28\, 1898 (argued M arch 5\, 1897).\nOpinion of the Court: Horace Gray /travel/calendars/supre me-court-justices/events/horace-gray\nDissenting: Fuller.\nApplied: the Fo urteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/a mendment-14\nTopic: Citizenship.\n\nUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark\, 169 U. S. 649 (1898)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which held that "a child born in the United States\, of parents of Chinese descent\, who\, at the time of his birth\, are subjects of the Emp eror of China\, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United States\, and are there carrying on business\, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China" became "at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States by virtue of the first c lause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution."\n\nhttps://en.wiki pedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Wong_Kim_Ark SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Wong Kim Ark END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:afroyim-v-rusk DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670529 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670530 DESCRIPTION:The right of citizenship is protected by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress has no power under the Constitution to revoke the American citizenship of any person unless the person relinq uishes it voluntarily.\n\nDecided May 29\, 1967 (argued February 20\, 1967 ).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justi ces/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-14\nTopic: Citizenship.\n\nAfroyim v. Rusk\, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States\ , which ruled that citizens of the United States may not be deprived of th eir citizenship involuntarily. The U.S. government had attempted to revoke the citizenship of Beys Afroyim\, a man born in Poland\, because he had c ast a vote in an Israeli election after becoming a naturalized U.S. citize n. \nThe Supreme Court decided that Afroyim's right to retain his citizens hip was guaranteed by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the Constitution. In so doing\, the Court struck down a federal law mand ating loss of U.S. citizenship for voting in a foreign election—thereby overruling one of its own precedents\, Perez v. Brownell (1958)\, in which it had upheld loss of citizenship under similar circumstances less than a decade earlier.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afroyim_v._Rusk SUMMARY:⚖️ Afroyim v. Rusk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:crandall-v-nevada DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18680316 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18680317 DESCRIPTION:Freedom of movement between states is a fundamental right\; a s tate cannot inhibit people from leaving it by imposing a tax on doing so.\ n\nDecided March 16\, 1868 (argued February 19\, 1868).\nOpinion of the Co urt: Samuel Freeman Miller /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events /samuel-freeman-miller\nTopic: Freedom of movement.\n\nCrandall v. Nevada\ , 73 U.S. 35 (1868)\, was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court that affirmed that a state cannot inhibit people from leaving the state by tax ing them.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crandall_v._Nevada SUMMARY:⚖️ Crandall v. Nevada END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-wheeler-1920 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19201213 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19201214 DESCRIPTION:The Constitution grants to the states the power to prosecute in dividuals for wrongful interference with the right to travel.\n\nDecided D ecember 13\, 1920 (argued April 28\, 1920).\nOpinion of the Court: White\n Dissenting: Clarke.\nTopic: Freedom of movement.\n\nUnited States v. Wheel er\, 254 U.S. 281 (1920)\, was an 8-to-1 landmark decision of the US Supre me Court that held that the Constitution alone does not grant the federal government the power to prosecute kidnappers\, even if moving abductees ac ross state lines on federally-regulated railroads at the behest of local l aw enforcement officials\, and only the states have the authority to punis h a private citizen's unlawful violation of another's freedom of movement. The case was a landmark interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities C lause of the Constitution\, and contains a classic legal statement of the right to travel which continues to undergird American jurisprudence.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Wheeler_%281920%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Wheeler (1920) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:edwards-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19411124 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19411125 DESCRIPTION:A state cannot prohibit indigent people from moving into it.\n\ nDecided November 24\, 1941 (argued 1941).\nOpinion of the Court: James F. Byrnes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/james-f-byrnes\nTo pic: Freedom of movement.\n\nEdwards v. People of State of California\, 31 4 U.S. 160 (1941)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case where a California law prohibiting the bringing of a non-resident "indigent perso n" into the state was struck down as unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Edwards_v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Edwards v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:kent-v-dulles DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19580616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19580617 DESCRIPTION:The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the cit izen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendme nt.\n\nDecided June 16\, 1958 (argued April 10\, 1958).\nOpinion of the Co urt: William O. Douglas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/wi lliam-o-douglas\nDissenting: Clark.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/ calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Freedom of movement.\n\nKent v. Dulles\, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)\, is a landmark decis ion of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the court held that the government violated the right to travel and First Amendment free speech rights when i t suspended people's passports based on their political speech. It was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court made a distinction between the constitutionally protected substantive due process freedom of movement an d the right to travel abroad.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_v._Dul les SUMMARY:⚖️ Kent v. Dulles END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:aptheker-v-secretary-of-state DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19640622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19640623 DESCRIPTION:Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950\, wh ich makes it a crime for any member of a communist organization to attempt to use or obtain a passport\, is an unconstitutional abridgment of the ri ght to travel.\n\nDecided June 22\, 1964 (argued April 21\, 1964).\nOpinio n of the Court: Arthur Goldberg /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/e vents/arthur-goldberg\nDissenting: Clark.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /t ravel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Fr eedom of movement.\n\nAptheker v. Secretary of State\, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) \, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on the right to travel a nd passport restrictions as they relate to Fifth Amendment due process rig hts and First Amendment free speech\, freedom of assembly and freedom of a ssociation rights. It is the first case in which the US Supreme Court cons idered the constitutionality of personal restrictions on the right to trav el abroad.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aptheker_v._Secretary_of_State SUMMARY:⚖️ Aptheker v. Secretary of State END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-guest DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660328 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660329 DESCRIPTION:There is a constitutional right to travel from state to state\, and the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to citizens who su ffer deprivations of their rights at the hands of a private conspiracy whe re there is state participation in the conspiracy\, no matter how minimal. \n\nDecided March 28\, 1966 (argued November 9\, 1965).\nOpinion of the Co urt: Potter Stewart /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/potter -stewart\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitut ional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of movement.\n\nUnite d States v. Guest\, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court authored by Justice Potter Stewart\, in which the court ext ended the protection of the 14th Amendment to citizens who suffer rights d eprivations at the hands of private conspiracies\, where there is minimal state participation in the conspiracy. The Court also held that there is a Constitutional right to travel from state to state.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Guest SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Guest END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:shapiro-v-thompson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19690421 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19690422 DESCRIPTION:The fundamental right to travel and the Equal Protection Clause forbid a state from reserving welfare benefits only for persons that have resided in the state for at least one year.\n\nDecided April 21\, 1969 (a rgued May 1\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Warren \, Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constit utional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of movement.\n\nSha piro v. Thompson\, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)\, is a landmark decision of the Sup reme Court of the United States that invalidated state durational residenc y requirements for public assistance and helped establish a fundamental "r ight to travel" in U.S. law. Shapiro was a part of a set of three welfare cases all heard during the 1968–69 term by the Supreme Court\, alongside Harrell v. Tobriner and Smith v. Reynolds. Additionally\, Shapiro\, King v. Smith (1968)\, and Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) comprise the "Welfare Cases "\, a set of successful Supreme Court cases that dealt with welfare.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shapiro_v._Thompson SUMMARY:⚖️ Shapiro v. Thompson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:saenz-v-roe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19990517 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19990518 DESCRIPTION:A California law that limits new residents' benefits for the fi rst year they live in the state is an unconstitutional violation of their right to travel.\n\nDecided May 17\, 1999 (argued January 13\, 1999).\nOpi nion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justi ces/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Thomas.\nTopic: Free dom of movement.\n\nSáenz v. Roe\, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)\, is a landmark ca se in which the Supreme Court of the United States discussed whether there is a constitutional right to travel from one state to another. The case w as a reaffirmation of the principle that citizens select states and not th e other way around.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saenz_v._Roe SUMMARY:⚖️ Saenz v. Roe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:jackson-v-indiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720607 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720608 DESCRIPTION:A state violates due process by involuntarily committing a crim inal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of the ir permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against them .\n\nDecided June 7\, 1972 (argued November 18\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Co urt: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/harry- blackmun\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutiona l-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel /calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Restri ctions on involuntary commitment.\n\nJackson v. Indiana\, 406 U.S. 715 (19 72)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that deter mined a U.S. state violated due process by involuntarily committing a crim inal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of his permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackson_v._Indiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Jackson v. Indiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:o-connor-v-donaldson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19750626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19750627 DESCRIPTION:A state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individ ual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by themselves or with th e help of willing and responsible family members or friends.\n\nDecided Ju ne 26\, 1975 (argued January 15\, 1975).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Ste wart /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/potter-stewart\nAppli ed: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/ev ents/amendment-4\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Restrictions on invol untary commitment.\n\nO'Connor v. Donaldson\, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)\, was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in mental health law. It ruled t hat a state cannot constitutionally confine non-dangerous individuals who are capable of surviving safely in freedom by themselves or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. Since the trial cour t jury found\, upon ample evidence\, that petitioner did so confine respon dent\, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that petition er had violated respondent's right to liberty. The case was important in t he deinstitutionalization movement in the United States.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/O%27Connor_v._Donaldson SUMMARY:⚖️ O'Connor v. Donaldson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:addington-v-texas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19790430 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19790501 DESCRIPTION:Clear and convincing evidence is required by the Fourteenth Ame ndment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individu al involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital.\n\nD ecided April 30\, 1979 (argued November 28\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e -burger-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Restrictions on involuntary commitment.\n\nAddington v. Texas\, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court that set the standard for invol untary commitment for treatment by raising the burden of proof required to commit persons for psychiatric treatment from the usual civil burden of p roof of "preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence" .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addington_v._Texas SUMMARY:⚖️ Addington v. Texas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:youngberg-v-romeo DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820618 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820619 DESCRIPTION:Involuntarily committed residents have protected liberty intere sts under the Due Process Clause to reasonably safe conditions of confinem ent\, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints\, and such minimally ade quate training as reasonably may be required by these interests.\n\nDecide d June 18\, 1982 (argued January 11\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell \nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-am endments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Restrictions on involuntary commitmen t.\n\nYoungberg v. Romeo\, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)\, is a landmark United Stat es Supreme Court case regarding the rights of the involuntarily committed and those with intellectual disabilities. Nicholas Romeo had an intellectu al disability with an infant level IQ and was committed to a Pennsylvania state hospital. He was restrained for 9 months straight out of his 11 mont h stay and repeatedly abused. The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circ uit Court of Appeals that involuntarily committed residents had the right to reasonably safe confinement conditions\, no unreasonable body restraint s and the habilitation they reasonably require.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Youngberg_v._Romeo SUMMARY:⚖️ Youngberg v. Romeo END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:compagnie-francaise-de-navigation-a-vapeur-v-louisiana-board-of-health DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19020602 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19020603 DESCRIPTION:A state's police power to enforce quarantine laws extends to re stricting the movements of uninfected individuals.\n\nDecided June 2\, 190 2 (argued 1900).\nOpinion of the Court: White\nDissenting: Brown.\nApplied : the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/ events/amendment-14\nTopic: Public health and safety.\n\nCompagnie Francai se de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health\, 186 U.S. 380 (190 2)\, was a United States Supreme Court case which held constitutional sta te laws requiring the involuntary quarantine of individuals to prevent the spread of disease. Louisiana's quarantine laws\, Justice Edward White sai d\, were a reasonable exercise of the state's police power that conflicted with neither the Dormant Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause of th e Fourteenth Amendment. In dissent\, Justice Henry Billings Brown\, joined by John Marshall Harlan\, agreed that while quarantine laws were constitu tional\, Louisiana's went beyond the scope of the state's authority over i nterstate commerce\, even violating several treaties between the United St ates and other nations.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compagnie_Francai se_de_Navigation_a_Vapeur_v._Louisiana_Board_of_Health SUMMARY:⚖️ Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Boar d of Health END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:jacobson-v-massachusetts DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19050220 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19050221 DESCRIPTION:Individual liberty is not absolute\, and a state's police power must be held to embrace at least such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment to protect public health and safety\, wh ich extends to compulsory vaccination laws.\n\nDecided February 20\, 1905 (argued December 6\, 1904).\nOpinion of the Court: John Marshall Harlan /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-harlan\nDissen ting: Brewer\, Peckham.\nTopic: Public health and safety.\n\nJacobson v. M assachusetts\, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the authority of states to enforce compulsory v accination laws. The Court's decision articulated the view that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to the police power of the state. Jacobson has been invoked in numerous other Supreme Court cases as an exam ple of a baseline exercise of the police power.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Jacobson_v._Massachusetts SUMMARY:⚖️ Jacobson v. Massachusetts END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:zucht-v-king DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19221113 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19221114 DESCRIPTION:School districts can constitutionally exclude unvaccinated stud ents.\n\nDecided November 13\, 1922 (argued October 20\, 1922).\nOpinion o f the Court: Louis Brandeis /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/louis-brandeis\nTopic: Public health and safety.\n\nZucht v. King\, 260 U.S. 174 (1922)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the Unite d States in which the Court unanimously held that public schools could con stitutionally exclude unvaccinated students from attending\, even if there was not an ongoing outbreak. In the case\, the school district of San Ant onio\, Texas enacted an ordinance that prohibited any child from attending a school within the district unless they had been vaccinated against smal lpox. One parent of a student who had been excluded\, Rosalyn Zucht\, sued on the basis that there was not a public health emergency. Justice Louis Brandeis wrote for the unanimous court that requiring students to be vacci nated was a justified use of "police power" to maintain public health and safety.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zucht_v._King SUMMARY:⚖️ Zucht v. King END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:buck-v-bell DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19270502 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19270503 DESCRIPTION:State statutes permitting compulsory sterilization of the unfit \, including the intellectually disabled\, "for the protection and health of the state" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Ame ndment. (Partially overruled by Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) and fully by th e Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990)\n\nDecided May 2\, 1927 (argued April 22\, 1927).\nOpinion of the Court: Oliver Wendell Holmes /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/oliver-wendell-holmes\nDissenting: B utler.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutio nal-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Public health and safety.\n\nBu ck v. Bell\, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)\, is a landmark decision of the United St ates Supreme Court\, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.\, in whi ch the Court ruled that a state statute permitting compulsory sterilizatio n of the unfit\, including the intellectually disabled\, "for the protecti on and health of the state" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite changing a ttitudes about sterilization\, the Supreme Court has never expressly overt urned Buck v. Bell. It is widely believed to have been weakened by Skinner v. Oklahoma\, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)\, which deemed compulsory sterilization of male habitual criminals unconstitutional. Legal scholar and Holmes bio grapher G. Edward White\, in fact\, wrote\, "the Supreme Court has disting uished the case [Buck v. Bell] out of existence". In addition\, federal st atutes\, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with D isabilities Act of 1990\, provide protections for people with disabilities \, defined as both physical and mental impairments.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Buck_v._Bell SUMMARY:⚖️ Buck v. Bell END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:prince-v-massachusetts DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19440131 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19440201 DESCRIPTION:States have broad authority to regulate the actions and treatme nt of children. Parental authority is not absolute and can be permissibly restricted if doing so is in the interests of a child's welfare. While chi ldren share many of the rights of adults\, they face different potential h arms from similar activities. Compulsory vaccination is an example of a fu ndamental police power.\n\nDecided January 31\, 1944 (argued December 14\, 1943).\nOpinion of the Court: Wiley Rutledge /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/wiley-rutledge\nDissenting: Murphy\, Jackson.\nTopic: Public health and safety.\n\nPrince v. Massachusetts\, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) \, was a United States Supreme Court case which held that the government h as broad authority to regulate the actions and treatment of children. Pare ntal authority is not absolute and can be permissibly restricted if doing so is in the interests of a child's welfare. While children share many of the rights of adults\, they face different potential harms from similar ac tivities.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_v._Massachusetts SUMMARY:⚖️ Prince v. Massachusetts END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ex-parte-milligan DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18660403 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18660404 DESCRIPTION:Trying citizens in military courts is unconstitutional when civ ilian courts are still operating. Trial by military tribunal is constituti onal only when there is no power left but the military\, and the military may validly try criminals only as long as is absolutely necessary.\n\nDeci ded April 3\, 1866 (argued March 5\, 1866).\nOpinion of the Court: David D avis /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/david-davis\nTopic: O ther areas.\n\nEx parte Milligan\, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)\, is a landmark decisi on of the U.S. Supreme Court that ruled that the use of military tribunals to try civilians when civil courts are operating is unconstitutional. In Ex parte Milligan\, the Court was unwilling to uphold former President Abr aham Lincoln's assertion of power to use military commissions to try civil ian opponents of the war\, part of the administration's controversial plan to deal with Union dissenters during the American Civil War. Justice Davi d Davis\, who delivered the majority opinion\, stated that "martial rule c an never exist when the courts are open" and confined martial law to areas of "military operations\, where war really prevails"\, and when it was a necessity to provide a substitute for a civil authority that had been over thrown. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and three associate justices filed a separate opinion concurring with the majority in the judgment\, but asser ting that Congress had the power to authorize a military commission\, alth ough it had not done so in Milligan's case.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/Ex_parte_Milligan SUMMARY:⚖️ Ex parte Milligan END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:reid-v-covert DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19570610 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19570611 DESCRIPTION:United States citizens abroad\, even when associated with the m ilitary\, cannot be deprived of the protections of the Constitution and ca nnot be made subject to military jurisdiction.\n\nDecided June 10\, 1957 ( argued May 3\, 1956).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/ supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Clark.\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nReid v. Covert\, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)\, is a 6–2 landmark decisi on of the United States Supreme Court holding that United States citizen c ivilians outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States cann ot be tried by a United States military tribunal\, but instead retain the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution\, in this case\, trial by jury. Additionally\, a plurality of the Court also reaffirmed the president’s ability to enter into international executive agreements\, though it held that such agreements cannot contradict federal law or the C onstitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reid_v._Covert SUMMARY:⚖️ Reid v. Covert END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19770616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19770617 DESCRIPTION:An employer may discharge an employee who observes a seventh-da y sabbath\, and that such employee is not entitled to equal employment opp ortunity protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964\, whic h makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of his religion.\n\nDecided June 16\, 19 77 (argued March 30\, 1977).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Marshall.\n Topic: Other areas.\n\nTrans World Airlines\, Inc. v. Hardison\, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)\, is a landmark decision on religious liberty and employment law . In 1977\, the US Supreme Court held that an employer may discharge an em ployee who observes a seventh-day sabbath\, and that such employee is not entitled to equal employment opportunity protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964\, which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of his r eligion.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans_World_Airlines%2C_Inc._v._ Hardison SUMMARY:⚖️ Trans World Airlines\, Inc. v. Hardison END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:plyler-v-doe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820615 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820616 DESCRIPTION:The government lacks a substantial interest in excluding from K -12 public schools children who were not legally admitted into the country .\n\nDecided June 15\, 1982 (argued December 1\, 1981).\nOpinion of the Co urt: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/wi lliam-j-brennan\nDissenting: Burger.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /t ravel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: O ther areas.\n\nPlyler v. Doe\, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)\, is a landmark decisio n in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education of undocumented immigrant children in the United States and an independent school district's attempt to charg e an annual $1\,000 tuition fee for each student to compensate for lost st ate funding. The Court found that any state restriction imposed on the rig hts afforded to children based on their immigration status must be examine d under an intermediate scrutiny standard to determine whether it furthers a substantial government interest.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plyle r_v._Doe SUMMARY:⚖️ Plyler v. Doe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:weeks-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19140224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19140225 DESCRIPTION:Exclusionary rule\, under which evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution cannot be admitted at trial\, formulated for federal p rosecutions.\n\nDecided February 24\, 1914 (argued 1913).\nOpinion of the Court: William R. Day /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/will iam-r-day\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitution al-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nWeeks v. United States\, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless seizure of i tems from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendm ent to the U.S. Constitution. It also prevented local officers from securi ng evidence by means prohibited under the federal exclusionary rule and gi ving it to their federal colleagues. It was not until the case of Mapp v. Ohio\, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)\, that the exclusionary rule was deemed to appl y to state courts as well.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weeks_v._Unite d_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Weeks v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:silverthorne-lumber-co-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19200126 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19200127 DESCRIPTION:All evidence developed and obtained based on evidence obtained unconstitutionally is "fruit of the poisonous tree" and cannot be used at trial.\n\nDecided January 26\, 1920 (argued December 12\, 1919).\nOpinion of the Court: Holmes\, joined by McKenna\, Day\, Van Devanter\, McReynolds \, Brandeis\, Clark\nDissenting: White\, Pitney.\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nSilverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States\, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)\ , was a U.S. Supreme Court decision in which Silverthorne had attempted to evade paying taxes. Federal agents illegally seized tax books from Silver thorne and created copies of the records. The ruling\, delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.\, was that any evidence obtained\, even indirectly\, f rom an illegal search was inadmissible in court. He reasoned that otherwis e\, police would have an incentive to circumvent the Fourth Amendment to o btain derivatives of the illegally obtained evidence. This precedent later became known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine\," and is an ex tension of the exclusionary rule.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silvert horne_Lumber_Co._v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:olmstead-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19280604 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19280605 DESCRIPTION:The Fourth Amendment's proscription on unreasonable search and seizure does not apply to telephone wiretaps. (Overruled by Katz v. United States (1967))\n\nDecided June 4\, 1928 (argued 1928).\nOpinion of the Co urt: William Howard Taft /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/w illiam-howard-taft-chief-justice\nDissenting: Holmes\, Brandeis\, Butler.\ nOverruled by Katz v. United States\, /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-c ourt-decisions/events/katz-v-united-states\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nApplied : the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-5\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nOlmstead v. United State s\, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)\, was a decision of the Supreme Court of the Unite d States\, on the matter of whether wiretapping of private telephone conve rsations\, conducted by federal agents without a search warrant with recor dings subsequently used as evidence\, constituted a violation of the targe t’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitutio n. In a 5–4 decision\, the Court held that the constitutional rights of a wiretapping target have not been violated.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Olmstead_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Olmstead v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mapp-v-ohio DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19610618 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19610619 DESCRIPTION:Exclusionary rule applied to state prosecutions.\n\nDecided Jun e 18\, 1961 (argued March 29\, 1961).\nOpinion of the Court: Thomas Campbe ll Clark /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thomas-campbell-c lark\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 14\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nMapp v. Ohio\, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)\ , is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule\, which prevents a prosecutor from using evidence th at was obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution \, also applies to the states.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mapp_v._Oh io SUMMARY:⚖️ Mapp v. Ohio END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:schmerber-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660620 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660621 DESCRIPTION:The application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against wa rrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimin ation to searches that intrude into the human body means that police may n ot conduct warrantless blood testing on suspects absent an emergency that justifies acting without a warrant.\n\nDecided June 20\, 1966 (argued Apri l 25\, 1966).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/ supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Warren\, Blac k\, Douglas.\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nSchmerber v. California\, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in w hich the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protect ion against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against sel f-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schme rber\, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police office rs must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise\, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood eviden ce taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Schmerber_v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Schmerber v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:katz-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19671218 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19671219 DESCRIPTION:The Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizure s applies to all places where an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."\n\nDecided December 18\, 1967 (argued October 17\, 1967).\nOp inion of the Court: Potter Stewart /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justice s/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: Black.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nKatz v. United States\, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court redef ined what constitutes a "search" or "seizure" with regard to the Fourth Am endment to the U.S. Constitution. The ruling expanded the Fourth Amendment 's protections from an individual's "persons\, houses\, papers\, and effec ts\," as specified in the Constitution's text\, to include any areas where a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The reasonable expect ation of privacy standard\, now known as the Katz test\, was formulated in a concurring opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan II.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Katz_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Katz v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:terry-v-ohio DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680610 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680611 DESCRIPTION:Police may stop a person if they have a reasonable suspicion th at the person has committed or is about to commit a crime and frisk the su spect for weapons if they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous without violating the Fourth Amendment.\n\nDecided Jun e 10\, 1968 (argued December 12\, 1967).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warre n /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justic e\nDissenting: Douglas.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nApplied: the Fourteenth Am endment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14 \nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nTerry v. Ohio\, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)\, i s a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they re asonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically\, the d ecision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment t o the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizure s when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person\, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspic ion that the person has committed\, is committing\, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have rea sonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerou s." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable f acts\," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Terry_v._Ohio SUMMARY:⚖️ Terry v. Ohio END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mancusi-v-deforte DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680617 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680618 DESCRIPTION:The privacy rights defined in Katz extend to the workplace.\n\n Decided June 17\, 1968 (argued April 25\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Ha rlan\nDissenting: Black\, White.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Ame ndment rights.\n\nMancusi v. DeForte\, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)\, is a decision of the United States Supreme Court on privacy and the Fourth Amendment. I t originated in the lower courts as United States ex rel. Frank DeForte\, appellant v. Vincent R. Mancusi\, Warden of Attica Prison\, Attica\, New Y ork\, appellee\, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner who had exhausted all his state appeals. By a 6–3 margin the Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's reversal of a district court denial of the petition.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma ncusi_v._DeForte SUMMARY:⚖️ Mancusi v. DeForte END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bivens-v-six-unknown-named-agents DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710622 DESCRIPTION:Individuals may sue federal government officials who have viola ted their Fourth Amendment rights even though such a suit is not authorize d by law. The existence of a remedy for the violation is implied from the importance of the right that is violated.\n\nDecided June 21\, 1971 (argue d January 12\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Burge r\, Black\, Blackmun.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us- constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment righ ts.\n\nBivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents\, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)\, was a ca se in which the US Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action exi sted for an individual whose Fourth Amendment protection against unreasona ble search and seizures had been violated by the Federal Bureau of Narcoti cs. The victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the Fo urth Amendment itself despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied by th e importance of the right violated.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biven s_v._Six_Unknown_Named_Agents SUMMARY:⚖️ Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-u-s-district-court DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720620 DESCRIPTION:Government officials must obtain a warrant before beginning ele ctronic surveillance even if domestic security issues are involved. The "i nherent vagueness of the domestic security concept" and the potential for abusing it to quell political dissent make the Fourth Amendment's protecti ons especially important when the government spies on its own citizens.\n\ nDecided June 19\, 1972 (argued February 24\, 1972).\nOpinion of the Court : Powell\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutiona l-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nUnited States v. U.S. District Court\, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)\, also known as the K eith Case\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that upheld\, in a unanimous 8-0 ruling\, the requirements of the Fourth Amend ment in cases of domestic surveillance targeting a domestic threat.\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._U.S._District_Court SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. U.S. District Court END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:illinois-v-gates DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19830608 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19830609 DESCRIPTION:The totality of the circumstances\, rather than a rigid test\, must be used in finding probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.\n\nDeci ded June 8\, 1983 (argued October 10\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: Willi am Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnq uist\nDissenting: Brennan\, Stevens.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nIllinois v. Gates\, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)\, is a Fourt h Amendment case. Gates overruled Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States\, thereby replacing the Aguilar–Spinelli test for probable cause with the "totality of the circumstances" test.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Illinois_v._Gates SUMMARY:⚖️ Illinois v. Gates END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:nix-v-williams DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840611 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840612 DESCRIPTION:Creates the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendm ent\, under which evidence that might otherwise be suppressed as unconstit utionally obtained can be included if the state can demonstrate that it wo uld reasonably have been found in any event.\n\nDecided June 11\, 1984 (ar gued January 18\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDiss enting: Brennan.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n \nNix v. Williams\, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)\, was a U.S. Supreme Court case th at recognized an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule . The exclusionary rule makes some evidence gathered through violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution\, which protects a gainst unreasonable search and seizure\, inadmissible in criminal trials a s "fruit of the poisonous tree". In Nix\, the Court ruled that evidence th at would inevitably have been discovered by law enforcement through legal means remained admissible.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nix_v._William s SUMMARY:⚖️ Nix v. Williams END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-jersey-v-t-l-o DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850115 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850116 DESCRIPTION:The Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches applies to those conducted by public school officials as well as those conducted by l aw enforcement personnel\, but public school officials can use the less st rict standard of reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause.\n\nDecide d January 15\, 1985 (argued March 28\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nApplie d: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/eve nts/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nNew Jersey v. T. L. O. \, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of th e United States which established the standards by which a public school o fficial can search a student in a school environment without a search warr ant\, and to what extent.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Jersey_v._T ._L._O. SUMMARY:⚖️ New Jersey v. T. L. O. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:o-connor-v-ortega DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870331 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870401 DESCRIPTION:In the absence of reasonable workplace policy to the contrary\, the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of public employees\, their belo ngings or workplaces by their superiors if done with reasonable suspicion for administrative reasons.\n\nDecided March 31\, 1987 (argued October 16\ , 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Blackmun.\nAppl ied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nO'Connor v. Ortega\, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision on the Fo urth Amendment rights of government employees with regard to administrativ e searches in the workplace\, during investigations by supervisors for vio lations of employee policy rather than by law enforcement for criminal off enses. It was brought by Magno Ortega\, a doctor at a California state hos pital after his supervisors found allegedly inculpatory evidence in his of fice while he was on administrative leave pending an investigation of alle ged misconduct. Some of what they uncovered was later used to impeach a wi tness who testified on his behalf at the hearing where he unsuccessfully a ppealed his dismissal.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Connor_v._Orte ga SUMMARY:⚖️ O'Connor v. Ortega END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:vernonia-school-district-47j-v-acton DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950622 DESCRIPTION:Schools may implement random drug testing upon students partici pating in school-sponsored athletics.\n\nDecided June 21\, 1995 (argued Ma rch 28\, 1995).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/su preme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: O'Connor.\nApplied : the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-4\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights .\n\nVernonia School District 47J v. Acton\, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)\, was a U .S. Supreme Court decision which upheld the constitutionality of random dr ug testing regimen implemented by the local public schools in Vernonia\, O regon. Under that regimen\, student-athletes were required to submit to ra ndom drug testing before being allowed to participate in sports. During th e season\, 10% of all athletes were selected at random for testing. The Su preme Court held that although the tests were searches under the Fourth Am endment\, they were reasonable in light of the schools' interest in preven ting teenage drug use.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vernonia_School_Di strict_47J_v._Acton SUMMARY:⚖️ Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ohio-v-robinette DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19961118 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19961119 DESCRIPTION:The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to inform a motorist at the end of a traffic stop that they are free to go before s eeking permission to search the motorist's car.\n\nDecided November 18\, 1 996 (argued October 8\, 1996).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-just ice\nDissenting: Stevens.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nOhio v. Robinette\, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)\, was a United States Su preme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does no t require police officers to inform a motorist at the end of a traffic sto p that they are free to go before seeking permission to search the motoris t's car.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_v._Robinette SUMMARY:⚖️ Ohio v. Robinette END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:board-of-education-v-earls DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20020627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20020628 DESCRIPTION:Coercive drug testing imposed by school districts upon students who participate in extracurricular activities does not violate the Fourth Amendment.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2002 (argued March 19\, 2002).\nOpinion o f the Court: Clarence Thomas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/even ts/clarence-thomas\nDissenting: O'Connor\, Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nBoard of Education v. Earls\, 536 U. S. 822 (2002)\, was a case by the Supreme Court of the United States in wh ich the Court held\, 5–4\, that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for public schools to conduct mandatory drug tes ting on students participating in extracurricular activities.\n\nhttps://e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/Board_of_Education_v._Earls SUMMARY:⚖️ Board of Education v. Earls END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:georgia-v-randolph DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20060322 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20060323 DESCRIPTION:Police cannot conduct a warrantless search in a home where one occupant consents and the other objects.\n\nDecided March 22\, 2006 (argue d November 8\, 2005).\nOpinion of the Court: David Souter /travel/calendar s/supreme-court-justices/events/david-souter\nDissenting: Roberts\, Scalia \, Thomas.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutio nal-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nGeor gia v. Randolph\, 547 U.S. 103 (2006)\, is a case in which the U.S. Suprem e Court held that without a search warrant\, police had no constitutional right to search a house where one resident consents to the search while an other resident objects. The Court distinguished this case from the "co-occ upant consent rule" established in United States v. Matlock\, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)\, which permitted one resident to consent in absence of the co-occ upant.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_v._Randolph SUMMARY:⚖️ Georgia v. Randolph END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-jones-2012 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20120123 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20120124 DESCRIPTION:Attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and then using the device t o monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Am endment.\n\nDecided January 23\, 2012 (argued November 8\, 2011).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/eve nts/antonin-scalia\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights. \n\nUnited States v. Jones\, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)\, was a landmark United S tates Supreme Court case in which the court held that installing a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle and using the device to monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Jones_%282012 %29 SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Jones (2012) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:riley-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140626 DESCRIPTION:Police must obtain a warrant in order to search digital informa tion on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.\n\nD ecided June 25\, 2014 (argued April 29\, 2014).\nOpinion of the Court: Joh n Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chi ef-justice\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutio nal-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourth Amendment rights.\n\nRile y v. California\, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)\, is a landmark United States Suprem e Court case in which the court ruled that the warrantless search and seiz ure of the digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitu tional under the Fourth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riley_ v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Riley v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:carpenter-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180623 DESCRIPTION:Government acquisition of cell-site records is a Fourth Amendme nt search\, and\, thus\, generally requires a warrant.\n\nDecided June 22\ , 2018 (argued November 29\, 2017).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\n Dissenting: Kennedy\, Thomas\, Alito.\nApplied: the Fourth Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-4\nTopic: Fourt h Amendment rights.\n\nCarpenter v. United States\, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning the privacy of h istorical cell site location information (CSLI). The Court held that gover nment entities violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion when accessing historical CSLI records containing the physical locatio ns of cellphones without a search warrant.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wik i/Carpenter_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Carpenter v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:powell-v-alabama DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19321107 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19321108 DESCRIPTION:Under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment\, a state mu st inform illiterate defendants charged with a capital crime that they hav e a right to be represented by counsel and must appoint counsel for defend ants who cannot afford to hire a lawyer and give counsel adequate time to prepare for trial.\n\nDecided November 7\, 1932 (argued October 10\, 1932) .\nOpinion of the Court: George Sutherland /travel/calendars/supreme-court -justices/events/george-sutherland\nDissenting: Butler.\nApplied: the Sixt h Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendmen t-6\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional -amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nPowell v. Ala bama\, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court deci sion in which the court reversed the convictions of nine young black teena gers for allegedly raping two white women on a freight train near Scottsbo ro\, Alabama. The majority of the court reasoned that the right to retain and be represented by a lawyer was fundamental to a fair trial and that at least in some circumstances\, the trial judge must inform a defendant of this right. In addition\, if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer\, the co urt must appoint one sufficiently far in advance of trial to permit the la wyer to prepare adequately for the trial.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Powell_v._Alabama SUMMARY:⚖️ Powell v. Alabama END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:betts-v-brady DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19420601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19420602 DESCRIPTION:Indigent defendants may be denied counsel when prosecuted by a state. (Overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright (1963))\n\nDecided June 1\, 1942 (argued 1942).\nOpinion of the Court: Owen Roberts /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/owen-roberts\nDissenting: Black.\nOverruled by G ideon v. Wainwright (1963)}} /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-deci sions/events/gideon-v-wainwright\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourt eenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nBetts v. Brady\, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) \, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that denied counsel to indigent defendants prosecuted by a state. The reinforcement that such a c ase is not to be reckoned as denial of fundamental due process was overrul ed by Gideon v. Wainwright. In the dissent\, Justice Hugo Black opined tha t "A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of f airness and right' which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of con viction merely because of their poverty."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Betts_v._Brady SUMMARY:⚖️ Betts v. Brady END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gideon-v-wainwright DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630318 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630319 DESCRIPTION:All defendants have the right to an attorney and must be provid ed one by the state if they are unable to afford legal counsel.\n\nDecided March 18\, 1963 (argued January 15\, 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo B lack /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-consti tutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nGideo n v. Wainwright\, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)\, is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court d ecision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Cons titution requires U.S. states to provide attorneys to criminal defendants who are unable to afford their own. The case extended the right to counsel \, which had been found under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to impose req uirements on the federal government\, by imposing those requirements upon the states as well.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gideon_v._Wainwright SUMMARY:⚖️ Gideon v. Wainwright END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:escobedo-v-illinois DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19640622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19640623 DESCRIPTION:A person in police custody has the right to speak to an attorne y.\n\nDecided June 22\, 1964 (argued April 29\, 1964).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: Arthur Goldberg /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/arthur -goldberg\nDissenting: Harlan\, Stewart\, White.\nApplied: the Sixth Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nAp plied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nEscobedo v. Illinois \, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)\, is a United States Supreme Court case holding tha t criminal suspects have a right to counsel during police interrogations u nder the Sixth Amendment. The case was decided a year after the court had held in Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent criminal defendants have a righ t to be provided counsel at trial.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escobe do_v._Illinois SUMMARY:⚖️ Escobedo v. Illinois END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:miranda-v-arizona DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660613 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660614 DESCRIPTION:Police must advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Constitution to remain silent\, to consult with a lawyer\, and to have one appointed to them if they are indigent. A police interrogation must stop if the suspect states that they wish to remain silent.\n\nDecided June 13\ , 1966 (argued 1966).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nDissenting: Harl an\, White.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutio nal-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nApplied: the Four teenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ame ndment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nMiranda v. Arizona\, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Cour t ruled that law enforcement must warn a person of their constitutional ri ghts before interrogating them when they are in custody\, or else the pers on's statements cannot be used as evidence against them at their trial. Sp ecifically\, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con stitution\, the government cannot use a person's statements made in respon se to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the r ight to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning\, and of the r ight against self-incrimination before police questioning\, and that the d efendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miranda_v._A rizona SUMMARY:⚖️ Miranda v. Arizona END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:in-re-gault DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670516 DESCRIPTION:Juvenile defendants are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided May 15\, 1967 (argued December 6\, 1966).\nOpinion of the Court: Abe Fortas /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/abe-fortas\nDissenting: Stewart.\nApplied: the Sixth Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nAp plied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nIn re Gault\, 387 U. S. 1 (1967)\, is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision which held the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment applies to juvenile defendants as we ll as to adult defendants. Juveniles accused of crimes in a delinquency pr oceeding must be afforded many of the same due process rights as adults\, such as the right to timely notification of the charges\, the right to con front witnesses\, the right against self-incrimination\, and the right to counsel. The court's opinion was written by Justice Abe Fortas\, a noted p roponent of children's rights.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_re_Gaul t SUMMARY:⚖️ In re Gault END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:goss-v-lopez DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19750122 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19750123 DESCRIPTION:A public school subjecting a student to suspension without cond ucting a hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt.\n\nDecided January 22\, 1975 (argued October 16\, 1974).\nOpinion of t he Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byro n-white\nDissenting: Powell.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nGoss v. Lopez\, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)\, is a landmark United Sta tes Supreme Court case. It held that a public school must conduct a hearin g before subjecting a student to suspension. Also\, a suspension without a hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of th e United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goss_v._Lop ez SUMMARY:⚖️ Goss v. Lopez END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:michigan-v-jackson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860401 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860402 DESCRIPTION:If a police interrogation begins after a defendant asserts thei r right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding\, then any waiv er of that right for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. (Over ruled by Montejo v. Louisiana (2009))\n\nDecided April 1\, 1986 (argued De cember 9\, 1985).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Rehnquist. \nOverruled by {{ussc\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Right to counsel.\n\nM ichigan v. Jackson\, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)\, was a case decided by the Unite d States Supreme Court regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in a police interrogation. In a decision written by Justice Stevens\, the Co urt held that once an accused individual has claimed a right to counsel at a plea hearing or other court proceeding\, a waiver of that right during later police questioning would be invalid unless the accused individual in itiated the communication.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_v._Ja ckson SUMMARY:⚖️ Michigan v. Jackson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:montejo-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20090526 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20090527 DESCRIPTION:A defendant may waive their right to counsel during a police in terrogation even if the interrogation begins after the defendant's asserti on of their right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.\n\nD ecided May 26\, 2009 (argued January 13\, 2009).\nOpinion of the Court: An tonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scali a\nDissenting: Stevens\, Breyer.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Right to co unsel.\n\nMontejo v. Louisiana\, 556 U.S. 778 (2009)\, is a 5–4 decision by the United States Supreme Court that overruled the Court's decision in Michigan v. Jackson. The case concerned the validity of a defendant's wai ver of his right to counsel during a police interrogation. In reversing Ja ckson\, the Court said such a waiver was valid.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Montejo_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Montejo v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:strickland-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840514 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840515 DESCRIPTION:To obtain relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel\, a c riminal defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance g ives rise to a reasonable probability that\, if counsel had performed adeq uately\, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\n\nDecide d May 14\, 1984 (argued January 10\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o- connor\nDissenting: Marshall.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calend ars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Other rights r egarding counsel.\n\nStrickland v. Washington\, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)\, is a landmark Supreme Court case that established the standard for determining when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by that counsel's inadequate performance.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Strickland_v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ Strickland v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:padilla-v-kentucky DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20100331 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20100401 DESCRIPTION:Criminal defense attorneys are duty-bound to inform clients of the risk of deportation under three circumstances. First\, where the law i s unambiguous\, attorneys must advise their criminal clients that deportat ion "will" result from a conviction. Second\, where the immigration conseq uences of a conviction are unclear or uncertain\, attorneys must advise th at deportation "may" result. Finally\, attorneys must give their clients s ome advice about deportation—counsel cannot remain silent about immigrat ion consequences.\n\nDecided March 31\, 2010 (argued October 13\, 2009).\n Opinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Scalia.\nApplied: the Sixth A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6 \nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-am endments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other rights regarding counsel.\n\nPa dilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky\, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)\, is a case in whi ch the United States Supreme Court decided that criminal defense attorneys must advise noncitizen clients about the deportation risks of a guilty pl ea. The case extended the Supreme Court's prior decisions on criminal defe ndants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel to immigration consequences.\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Padilla_v._Kentucky SUMMARY:⚖️ Padilla v. Kentucky END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:berghuis-v-thompkins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20100601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20100602 DESCRIPTION:The right to remain silent does not exist unless a suspect invo kes it unambiguously.\n\nDecided June 1\, 2010 (argued March 1\, 2010).\nO pinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justi ces/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Sotomayor.\nApplied: the Fifth Ame ndment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\n Applied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendment s/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Right to remain silent.\n\nBerghuis v. Thompk ins\, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that\, unless and until a crimi nal suspect explicitly states that they are relying on their right to rema in silent\, their voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to question them. The mere act of remaining silent is not suffic ient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights even when the suspect a ctually intended their silence to have that effect. Furthermore\, a volunt ary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as waiving the right to remain silent.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berghuis_v._Thompkins SUMMARY:⚖️ Berghuis v. Thompkins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:dusky-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19600418 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19600419 DESCRIPTION:A defendant has the right to a competency evaluation before pro ceeding to trial.\n\nDecided April 18\, 1960.\nTopic: Competence.\n\nDusky v. United States\, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)\, was a landmark United States Sup reme Court case in which the Court affirmed a defendant's right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial. The Court outlined the b asic standards for determining competency.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wik i/Dusky_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Dusky v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ford-v-wainwright DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860627 DESCRIPTION:A defendant has the right to a competency evaluation before bei ng executed.\n\nDecided June 26\, 1986 (argued April 22\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: Marshall (parts I and II)\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events /amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Competence.\n\nFord v. Wa inwright\, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)\, is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case tha t upheld the common law rule that the insane cannot be executed\; therefor e the petitioner is entitled to a competency evaluation and to an evidenti ary hearing in court on the question of their competency to be executed.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_v._Wainwright SUMMARY:⚖️ Ford v. Wainwright END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:godinez-v-moran DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19930624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19930625 DESCRIPTION:A defendant who is competent to stand trial is automatically co mpetent to plead guilty or waive the right to legal counsel.\n\nDecided Ju ne 24\, 1993 (argued April 21\, 1993).\nOpinion of the Court: Clarence Tho mas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/clarence-thomas\nDisse nting: Blackmun.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Competence.\n\nGodine z v. Moran\, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)\, is a landmark decision in which the U.S . Supreme Court ruled that if a defendant was competent to stand trial\, t hey were automatically competent to plead guilty\, and thereby waive the p anoply of trial rights\, including the right to counsel.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Godinez_v._Moran SUMMARY:⚖️ Godinez v. Moran END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:sell-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20030616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20030617 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court laid down four criteria for cases involving t he involuntary administration of medication to an incompetent pretrial def endant.\n\nDecided June 16\, 2003 (argued March 3\, 2003).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ste phen-breyer\nDissenting: Scalia.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourt eenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-14\nTopic: Competence.\n\nSell v. United States\, 539 U.S. 166 (2003 )\, is a decision in which the United States Supreme Court imposed stringe nt limits on the right of a lower court to order the forcible administrati on of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant who had been determ ined to be incompetent to stand trial for the sole purpose of making them competent and able to be tried. Specifically\, the court held that lower c ourts could do so only under limited circumstances in which specified crit eria had been met. In the case of Charles Sell\, since the lower court had failed to determine that all the appropriate criteria for court-ordered f orcible treatment had been met\, the order to forcibly medicate the defend ant was reversed.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sell_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Sell v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:rasul-v-bush DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20040628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20040629 DESCRIPTION:The federal court system has the authority to decide if foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully imprisoned.\n\nDecided J une 28\, 2004 (argued April 20\, 2004).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul S tevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\n Dissenting: Scalia.\nTopic: Detention of terrorism suspects.\n\nRasul v. B ush\, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Su preme Court in which the Court held that foreign nationals held in the Gua ntanamo Bay detention camp could petition federal courts for writs of habe as corpus to review the legality of their detention. The Court's 6–3 jud gment on June 28\, 2004\, reversed a D.C. Circuit decision which had held that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to hear any petitions from foreign nationals held in Guantanamo Bay.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasul_v ._Bush SUMMARY:⚖️ Rasul v. Bush END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hamdi-v-rumsfeld DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20040628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20040629 DESCRIPTION:The federal government has the power to detain those it designa tes as enemy combatants\, including United States citizens\, but detainees that are United States citizens must have the rights of due process and t he ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial a uthority.\n\nDecided June 28\, 2004 (argued April 28\, 2004).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ev ents/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Scalia\, Thomas.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment -5\nTopic: Detention of terrorism suspects.\n\nHamdi v. Rumsfeld\, 542 U.S . 507 (2004)\, is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court re cognized the power of the U.S. government to detain enemy combatants\, inc luding U.S. citizens\, but ruled that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have the rights of due process\, and the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial authority.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Hamdi_v._Rumsfeld SUMMARY:⚖️ Hamdi v. Rumsfeld END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hamdan-v-rumsfeld DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20060629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20060630 DESCRIPTION:The military commissions set up by the Bush administration to t ry detainees at Guantanamo Bay detention camp are illegal because they lac k the protections that are required by the Geneva Conventions and the Unif orm Code of Military Justice.\n\nDecided June 29\, 2006 (argued March 28\, 2006).\nOpinion of the Court: Stevens (Parts I through IV\, VI through VI –D–iii\, VI–D–v\, and VII)\nDissenting: Scalia\, Thomas\, Alito.\n Topic: Detention of terrorism suspects.\n\nHamdan v. Rumsfeld\, 548 U.S. 5 57 (2006)\, is a United States Supreme Court case holding that military co mmissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at the Guanta namo Bay detention camp violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions ratified by the U.S.\n\nhttps://en.wiki pedia.org/wiki/Hamdan_v._Rumsfeld SUMMARY:⚖️ Hamdan v. Rumsfeld END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:boumediene-v-bush DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080613 DESCRIPTION:Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 is unconstitu tional because foreign terrorism suspects held at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional right to challenge their detention in United States courts. \n\nDecided June 12\, 2008 (argued December 5\, 2007).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthon y-kennedy\nDissenting: Roberts\, Scalia.\nTopic: Detention of terrorism su spects.\n\nBoumediene v. Bush\, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)\, was a writ of habeas corpus petition made in a civilian court of the United States on behalf o f Lakhdar Boumediene\, a naturalized citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina\, h eld in military detention by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay deten tion camps in Cuba. Guantánamo Bay is not formally part of the United Sta tes\, and under the terms of the 1903 lease between the United States and Cuba\, Cuba retained ultimate sovereignty over the territory\, while the U nited States exercises complete jurisdiction and control. The case was con solidated with habeas petition Al Odah v. United States. It challenged the legality of Boumediene's detention at the United States Naval Station mil itary base in Guantanamo Bay\, Cuba as well as the constitutionality of th e Military Commissions Act of 2006. Oral arguments on the combined cases w ere heard by the Supreme Court on December 5\, 2007.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Boumediene_v._Bush SUMMARY:⚖️ Boumediene v. Bush END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:louisiana-ex-rel-francis-v-resweber DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19470113 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19470114 DESCRIPTION:A condemned person does not suffer double jeopardy when he is e xecuted again after the failure of the first attempt.\n\nDecided January 1 3\, 1947 (argued November 18\, 1946).\nOpinion of the Court: Stanley Forma n Reed /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stanley-forman-reed \nDissenting: Burton.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplie d: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nLouisiana ex rel. Fran cis v. Resweber\, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)\, is a case in which the U.S. Suprem e Court was asked whether imposing capital punishment a second time\, afte r it failed in an attempt to execute Willie Francis in 1946\, constituted a violation of the United States Constitution. The issues raised surrounde d the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment\, and the cruel and un usual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment\, as made applicable to th e State of Louisiana via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendmen t.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_ex_rel._Francis_v._Resweber SUMMARY:⚖️ Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:witherspoon-v-illinois DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680603 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680604 DESCRIPTION:Stacking the jury with only jurors who would choose the death p enalty violates the Sixth Amendment because it is not an impartial jury or a cross-section of the community.\n\nDecided June 3\, 1968 (argued April 24\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: Black\, White.\nApplie d: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\n Witherspoon v. Illinois\, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)\, was a U.S. Supreme Court c ase where the court ruled that a state statute providing the state unlimit ed challenge for cause of jurors who might have any objection to the death penalty violated the constitutional right to an impartial jury.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witherspoon_v._Illinois SUMMARY:⚖️ Witherspoon v. Illinois END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:furman-v-georgia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720630 DESCRIPTION:The arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constitutes cruel and un usual punishment. This decision initiates a nationwide de facto moratorium on executions that lasts until the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. G eorgia (1976).\n\nDecided June 29\, 1972 (argued January 17\, 1972).\nDiss enting: Burger\, Blackmun\, Powell.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel /calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the F ourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nFurman v. Georgia\, 408 U.S. 2 38 (1972)\, was a landmark criminal case in which the United States Suprem e Court decided that arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death pe nalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments\, and constitutes crue l and unusual punishment. It was a per curiam decision. Five justices each wrote separately in support of the decision. Although the justices did no t rule that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional\, the Furman dec ision invalidated the death sentences of nearly 700 people. The decision m andated a degree of consistency in the application of the death penalty. T his case resulted in a de facto moratorium of capital punishment throughou t the United States. Dozens of states rewrote their death penalty laws\, m ost of which were upheld in the 1976 case Gregg v. Georgia.\n\nhttps://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Furman_v._Georgia SUMMARY:⚖️ Furman v. Georgia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:jurek-v-texas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760703 DESCRIPTION:Texas's new death penalty statute is constitutional because it uses a three-part test to determine if a death sentence should be imposed. \n\nDecided July 2\, 1976 (argued 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\ nDissenting: Brennan\, Marshall.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the Four teenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ame ndment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nGregg v. Georgia\, Proffitt v. Fl orida\, Jurek v. Texas\, Woodson v. North Carolina\, and Roberts v. Louisi ana\, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Su preme Court. It reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States\, upholding\, in particular\, the death sente nce imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. The set of cases is referred to by a leadi ng scholar as the July 2 Cases\, and elsewhere referred to by the lead cas e Gregg. The court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban o n "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended the de f acto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 deci sion in Furman v. Georgia (1972). Justice Brennan's dissent said that "The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves\, by its very n ature\, a denial of the executed person's humanity [...] An executed pers on has indeed 'lost the right to have rights.'"\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Jurek_v._Texas SUMMARY:⚖️ Jurek v. Texas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:roberts-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760703 DESCRIPTION:Louisiana's new death penalty statute is unconstitutional becau se it calls for a mandatory death sentence for a large range of crimes.\n\ nDecided July 2\, 1976 (argued 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Ste vens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDi ssenting: Brennan\, Marshall.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calen dars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourtee nth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nGregg v. Georgia\, Proffitt v. Flori da\, Jurek v. Texas\, Woodson v. North Carolina\, and Roberts v. Louisiana \, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supre me Court. It reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the use of the death pen alty in the United States\, upholding\, in particular\, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. The set of cases is referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases\, and elsewhere referred to by the lead case G regg. The court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing pr ocedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on " cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended the de fact o moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decisio n in Furman v. Georgia (1972). Justice Brennan's dissent said that "The ca lculated killing of a human being by the State involves\, by its very natu re\, a denial of the executed person's humanity [...] An executed person has indeed 'lost the right to have rights.'"\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Roberts_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Roberts v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:coker-v-georgia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19770629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19770630 DESCRIPTION:A death sentence may not be imposed for the crime of rape.\n\nD ecided June 29\, 1977 (argued March 28\, 1977).\nOpinion of the Court: Byr on White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDiss enting: Burger.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-consti tutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nCoker v. Georgia\, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) was a Unite d States Supreme Court decision which held that the death penalty for rape of an adult was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment\, and t herefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitut ion.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coker_v._Georgia SUMMARY:⚖️ Coker v. Georgia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:enmund-v-florida DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820703 DESCRIPTION:A death sentence may not be imposed on offenders who are involv ed in a felony during which a murder is committed but who do not actually kill\, attempt to kill\, or intend that a killing take place.\n\nDecided J uly 2\, 1982 (argued March 23\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: O 'Connor.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutiona l-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nEnmund v. F lorida\, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)\, is a United States Supreme Court case. It w as a 5–4 decision in which the United States Supreme Court applied its c apital proportionality principle\, to set aside the death penalty for the driver of a getaway car\, in a robbery-murder of an elderly Floridian coup le. The court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty under the fel ony murder rule when the defendant did not intentionally kill the victim c onstituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enmund_v._Flo rida SUMMARY:⚖️ Enmund v. Florida END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:tison-v-arizona DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870421 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870422 DESCRIPTION:The death penalty is an appropriate punishment for a felony mur derer who did not intend to cause the death\, but was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibited a reckless indifference to human li fe.\n\nDecided April 21\, 1987 (argued November 3\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Brennan.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nTison v. Arizona\, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)\, is a Unit ed States Supreme Court case in which the Court qualified the rule it set forth in Enmund v. Florida (1982). Just as in Enmund\, in Tison the Court applied the proportionality principle to conclude that the death penalty w as an appropriate punishment for a felony murderer who was a major partici pant in the underlying felony and exhibited a reckless indifference to hum an life.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tison_v._Arizona SUMMARY:⚖️ Tison v. Arizona END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mccleskey-v-kemp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870422 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870423 DESCRIPTION:Evidence of a "racially-disproportionate impact" in the applica tion of the death penalty indicated by a comprehensive scientific study is not enough to invalidate an individual's death sentence without showing a "racially discriminatory purpose."\n\nDecided April 22\, 1987 (argued Oct ober 15\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: Brennan\, Blac kmun\, Stevens.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\ nMcCleskey v. Kemp\, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)\, is a United States Supreme Cour t case\, in which the death sentence of Warren McCleskey for armed robbery and murder was upheld. The Court said the "racially disproportionate impa ct" in the Georgia death penalty indicated by a comprehensive scientific s tudy was not enough to mitigate a death penalty determination without show ing a "racially discriminatory purpose." McCleskey has been described as t he "most far-reaching post-Gregg challenge to capital sentencing."\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCleskey_v._Kemp SUMMARY:⚖️ McCleskey v. Kemp END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:stanford-v-kentucky DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19890626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19890627 DESCRIPTION:The imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a cri me committed at 16 or 17 years of age does not constitute cruel and unusua l punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Overruled by Roper v. Simmons (2 005))\n\nDecided June 26\, 1989 (argued March 7\, 1989).\nOpinion of the C ourt: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anton in-scalia\nDissenting: Brennan.\nOverruled by {{ussc\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-a mendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nStanford v. K entucky\, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)\, was a United States Supreme Court case tha t sanctioned the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were at least 16 years of age at the time of the crime. This decision came one yea r after Thompson v. Oklahoma\, in which the Court had held that a 15-year- old offender could not be executed because to do so would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_v._Kent ucky SUMMARY:⚖️ Stanford v. Kentucky END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:breard-v-greene DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19980414 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19980415 DESCRIPTION:The International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction i n capital punishment cases that involve foreign nationals.\n\nDecided Apri l 14\, 1998.\nDissenting: Stevens\, Breyer\, Ginsburg.\nTopic: Capital pun ishment.\n\nBreard v. Greene\, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)\, is a United States Su preme Court decision decided on April 14\, 1998. The Court held that Ánge l Francisco Breard would not receive a stay of execution and/or other reli ef under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations\, thus confirming the constitutional law principle that a Senate-ratified treaty may be overrid den by a later domestic statute enacted by Congress.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Breard_v._Greene SUMMARY:⚖️ Breard v. Greene END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:atkins-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20020620 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20020621 DESCRIPTION:A death sentence may not be imposed on intellectually disabled offenders\, but the states can define what it means to be intellectually d isabled.\n\nDecided June 20\, 2002 (argued February 20\, 2002).\nOpinion o f the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ev ents/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Scalia.\nApplied: the Eigh th Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendme nt-8\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nAtkins v. Virginia\, 536 U.S. 304 (200 2)\, is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6–3 that executing people with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments\, but that states can def ine who has an intellectual disability. At the time Atkins was decided\, 1 8 of the 38 death penalty states exempted mentally disabled offenders from the death penalty.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atkins_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Atkins v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:roper-v-simmons DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20050301 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20050302 DESCRIPTION:A death sentence may not be imposed on juvenile offenders.\n\nD ecided March 1\, 2005 (argued October 13\, 2004).\nOpinion of the Court: A nthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-ken nedy\nDissenting: Scalia\, O'Connor.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events /amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nRoper v. Simmons\, 543 U.S. 5 51 (2005)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United Stat es in which the Court held that it is unconstitutional to impose capital p unishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18. The 5–4 decisi on overruled Stanford v. Kentucky\, in which the court had upheld executio n of offenders at or above age 16. Roper overturned statutes in 19 states. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roper_v._Simmons SUMMARY:⚖️ Roper v. Simmons END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:baze-v-rees DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080416 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080417 DESCRIPTION:The three-drug cocktail used for performing executions by letha l injection in Kentucky (as well as virtually all of the states using leth al injection at the time) is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.\n\ nDecided April 16\, 2008 (argued January 7\, 2008).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts -chief-justice\nDissenting: Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Capit al punishment.\n\nBaze v. Rees\, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)\, is a decision by the United States Supreme Court\, which upheld the constitutionality of a par ticular method of lethal injection used for capital punishment.\n\nhttps:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baze_v._Rees SUMMARY:⚖️ Baze v. Rees END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:kennedy-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080626 DESCRIPTION:The death penalty is unconstitutional in all cases that do not involve homicide or crimes against the state such as treason and "drug kin gpin activity".\n\nDecided June 25\, 2008 (argued April 16\, 2008).\nOpini on of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Alito.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nApplied : the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/ events/amendment-14\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nKennedy v. Louisiana\, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the U nited States which held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Puni shments Clause prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a crime i n which the victim did not die and the victim's death was not intended.\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kennedy_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Kennedy v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:glossip-v-gross DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20150629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20150630 DESCRIPTION:The Eighth Amendment requires prisoners to show 1.) there is a known and available alternative method of execution and 2.) the challenged method of execution poses a demonstrated risk of severe pain\, with the b urden of proof resting on the prisoners\, not the state.\n\nDecided June 2 9\, 2015 (argued April 29\, 2015).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alito /tr avel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting: Bre yer\, Sotomayor.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Capital punishment.\n\nGlo ssip v. Gross\, 576 U.S. 863 (2015)\, was a United States Supreme Court ca se in which the Court held\, 5–4\, that lethal injections using midazola m to kill prisoners convicted of capital crimes do not constitute cruel an d unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Const itution. The Court found that condemned prisoners can only challenge their method of execution after providing a known and available alternative met hod.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossip_v._Gross SUMMARY:⚖️ Glossip v. Gross END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:apodaca-v-oregon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720522 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720523 DESCRIPTION:The Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous decision for c onviction in jury trials. (Overruled by Ramos v. Louisiana (2020))\n\nDeci ded May 22\, 1972 (argued March 1\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron Wh ite /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissentin g: Douglas\, Brennan\, Stewart.\nOverruled by Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) /t ravel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/ramos-v-louisiana\ nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendmen ts/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nApodaca v. Oreg on - 406 U.S. 404 (1972) - is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that state juries may convict a defendant by a less-than-un animous verdict in a felony criminal case. The four-justice plurality opin ion of the court\, written by Justice White\, affirmed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals and held that there was no constitutional right t o a unanimous verdict. Although federal law requires federal juries to rea ch criminal verdicts unanimously\, the Court held Oregon's practice did no t violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and so allowed it to continue. In Johnson v. Louisiana\, a case decided on the same day\, the C ourt held that Louisiana's similar practice of allowing criminal convictio ns by a jury vote of 9–3 did not violate due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apodaca_ v._Oregon SUMMARY:⚖️ Apodaca v. Oregon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:morrissey-v-brewer DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720630 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court extended Fourteenth Amendment due process pro tection to the parole revocation process\, hold that the due process claus e of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a "neutral and detached" hearing bo dy such as a parole board to give an evidentiary hearing prior to revoking the parole of a defendant and spelled out the minimum due process require ments for the revocation hearing.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1972 (argued April 11\, 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Dougl as.\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nMorrissey v. Brewer\, 408 U.S. 47 1 (1972)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that people facing parole revocation have due process rights under the Fou rteenth Amendment. The decision requires that the states provide for a hea ring before a "neutral and detached" hearing body\, such as a parole board \, to determine the factual basis for parole violations. This hearing is c olloquially known as a "Morrissey hearing."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/Morrissey_v._Brewer SUMMARY:⚖️ Morrissey v. Brewer END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gagnon-v-scarpelli DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19730514 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19730515 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court issued a substantive ruling regarding the rig hts of individuals in violation of a probation or parole sentence. It held that a previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked. More specifically the Supreme Court held that a pre liminary and final revocation of probation hearings are required by Due Pr ocess\; the judicial body overseeing the revocation hearings shall determi ne if the probationer or parolee requires counsel\; denying representation of counsel must be documented in the record of the Court.\n\nDecided May 14\, 1973 (argued January 9\, 1973).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissen ting: Douglas.\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nGagnon v. Scarpelli\, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)\, was the second substantive ruling by the United Stat es Supreme Court regarding the rights of individuals in violation of a pro bation or parole sentence.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gagnon_v._Scar pelli SUMMARY:⚖️ Gagnon v. Scarpelli END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:wolff-v-mcdonnell DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740627 DESCRIPTION:In administrative proceedings regarding discipline\, prisoners retain some of their due process rights. When a prison disciplinary hearin g might result in the loss of good-time credits\, due process requires tha t the prison notify the prisoner in advance of the hearing\, afford him an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his def ense\, and furnish him with a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reason for the disciplinary action.\n\nDecided June 26\, 1974 (arg ued April 22\, 1974).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendm ent /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTo pic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nWolff v. McDonnell\, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) \, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that pri soners retained some due process rights when incarcerated. In particular\, the Court ruled that due process required that prison disciplinary decisi ons to revoke good-time credits must be accompanied by notification of the inmate\, administrative hearings\, the chance to call witnesses and prese nt evidence\, and a written statement detailing the nature of the offense committed and the evidence for said offense.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Wolff_v._McDonnell SUMMARY:⚖️ Wolff v. McDonnell END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bearden-v-georgia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19830524 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19830525 DESCRIPTION:A sentencing court cannot properly revoke a defendant's probati on for failure to pay a fine and make restitution\, absent evidence and fi ndings that he was somehow responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate to meet the State's interest in punis hment and deterrence.\n\nDecided May 24\, 1983 (argued January 11\, 1983). \nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-cour t-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nBearden v. Georgia\, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)\, wa s a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case holding that a local government can o nly imprison or jail someone for not paying a fine if it can be shown\, by means of a hearing\, that the person in question could have paid it but " willfully" chose not to do so.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bearden_v. _Georgia SUMMARY:⚖️ Bearden v. Georgia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:apprendi-v-new-jersey DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20000626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20000627 DESCRIPTION:Other than the fact of a prior conviction\, any fact that incre ases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nDecided Ju ne 26\, 2000 (argued March 28\, 2000).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul St evens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nD issenting: O'Connor\, Breyer.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calend ars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nApprendi v. New Jersey\, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)\, is a landmar k United States Supreme Court decision with regard to aggravating factors in crimes. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial\ , incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment\, prohi bited judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maxima bas ed on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt . The decision has been a cornerstone in the modern resurgence in jury tri al rights. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion\, the jury-tr ial right "has never been efficient\; but it has always been free."\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apprendi_v._New_Jersey SUMMARY:⚖️ Apprendi v. New Jersey END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:blakely-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20040624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20040625 DESCRIPTION:Mandatory state sentencing guidelines are the statutory maximum for purposes of applying the Apprendi rule.\n\nDecided June 24\, 2004 (ar gued March 23\, 2004).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: O'Connor\, Kennedy\, Breyer.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\ n\nBlakely v. Washington\, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held\, 5–4\, that in the context of mandatory sentencing guidelines under state law\, t he Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based on facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant. The landmark nature of the case was alluded to by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor\, who characterized the decision as a "Numb er 10 earthquake".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blakely_v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ Blakely v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-booker DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20050112 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20050113 DESCRIPTION:Blakely v. Washington applies to the Federal Sentencing Guideli nes and requires all facts that increase the defendant's punishment beyond the Guidelines range applicable to the offense of conviction to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result\, the provision of the f ederal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory is stricken\ , and in imposing sentences\, district courts must instead focus on a broa der range\; appellate courts are to review sentences for "reasonableness." \n\nDecided January 12\, 2005 (argued October 4\, 2004).\nOpinion of the C ourt: Stevens (in part)\nDissenting: Stevens (in part)\, Scalia (in part)\ , Thomas (in part).\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nTopic: Other criminal sentences .\n\nUnited States v. Booker\, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)\, is a United States Su preme Court decision on criminal sentencing. The Court ruled that the Sixt h Amendment right to jury trial requires that other than a prior convictio n\, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed st atutory maximum sentence\, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or bee n convicted at trial. The maximum sentence that a judge may impose is base d upon the facts admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a re asonable doubt.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Booker SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Booker END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:graham-v-florida DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20100517 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20100518 DESCRIPTION:A sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of paro le may not be imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders.\n\nDecided May 1 7\, 2010 (argued November 9\, 2009).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kenned y /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissent ing: Thomas\, Alito.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Other criminal sentenc es.\n\nGraham v. Florida\, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)\, was a decision by the Supr eme Court of the United States holding that juvenile offenders cannot be s entenced to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses.\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_v._Florida SUMMARY:⚖️ Graham v. Florida END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:miller-v-alabama DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20120625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20120626 DESCRIPTION:A sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of paro le may not be a mandatory sentence for juvenile offenders.\n\nDecided June 25\, 2012 (argued March 19\, 2012).\nOpinion of the Court: Elena Kagan /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/elena-kagan\nDissenting: Rob erts\, Thomas\, Alito.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us -constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-8\nTopic: Other criminal sente nces.\n\nMiller v. Alabama\, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)\, was a United States Sup reme Court case in which the Court held that mandatory sentences of life i mprisonment without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juv enile offenders. The ruling applied even to those persons who had committe d murder as a juvenile\, extending beyond Graham v. Florida (2010)\, which had ruled juvenile life without parole sentences unconstitutional for cri mes excluding murder.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_v._Alabama SUMMARY:⚖️ Miller v. Alabama END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ramos-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200420 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200421 DESCRIPTION:The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is read as requiring a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense and is an in corporated right to the states.\n\nDecided April 20\, 2020 (argued October 7\, 2019).\nOpinion of the Court: Gorsuch (Parts I\, II–A\, III\, and I V–B–1)\nDissenting: Alito.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calen dars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourtee nth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-14\nTopic: Other criminal sentences.\n\nRamos v. Louisiana\, 590 U.S. 83 (2020)\, is a U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that guilty verdict s be unanimous in criminal trials. The decision also incorporated the Sixt h Amendment requirement for unanimous jury criminal convictions against th e states\, and thereby overturned the Court's previous decision from the 1 972 cases Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana. At the time of the d ecision\, only Oregon and Louisiana allowed non-unanimous jury convictions \, while all other states had incorporated the unanimous requirement.\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramos_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Ramos v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-hudson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18120213 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18120214 DESCRIPTION:Congress must pass laws criminalizing activities. Common law cr imes do not exist on the federal level.\n\nDecided February 13\, 1812.\nOp inion of the Court: William Johnson /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justic es/events/william-johnson\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nUnited States v. Hudson and Goodwin\, 11 U.S. 32 (1812)\, was a case in which the United States Su preme Court held that Congress must first enact a constitutional law crimi nalizing an activity\, attach a penalty\, and give the federal courts juri sdiction over the offense in order for the court to render a conviction. I n other words\, there is no federal common law of crimes.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Hudson SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Hudson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hurtado-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18840303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18840304 DESCRIPTION:State governments\, as distinguished from the federal governmen t\, need not use grand juries in criminal prosecutions.\n\nDecided March 3 \, 1884 (argued 1884).\nOpinion of the Court: Stanley Matthews /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/stanley-matthews\nDissenting: Harlan. \nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\ nHurtado v. California\, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)\, was a landmark case decided by the United States Supreme Court that allowed state governments\, as di stinguished from the federal government\, to avoid using grand juries in c riminal prosecutions.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurtado_v._Californ ia SUMMARY:⚖️ Hurtado v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:moore-v-dempsey DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19230219 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19230220 DESCRIPTION:Mob violence at criminal trials\, such as those that followed t he Elaine massacre\, is a violation of due process. First 20th-century cas e where the Court protected the rights of Blacks in the South\, and one of its first to review a criminal conviction for constitutionality.\n\nDecid ed February 19\, 1923 (argued January 9\, 1923).\nOpinion of the Court: Ol iver Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/oliver -wendell-holmes\nDissenting: McReynolds.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendmen t /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopi c: Other areas.\n\nMoore et al. v. Dempsey\, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)\, was a Un ited States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled 6–2 that the def endants' mob-dominated trials deprived them of due process guaranteed by t he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reversed the distric t court's decision declining the petitioners' writ of habeas corpus.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore_v._Dempsey SUMMARY:⚖️ Moore v. Dempsey END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:sorrells-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19321219 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19321220 DESCRIPTION:Entrapment is a valid defense to a criminal charge.\n\nDecided December 19\, 1932 (argued November 8\, 1932).\nOpinion of the Court: Char les Evans Hughes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-e vans-hughes-chief-justice\nDissenting: McReynolds (no opinion).\nTopic: Ot her areas.\n\nSorrells v. United States\, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)\, is a Supre me Court case in which the justices unanimously recognized the entrapment defense. However\, while the majority opinion by Chief Justice Charles Eva ns Hughes located the key to entrapment in the defendant's predisposition or lack thereof to commit the crime\, Owen Roberts' concurring opinion pro posed instead that it be rooted in an analysis of the conduct of the law e nforcement agents making the arrest. Although the Court has stuck with pre disposition\, the dispute has hung over entrapment jurisprudence ever sinc e.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorrells_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Sorrells v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:brown-v-mississippi DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19360217 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19360218 DESCRIPTION:Confessions obtained through physical force and torture are ina dmissible at trial.\n\nDecided February 17\, 1936 (argued January 10\, 193 6).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Hughes /travel/calendars/supreme- court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fou rteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/am endment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nBrown v. Mississippi\, 297 U.S. 278 (19 36)\, was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that a defendant's involuntary confession that is extracted by the use of force on the part of law enforcement cannot be entered as evidence and violates the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B rown_v._Mississippi SUMMARY:⚖️ Brown v. Mississippi END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:chambers-v-florida DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19400212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19400213 DESCRIPTION:Confessions compelled by police through duress are inadmissible at trial.\n\nDecided February 12\, 1940 (argued January 4\, 1940).\nOpini on of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/hugo-black\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nChambers v. Florida\, 309 U.S. 227 (1 940)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that addressed the constitutional limits on police interrogation tactics. The court held that confessions obtained through prolonged questioning\; where suspects were held without any formal charges and denied contact with counsel\, friends or family\, was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chambers_v._Florida SUMMARY:⚖️ Chambers v. Florida END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-morgan-1954 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19540104 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19540105 DESCRIPTION:The writ of coram nobis is the proper application to request fe deral post-conviction judicial review for those who have completed the con viction's incarceration in order to challenge the validity of a federal cr iminal conviction.\n\nDecided January 4\, 1954 (argued October 19\, 1953). \nOpinion of the Court: Stanley Forman Reed /travel/calendars/supreme-cour t-justices/events/stanley-forman-reed\nDissenting: Minton.\nTopic: Other a reas.\n\nUnited States v. Morgan\, 346 U.S. 502 (1954)\, is a landmark dec ision by the United States Supreme Court which provides the writ of coram nobis as the proper application to request federal post-conviction judicia l review for those who have completed the conviction's incarceration in or der to challenge the validity of a federal criminal conviction.\n\nhttps:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Morgan_%281954%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Morgan (1954) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:thompson-v-city-of-louisville DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19600321 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19600322 DESCRIPTION:Criminal convictions are unconstitutional when no element of th e offense has been proven.\n\nDecided March 21\, 1960 (argued 1960).\nOpin ion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/even ts/hugo-black\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-cons titutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nThompson v. City of Louisville\, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)\, was a decision of the Unite d States Supreme Court in which the Court unanimously held that it is a vi olation of due process to convict a person of an offense when there is no evidence of his guilt. It is one of the rare instances of the Supreme Cour t's granting certiorari to review a decision of a court so insignificant t hat state law does not provide any mechanism for appeals from its judgment s.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thompson_v._City_of_Louisville SUMMARY:⚖️ Thompson v. City of Louisville END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:robinson-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19620625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19620626 DESCRIPTION:Punishing a person for a medical condition is a violation of th e Eighth Amendment. The protection from cruel and unusual punishment is in corporated against the states.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1962 (argued April 17\ , 1962).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart /travel/calendars/supreme-c ourt-justices/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: Clark\, White.\nApplied: the Eighth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events /amendment-8\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nRobinson v. California\, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)\, is the first landmark decision of th e United States Supreme Court in which the Eighth Amendment of the Constit ution was interpreted to prohibit particular acts or conduct\, as contrast ed with prohibiting the use of a particular form of punishment for a crime . In Robinson\, the Court struck down a California law that criminalized b eing addicted to narcotics.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_v._C alifornia SUMMARY:⚖️ Robinson v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:brady-v-maryland DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630514 DESCRIPTION:The prosecution must turn over all evidence that might exonerat e the defendant (exculpatory evidence) to the defense.\n\nDecided May 13\, 1963 (argued 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDissenting: Harlan .\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-a mendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nBrady v. Maryland\, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)\, is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision holding tha t under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States\, the prosecution must turn over to a criminal defendant any significant evi dence in its possession that suggests the defendant is not guilty.\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brady_v._Maryland SUMMARY:⚖️ Brady v. Maryland END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:duncan-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19681221 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19681222 DESCRIPTION:The Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial is incorpora ted and applied it to the states.\n\nDecided December 21\, 1968 (argued Ja nuary 17\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-6\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nDuncan v. Loui siana\, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)\, was a significant United States Supreme Cour t decision which incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial and applied it to the states.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunc an_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Duncan v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:barker-v-wingo DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720623 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court laid down a four-part case-by-case balancing test for determining whether the defendant's speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment has been violated.\n\nDecided June 22\, 1972 (argued April 11\, 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nTopic: Other areas.\n\nBarker v. Wingo\, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in volving the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution\, specifically the ri ght of defendants in criminal cases to a speedy trial. The Court held that determinations of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been vio lated must be made on a case-by-case basis\, and set forth four factors to be considered in the determination.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bark er_v._Wingo SUMMARY:⚖️ Barker v. Wingo END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:crawford-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20040308 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20040309 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court held that the admission of "testimonial" hear say in a criminal trial violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examin e the declarant.\n\nDecided March 8\, 2004 (argued November 10\, 2003).\nO pinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justic es/events/antonin-scalia\nApplied: the Sixth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-6\nApplied: the Fourteenth Am endment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14 \nTopic: Other areas.\n\nCrawford v. Washington\, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that reformulated the stan dard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have sin ce become unavailable may not be admitted without cross-examination.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crawford_v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ Crawford v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:pennoyer-v-neff DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18780121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18780122 DESCRIPTION:A state can only exercise personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant if they are served with process within the bounds of the s tate. Quasi in rem jurisdiction can only be established over property with in the state if it was 'brought under the control of the court' by the tim e the suit commenced. This decision was modified by later cases\, but rema ins the underlying basis for much of federal personal jurisdiction.\n\nDec ided January 21\, 1878 (argued October\, 1877).\nOpinion of the Court: Ste phen Johnson Field /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stephen -johnson-field\nDissenting: Hunt.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Pers onal jurisdiction.\n\nPennoyer v. Neff\, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)\, was a decisi on by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that a state court can only exert personal jurisdiction over a party domiciled out-of-state if that party is served with process while physically present within the state. More importantly\, the court imposed a procedural limit on quasi in rem jurisdiction over property located within the state\; it would have to be "brought under the control of the court" at the time the suit commenced otherwise quasi in rem jurisdiction would remain unavailabl e.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pennoyer_v._Neff SUMMARY:⚖️ Pennoyer v. Neff END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:international-shoe-co-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19451203 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19451204 DESCRIPTION:Personal jurisdiction can be established over a defendant if th at defendant has "minimum contacts" with a state "such that the maintenanc e of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan tial justice."\n\nDecided December 3\, 1945 (argued November 14\, 1945).\n Opinion of the Court: Harlan F. Stone /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/harlan-f-stone-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendmen t /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopi c: Personal jurisdiction.\n\nInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington\, 326 U. S. 310 (1945)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that a party\, particularly a corporation\, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state court if it has "minimum co ntacts" with that state. The ruling has important consequences for corpora tions involved in interstate commerce\, their payments to state unemployme nt compensation funds\, limits on the power of states imposed by the Due P rocess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\, the sufficiency of service of process\, and\, especially\, personal jurisdiction.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/International_Shoe_Co._v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ International Shoe Co. v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:world-wide-volkswagen-corp-v-woodson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19800121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19800122 DESCRIPTION:It is not enough that it is foreseeable that a defendant's prod uct could enter a particular state\; they must "purposely avail" themselve s of the jurisdiction in order to establish personal jurisdiction.\n\nDeci ded January 21\, 1980 (argued October 3\, 1979).\nOpinion of the Court: By ron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDis senting: Brennan\, Marshall\, Blackmun.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic : Personal jurisdiction.\n\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson\, 444 U. S. 286 (1980)\, is a United States Supreme Court case involving strict pro ducts liability\, personal injury and various procedural issues and consid erations. The 1980 opinion\, written by Justice Byron White\, is included in the first-year civil procedure curriculum at nearly every American law school for its focus on personal jurisdiction.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson SUMMARY:⚖️ World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:daimler-ag-v-bauman DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140114 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140115 DESCRIPTION:A corporate defendant is subject to general jurisdiction only i n its place of incorporation and principal place of business.\n\nDecided J anuary 14\, 2014 (argued October 15\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Court: Ruth B ader Ginsburg /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ruth-bader-g insburg\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Personal jurisdiction.\n\nDaim ler AG v. Bauman\, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)\, is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court answered whether an American court may exercise ju risdiction over a foreign company based on the fact that a subsidiary of t he company acts on its behalf in the jurisdictional state. The court held that an American company cannot be sued for conduct occurring outside the United States and American courts do not have jurisdiction of such a claim .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler_AG_v._Bauman SUMMARY:⚖️ Daimler AG v. Bauman END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bristol-myers-squibb-co-v-superior-court DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20170619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20170620 DESCRIPTION:State courts lack personal jurisdiction over defendants on clai ms brought by plaintiffs who don't reside in the state and whose claims di d not arise in the state.\n\nDecided June 19\, 2017 (argued April 25\, 201 7).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alito /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting: Sotomayor.\nApplied: the Fourteent h Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendmen t-14\nTopic: Personal jurisdiction.\n\nBristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superio r Court of California\, San Francisco County\, 582 U.S. 255 (2017)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant on claims brought b y plaintiffs who are not California residents and did not suffer their all eged injury in California. It is part of a group of six cases decided sinc e 2011 that have greatly changed the application of personal jurisdiction. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bristol-Myers_Squibb_Co._v._Superior_Cou rt SUMMARY:⚖️ Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ford-motor-co-v-montana-eighth-judicial-district DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210325 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210326 DESCRIPTION:A corporate defendant's purposeful availment of a state can lea d to personal jurisdiction even when there is no direct causal connection\ , when the claims nonetheless 'arise out of or relate to' a defendant's co ntact with a state.\n\nDecided March 25\, 2021 (argued October 7\, 2020).\ nOpinion of the Court: Elena Kagan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justice s/events/elena-kagan\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/ us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Personal jurisdic tion.\n\nFord Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District\, 592 U.S. 351 (2021)\, was a U.S. Supreme Court case involving personal jurisdiction of a state court in product liability lawsuits against an out-of-state manuf acturer. The case\, consolidated with Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer\, involve d two product liability lawsuits brought against the Ford Motor Company at the state level related to two drivers' injuries in separate accidents in volving Ford's vehicles in Montana and Minnesota. Ford challenged the laws uits as the vehicles in question were designed\, manufactured\, and sold i n other states\, and therefore Ford contended that the states in which the accidents actually occurred did not have specific personal jurisdiction o ver its allegedly tortious conduct. The Supreme Court ruled in a 8–0 dec ision that under the Due Process Clause\, the plaintiffs' claims "arise ou t of or relate to" Ford's business and marketing activities and in turn th ose activities support the states' exercise of specific personal jurisdict ion over the liability lawsuits.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Mot or_Co._v._Montana_Eighth_Judicial_District SUMMARY:⚖️ Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mallory-v-norfolk-southern-railway-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230628 DESCRIPTION:Long arm statutes that subject defendants to personal jurisdict ion in a particular state by doing business there do not violate the Due P rocess Clause.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2023 (argued November 8\, 2022).\nOpin ion of the Court: Gorsuch (Parts I and III–B)\nDissenting: Barrett.\nApp lied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Personal jurisdiction.\n\nMallory v. Norfo lk Southern Railway Co.\, 600 U.S. 122 (2023)\, was a United States Suprem e Court case in which the court held that a Pennsylvania law is consistent with Due Process. That law requires out-of-state companies to agree to ap pear\, for all lawsuits against them\, in Pennsylvania courts as a prerequ isite to registering for business in the state.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Mallory_v._Norfolk_Southern_Railway_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:chisholm-v-georgia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:17930218 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:17930219 DESCRIPTION:The Constitution prevents the states from exercising sovereign immunity. Therefore\, the states can be sued in federal court by citizens of other states. This decision was voided by the Eleventh Amendment in 179 5\, just two years after it was handed down.\n\nDecided February 18\, 1793 (argued February 5\, 1793).\nDissenting: Iredell.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\n Chisholm v. Georgia\, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)\, is considered the first United S tates Supreme Court case of significance and impact. The Court in a 4–1 decision ruled in favor of Alexander Chisholm\, executor of an estate of a citizen of South Carolina\, holding that Article III\, Section 2 grants f ederal courts jurisdiction in cases between a state and a citizen of anoth er state wherein the state is the defendant.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Chisholm_v._Georgia SUMMARY:⚖️ Chisholm v. Georgia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hylton-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:17960308 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:17960309 DESCRIPTION:A tax on the possession of goods is not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the states according to their populations. This case featured the first example of judicial review by the Supreme Court.\n\nDec ided March 8\, 1796 (argued February 23\, 1796).\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nHy lton v. United States\, 3 U.S. 171 (1796)\, is an early United States Supr eme Court case in which the Court held that a yearly tax on carriages did not violate the Article I\, Section 2\, Clause 3 and Article I\, Section 9 \, Clause 4 requirements for the apportioning of direct taxes. The Court c oncluded that the carriage tax was not a direct tax\, which would require apportionment among the states. The Court noted that a tax on land was an example of a direct tax that was contemplated by the Constitution.\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylton_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Hylton v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ware-v-hylton DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:17960307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:17960308 DESCRIPTION:A section of the Treaty of Paris supersedes an otherwise valid Virginia statute under the Supremacy Clause. This case featured the first example of judicial nullification of a state law.\n\nDecided March 7\, 179 6 (argued February 6–12\, 1796).\nDissenting: Paterson.\nTopic: Federali sm.\n\nWare v. Hylton\, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)\, also known as the British Debt Case\, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that tre aties take precedence over state law under the U.S. Constitution. It was t he first Supreme Court case concerned with treaties\, the first to rule th at treaty provisions were as binding as domestic U.S. law\, and the first to affirm the supremacy of federal law over state law. Ware is also notabl e for articulating the legal doctrine that would later be known as judicia l review\, whereby federal courts have the authority to settle conflicts o f law.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ware_v._Hylton SUMMARY:⚖️ Ware v. Hylton END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:fletcher-v-peck DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18100316 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18100317 DESCRIPTION:A state legislature can repeal a corruptly made law\, but the C ontract Clause of the Constitution prohibits the voiding of valid contract s made under such a law. This was the first case in which the Supreme Cour t struck down a state law as unconstitutional.\n\nDecided March 16\, 1810 (argued February 15\, 1810).\nOpinion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/ calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nTopic : Federalism.\n\nFletcher v. Peck\, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)\, is a landmark Unit ed States Supreme Court decision in which the Supreme Court first ruled a state law unconstitutional. The decision created a growing precedent for t he sanctity of legal contracts and hinted that Native Americans did not ho ld complete title to their own lands.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fle tcher_v._Peck SUMMARY:⚖️ Fletcher v. Peck END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:martin-v-hunter-s-lessee DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18160320 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18160321 DESCRIPTION:Federal courts may review state court decisions when they rest on federal law or the federal Constitution. This decision provides for the uniform interpretation of federal law throughout the states.\n\nDecided M arch 20\, 1816 (argued March 12\, 1816).\nOpinion of the Court: Joseph Sto ry /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/joseph-story\nTopic: Fe deralism.\n\nMartin v. Hunter's Lessee\, 14 U.S. 304 (1816)\, is a landmar k decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that asserted ultimat e Supreme Court authority over state courts in civil matters of federal la w.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_v._Hunter%27s_Lessee SUMMARY:⚖️ Martin v. Hunter's Lessee END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mcculloch-v-maryland DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18190306 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18190307 DESCRIPTION:The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution grants to C ongress implied powers for implementing the Constitution's express powers\ , and state actions may not impede valid exercises of power by the federal government.\n\nDecided March 6\, 1819 (argued 1819).\nOpinion of the Cour t: John Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-mars hall-chief-justice\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nMcCulloch v. Maryland\, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United Sta tes that defined the scope of the U.S. Congress's legislative power and ho w it relates to the powers of American state legislatures. The dispute in McCulloch involved the legality of the Second Bank of the United States an d a tax that the state of Maryland imposed on it. In its ruling\, the Supr eme Court established firstly that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives the U.S. federal government certain implied powers necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers enumerated explicitly in the Constitution\, and secondly that the American federal government i s supreme over the states\, and so states' ability to interfere with the f ederal government is restricted. Since the legislature has the authority t o tax and spend\, the court held that it therefore has authority to establ ish a national bank\, as being "necessary and proper" to that end.\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCulloch_v._Maryland SUMMARY:⚖️ McCulloch v. Maryland END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cohens-v-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18210303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18210304 DESCRIPTION:State laws in opposition to national laws are void. The U.S. Su preme Court has appellate jurisdiction for any U.S. case and final say.\n\ nDecided March 3\, 1821.\nOpinion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/cale ndars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nTopic: Fe deralism.\n\nCohens v. Virginia\, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)\, is a landmark case by the Supreme Court of the United States that asserts the Court's power t o review state supreme court decisions in criminal law matters if defendan ts claim that their constitutional rights have been violated. The Court ha d previously asserted a similar jurisdiction over civil cases involving U. S. parties.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohens_v._Virginia SUMMARY:⚖️ Cohens v. Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gibbons-v-ogden DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18240302 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18240303 DESCRIPTION:The power to regulate interstate navigation is granted to Congr ess by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.\n\nDecided March 2\, 1824 (argued February 5\, 1824).\nOpinion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nGibbons v. Ogden\, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)\, is a landmark decisi on of the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the power to regulate interstate commerce\, which is granted to the U.S. Congress by th e Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution\, encompasses the power to regu late navigation. The decision is credited with supporting the economic gro wth of the antebellum United States and the creation of national markets. Gibbons v. Ogden has since provided the basis for Congress' regulation of railroads\, freeways and television and radio broadcasts.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Gibbons_v._Ogden SUMMARY:⚖️ Gibbons v. Ogden END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:barron-v-baltimore DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18330216 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18330217 DESCRIPTION:The Bill of Rights cannot be applied to the state governments. This decision has essentially been rendered moot by the Supreme Court's ad option of the incorporation doctrine\, which uses the Due Process Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment to apply portions of the Bill of Rights to the states.\n\nDecided February 16\, 1833 (argued February 11\, 1833).\nOpinio n of the Court: John Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/eve nts/john-marshall-chief-justice\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nBarron v. Baltimore \, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in 1833\, which helped define the concept of federalism in US constitutional law. The Court ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the state go vernments\, establishing a precedent until the ratification of the Fourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case is also signific ant for highlighting the separation between federal government and state g overnment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barron_v._Baltimore SUMMARY:⚖️ Barron v. Baltimore END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cooley-v-board-of-wardens DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18520302 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18520303 DESCRIPTION:When local circumstances make it necessary\, the states can reg ulate interstate commerce as long as such regulations do not conflict with federal law. State laws related to commerce powers can be valid if Congre ss is silent on the matter.\n\nDecided March 2\, 1852 (argued 1852).\nOpin ion of the Court: Benjamin Robbins Curtis /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/benjamin-robbins-curtis\nDissenting: McLean.\nTopic: Feder alism.\n\nCooley v. Board of Wardens\, 53 U.S. 299 (1852)\, was a US Supre me Court case that held that a Pennsylvania law requiring all ships enteri ng or leaving Philadelphia to hire a local pilot did not violate the Comme rce Clause of the US Constitution. Those who did not comply with the law h ad been required to pay a fee.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooley_v._ Board_of_Wardens SUMMARY:⚖️ Cooley v. Board of Wardens END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ableman-v-booth DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18590307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18590308 DESCRIPTION:State courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts.\n\nDecided March 7\, 1859 (argued January 19\, 1859).\ nOpinion of the Court: Roger B. Taney /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/roger-b-taney-chief-justice\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nAbleman v. Booth\, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in whi ch the Court unanimously held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts\, overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The Court found that under the Constitution\, federal courts have the final power to decide cases arising under the Con stitution and federal statutes\, and that the States do not have the power to overturn those decisions. Thus\, Wisconsin did not have the authority to nullify federal judgments or statutes. For example\, it is illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals acting under f ederal laws. The Ableman decision emphasized the dual form of American gov ernment and the independence of State and federal courts from each other.\ n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ableman_v._Booth SUMMARY:⚖️ Ableman v. Booth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:texas-v-white DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18690412 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18690413 DESCRIPTION:The states that formed the Confederate States of America during the Civil War never actually left the Union because a state cannot unilat erally secede from the United States.\n\nDecided April 12\, 1869 (argued F ebruary 5\, 1869).\nOpinion of the Court: Salmon P. Chase /travel/calendar s/supreme-court-justices/events/salmon-p-chase-chief-justice\nDissenting: Grier.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nTexas v. White\, 74 U.S. 700 (1869)\, was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1869. The cas e's notable political dispute involved a claim by the Reconstruction era g overnment of Texas that U.S. bonds owned by Texas since 1850 had been ille gally sold by the Confederate state legislature during the American Civil War. The state filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court\, given that\, under t he Constitution\, that institution has original jurisdiction on certain ca ses in which a state is a party.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_v. _White SUMMARY:⚖️ Texas v. White END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hans-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18900303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18900304 DESCRIPTION:The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against their own state in federal court.\n\nDecided March 3\, 1890 (argued January 22\, 18 90).\nOpinion of the Court: Joseph P. Bradley /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/joseph-p-bradley\nApplied: the Eleventh Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-11\nTopic: Fed eralism.\n\nHans v. Louisiana\, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)\, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court determining that the Eleventh Amendment prohib its a citizen of a U.S. state from suing that state in a federal court. Ci tizens cannot bring suits against their own state for cases related to the federal constitution and federal laws. The court left open the question o f whether a citizen may sue his or her state in state courts. That ambigui ty was resolved in Alden v. Maine (1999)\, in which the Court held that a state's sovereign immunity forecloses suits against a state government in state court.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_v._Louisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Hans v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:pollock-v-farmers-loan-trust-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18950408 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18950409 DESCRIPTION:Income taxes on interest\, dividends\, and rents are\, in effec t\, direct taxes that must be apportioned among the states according to th eir populations. This decision was voided by the Sixteenth Amendment in 19 13\, allowing taxes on unearned income to be implemented without apportion ment.\n\nDecided April 8\, 1895 (argued March 7–8\, 11–13\, 1895).\nOp inion of the Court: Melville Fuller /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justic es/events/melville-fuller-chief-justice\nDissenting: White\, Harlan\, Brow n.\nOverruled by South Carolina v. Baker\, {{ussc|485|505|1988\nTopic: Fed eralism.\n\nPollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company\, 157 U.S. 429 (1895) \, affirmed on rehearing\, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)\, was a landmark case of th e Supreme Court of the United States. In a 5–4 decision\, the Supreme Co urt struck down the income tax imposed by the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act f or being an unapportioned direct tax. This decision was superseded in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution\, which allo ws Congress to levy income taxes without apportioning them among the state s.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pollock_v._Farmers%27_Loan_%26_Trust_C o. SUMMARY:⚖️ Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:swift-and-company-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19050130 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19050131 DESCRIPTION:Congress can prohibit local business practices in order to regu late interstate commerce because those practices\, when combined\, form a "stream of commerce" between the states.\n\nDecided January 30\, 1905 (arg ued January 6\, 1905).\nOpinion of the Court: Oliver Wendell Holmes /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/oliver-wendell-holmes\nTopic: Fe deralism.\n\nSwift & Co. v. United States\, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)\, was a ca se in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause allowed the federal government to regulate monopolies if it has a direct effect on commerce. It marked the success of the Presidency of Theodore Ro osevelt in destroying the "Beef Trust". This case established a "stream of commerce" argument that allows Congress to regulate things that fall into either category. In particular it allowed Congress to regulate the Chicag o slaughterhouse industry. Even though the slaughterhouse supposedly dealt with only intrastate matters\, the butchering of meat was merely a "stati on" along the way between cow and meat. Thus\, as it was part of the great er meat industry that was between the several states\, Congress can regula te it. The Court's decision halted price fixing by Swift & Company and its allies.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swift_and_Company_v._United_Stat es SUMMARY:⚖️ Swift and Company v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hunter-v-city-of-pittsburgh DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19071118 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19071119 DESCRIPTION:States have sovereignty over their local governments.\n\nDecide d November 18\, 1907 (argued 1907).\nOpinion of the Court: William Henry M oody /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-henry-moody\n Topic: Federalism.\n\nHunter v. Pittsburgh\, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)\, is a la ndmark case that confirmed the supreme sovereignty of a state over its mun icipalities.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter_v._City_of_Pittsburgh SUMMARY:⚖️ Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ex-parte-young DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19080323 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19080324 DESCRIPTION:When state officers are charged with violating federal law\, th ey cannot set up the state's federal constitutional sovereign immunity to defeat suits for prospective relief.\n\nDecided March 23\, 1908 (argued 19 07).\nOpinion of the Court: Rufus W. Peckham /travel/calendars/supreme-cou rt-justices/events/rufus-w-peckham\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Elev enth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amend ment-11\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nEx parte Young\, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)\, is a United States Supreme Court case that allows suits in federal courts for injunctions against officials acting on behalf of states of the union to p roceed despite the State's sovereign immunity\, when the State acted contr ary to any federal law or contrary to the Constitution. Although such suit s were challenged as actions against the state barred by the Eleventh Amen dment\, in the early twentieth century\, federal courts recognized that th ey could enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional laws that threatened property rights. Ex parte Young became the leading authority fo r this principle.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_parte_Young SUMMARY:⚖️ Ex parte Young END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hammer-v-dagenhart DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19180603 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19180604 DESCRIPTION:Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to regulate lab or conditions. (Overruled by United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941))\n\n Decided June 3\, 1918 (argued 1918).\nOpinion of the Court: William R. Day /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-r-day\nDissenting : Holmes.\nOverruled by United States v. Darby Lumber Co.\, /travel/calend ars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/united-states-v-darby-lumber-c o\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nHammer v. Dagenhart\, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)\, was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court struck down a fed eral law regulating child labor. The decision was overruled by United Stat es v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941).\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hammer_v._ Dagenhart SUMMARY:⚖️ Hammer v. Dagenhart END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:missouri-v-holland DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19200419 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19200420 DESCRIPTION:Treaties made by the federal government are supreme over any co ncerns brought by the states about such treaties interfering with any stat es' rights derived from the Tenth Amendment.\n\nDecided April 19\, 1920 (a rgued March 2\, 1920).\nOpinion of the Court: Oliver Wendell Holmes /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/oliver-wendell-holmes\nDissentin g: Van Devanter\, Pitney.\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calendars/ us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nMi ssouri v. Holland\, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) is a United States Supreme Court c ase concerning the extent to which international legal obligations are inc orporated into federal law under the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missouri_v._Holland SUMMARY:⚖️ Missouri v. Holland END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hawke-v-smith DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19200601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19200602 DESCRIPTION:States cannot ratify or rescind their ratification of federal c onstitutional amendments through referendums\, only by votes of their legi slatures.\n\nDecided June 1\, 1920 (argued April 23\, 1920).\nOpinion of t he Court: William R. Day /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/w illiam-r-day\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nHawke v. Smith\, 253 U.S. 221 (1920)\, was a United States Supreme Court case coming out of the state of Ohio. I t challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the state constitutio n allowing the state legislature's ratification of federal constitutional amendments to be challenged by a petition signed by six percent of Ohio vo ters. This would then bring the issue to referendum.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Hawke_v._Smith SUMMARY:⚖️ Hawke v. Smith END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-butler DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19360106 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19360107 DESCRIPTION:The U.S. Congresss power to lay taxes is not limited only to th e level necessary to carry out its other powers enumerated in Article I of the U.S. Constitution\, but is a broad authority to tax and spend for the "general welfare" of the United States.\n\nDecided January 6\, 1936 (argu ed 1935).\nOpinion of the Court: Owen Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/owen-roberts\nDissenting: Stone.\nApplied: the Tenth A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1 0\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nUnited States v. Butler\, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)\, is a U.S. Supreme Court case that held that the U.S. Congress has not only th e power to lay taxes to the level necessary to carry out its other powers enumerated in Article I of the U.S. Constitution but also a broad authorit y to tax and spend for the "general welfare" of the United States. The dec ision itself concerned whether the processing taxes instituted by the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act were constitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/United_States_v._Butler SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Butler END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:carter-v-carter-coal-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19360518 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19360519 DESCRIPTION:The Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to regulate manufa cturing. Just because a product will be used in interstate commerce does n ot mean it can be regulated before that point. The last of the “Lochner era” decisions striking down numerous New Deal programs.\n\nDecided May 18\, 1936 (argued March 11\, 1936).\nOpinion of the Court: George Sutherla nd /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/george-sutherland\nOver ruled by {{ussc\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nCarter v. Carter Coal Company\, 298 U.S. 238 (1936)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution\, which permits the United States Congress to "regulate Commerce... among the several States." Specifically\, it analyzes the extent of Congress' power\, according to t he Commerce Clause\, looking at whether or not they have the right to regu late manufacturing.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carter_v._Carter_Coal _Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Carter v. Carter Coal Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:national-labor-relations-board-v-jones-laughlin-steel-corporation DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19370412 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19370413 DESCRIPTION:The National Labor Relations Act and\, by extension\, the Natio nal Labor Relations Board are constitutional because the Commerce Clause a pplies to labor relations. Therefore\, the NLRB has the right to sanction companies that fire or discriminate against workers for belonging to a uni on. Also\, a local commercial activity that is considered in isolation may still constitute interstate commerce if that activity has a "close and su bstantial relationship" to interstate commerce.\n\nDecided April 12\, 1937 (argued 1937).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Hughes /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes-chief-justice\nDiss enting: McReynolds.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nNational Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation\, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)\, is a landmark d ecision of the Supreme Court of the United States that upheld the constitu tionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935\, also known as the Wagner Act. The case marked a major expansion in the Court's interpretatio n of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and effectively spelled th e end to the Court's striking down of New Deal economic legislation.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Labor_Relations_Board_v._Jones_%26_La ughlin_Steel_Corporation SUMMARY:⚖️ National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Cor poration END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:steward-machine-company-v-davis DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19370524 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19370525 DESCRIPTION:The federal government is permitted to impose a tax even if the goal of the tax is not just the collection of revenue.\n\nDecided May 24\ , 1937 (argued 1937).\nOpinion of the Court: Benjamin N. Cardozo /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/benjamin-n-cardozo\nDissenting: McR eynolds\, Sutherland\, Butler.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nSteward Machine Comp any v. Davis\, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)\, was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the unemployment compensation provisions of the Soci al Security Act of 1935\, which established the federal taxing structure t hat was designed to induce states to adopt laws for funding and payment of unemployment compensation. The decision signaled the Court's acceptance o f a broad interpretation of Congressional power to influence state laws.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steward_Machine_Company_v._Davis SUMMARY:⚖️ Steward Machine Company v. Davis END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-negro-alliance-v-sanitary-grocery-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19380328 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19380329 DESCRIPTION:The Norris–La Guardia Act of 1932 prohibits employers from pr oscribing the peaceful dissemination of information concerning the terms a nd conditions of employment by those involved in an active labor dispute\, even when such dissemination occurs on an employer's private property.\n\ nDecided March 28\, 1938 (argued 1938).\nOpinion of the Court: Owen Robert s /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/owen-roberts\nDissenting : McReynolds.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nNew Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocer y Co.\, 303 U.S. 552 (1938)\, was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Co urt which affects US labor law\, safeguarding a right to boycott and in th e struggle by African Americans against discriminatory hiring practices. S anitary Grocery Co. was at the time of the case owned by Safeway Inc.\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Negro_Alliance_v._Sanitary_Grocery_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-carolene-products-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19380425 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19380426 DESCRIPTION:Economic regulations are presumptively constitutional under the rational basis test. Particularly notable for Footnote 4\, which formulat ed the foundation for strict scrutiny review.\n\nDecided April 25\, 1938 ( argued April 6\, 1938).\nOpinion of the Court: Harlan F. Stone /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/harlan-f-stone\nDissenting: McReynold s.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amend ments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nUnited States v. Carolene Products Company\, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)\, was a case of the United States S upreme Court that upheld the federal government's power to prohibit filled milk from being shipped in interstate commerce. In his majority opinion f or the Court\, Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone wrote that economic regul ations were "presumptively constitutional" under a deferential standard of review known as the "rational basis test".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/United_States_v._Carolene_Products_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Carolene Products Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-darby-lumber-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19410203 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19410204 DESCRIPTION:Control over interstate commerce belongs entirely to Congress. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it prevents the states from lowering labor standards to gai n commercial advantages.\n\nDecided February 3\, 1941 (argued 1940).\nOpin ion of the Court: Harlan F. Stone /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/harlan-f-stone\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nUnited States v. Darby Lumbe r Co.\, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)\, was a case in which the United States Suprem e Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938\, holding that the U.S . Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions. The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned Ha mmer v. Dagenhart\, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)\, limited the application of Carte r v. Carter Coal Company\, 298 U.S. 238 (1936)\, and confirmed the underly ing legality of minimum wages held in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish\, 30 0 U.S. 379 (1937).\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Darby _Lumber_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Darby Lumber Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:wickard-v-filburn DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19421109 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19421110 DESCRIPTION:The Commerce Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to regu late anything that has a substantial economic effect on commerce even if t hat effect is indirect.\n\nDecided November 9\, 1942 (argued May 4\, 1942) .\nOpinion of the Court: Robert H. Jackson /travel/calendars/supreme-court -justices/events/robert-h-jackson\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fift h Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendmen t-5\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nWickard v. Filburn\, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that dramatically increased the regulatory power of the federal government. It remains as one of the most important and far-reaching cases concerning the New Deal\, and it set a precedent for an expansive reading of the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause for decades to come. The goal of the legal challenge was to end the entire federal crop support program by declaring it unconstitutional.\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn SUMMARY:⚖️ Wickard v. Filburn END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cooper-v-aaron DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19580912 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19580913 DESCRIPTION:The states are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and cannot choose to ignore them.\n\nDecided September 12\, 1958 (argued Septe mber 11\, 1958).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Whittaker /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-whittaker\nApplied: th e Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-14\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nCooper v. Aaron\, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) \, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that d enied the school board of Little Rock\, Arkansas the right to delay racial desegregation for 30 months. On September 12\, 1958\, the Warren Court delivered a decision that held that the states are bound by the Court's de cisions and must enforce them even if the states disagree with them\, asse rting the judicial supremacy established in Marbury v. Madison (1803). The decision in this case upheld the rulings in Brown v. Board of Education a nd Brown II which held that the doctrine of separate but equal was unconst itutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooper_v._Aaron SUMMARY:⚖️ Cooper v. Aaron END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:oregon-v-mitchell DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19701221 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19701222 DESCRIPTION:Congress has the power to regulate requirements for voting in f ederal elections\, but it is prohibited from regulating requirements for v oting in state and local elections. This decision preceded the ratificatio n of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971\, which lowered the minimum voting age to 18 for all elections.\n\nDecided December 21\, 1970 (argued Octobe r 20\, 1970).\nOpinion of the Court: Thurgood Marshall /travel/calendars/s upreme-court-justices/events/thurgood-marshall\nDissenting: Part 1: Stewar t\, Burger\, and Blackmun\; Harlan\; Part 2: Brennan\, White\, and Marshal l\; Douglas\; Part 4: Harlan.\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calend ars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Federalism.\n \nOregon v. Mitchell\, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)\, was a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the states of Oregon\, Texas\, Arizona\, and Idaho challenged th e constitutionality of Sections 201\, 202\, and 302 of the Voting Rights A ct (VRA) Amendments of 1970 passed by the 91st United States Congress\, an d where John Mitchell was the respondent in his role as United States Atto rney General. The Supreme Court ruled that the literacy test ban under Sec tion 201\, the minimum residency duration requirement for voter registrati on and the uniform rule for absentee voting in presidential elections unde r Section 202\, and that Congress lowering the voting age in federal elect ions from 21 to 18 under Section 302 were all constitutional\, but that Co ngress lowering the voting age in state and local elections from 21 to 18 under Section 302 was unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O regon_v._Mitchell SUMMARY:⚖️ Oregon v. Mitchell END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:marquette-national-bank-of-minneapolis-v-first-of-omaha-service-corp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19781218 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19781219 DESCRIPTION:States may not cap the interest rates offered to their citizens by federally chartered banks based in other states\; a holding that contr ibuted greatly to the growth of the credit card industry in the ensuing de cades.\n\nDecided December 18\, 1978 (argued October 31\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/william-j-brennan\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nMarquette Nat. Bank of Min neapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.\, 439 U.S. 299 (1978)\, is a unan imous U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that state anti-usury laws regul ating interest rates cannot be enforced against nationally chartered banks based in other states. Justice William Brennan wrote that it was clearly the intent of Congress when it passed the National Banking Act that nation ally chartered banks would be subject only to federal regulation by the Co mptroller of Currency and the laws of the state in which they were charter ed\, and that only Congress or the appropriate state legislature could pas s laws regulating them.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marquette_Nationa l_Bank_of_Minneapolis_v._First_of_Omaha_Service_Corp. SUMMARY:⚖️ Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Ser vice Corp. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:garcia-v-san-antonio-metropolitan-transit-authority DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850219 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850220 DESCRIPTION:Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause of the Constit ution to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act\, which requires that employe rs provide minimum wage and overtime pay to their employees\, to state and local governments.\n\nDecided February 19\, 1985 (argued March 19\, 1984) .\nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/harry-blackmun\nDissenting: Powell\, Rehnquist\, O'Connor.\n Applied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amen dments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nGarcia v. San Antonio Me tropolitan Transit Authority\, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that the Congress ha s the power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to extend the Fa ir Labor Standards Act\, which requires that employers provide minimum wag e and overtime pay to their employees\, to state and local governments. In this case\, the Court overruled its previous decision in National League of Cities v. Usery\, in which the Court had held that regulation of the ac tivities of state and local governments "in areas of traditional governmen tal functions" would violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Cons titution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropoli tan_Transit_Authority SUMMARY:⚖️ Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:heath-v-alabama DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19851203 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19851204 DESCRIPTION:The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not proh ibit two different states from separately prosecuting and convicting the s ame individual for the same illegal act.\n\nDecided December 3\, 1985 (arg ued October 9\, 1985).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/ calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: B rennan\, Marshall.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nHeath v. Alabama\, 474 U.S. 82 ( 1985)\, is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that\, be cause of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty"\, the double jeopardy clause o f the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already b een convicted of and sentenced for in another state.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Heath_v._Alabama SUMMARY:⚖️ Heath v. Alabama END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:south-dakota-v-dole DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870624 DESCRIPTION:Congress may attach reasonable conditions to funds disbursed to the states without violating the Tenth Amendment.\n\nDecided June 23\, 19 87 (argued April 28\, 1987).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justic e\nDissenting: Brennan\, O'Connor.\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/c alendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nApplied: the Tw enty-first Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events /amendment-21\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nSouth Dakota v. Dole\, 483 U.S. 203 ( 1987)\, was a case in which the United States Supreme Court considered the limitations that the Constitution places on the authority of the United S tates Congress to influence state lawmaking. The Court upheld the constitu tionality of a federal statute that withheld federal funds from states who se legal drinking age did not conform to federal policy. The dissent argue d that the minimum drinking age condition for states to receive federal hi ghway funds was not sufficiently related to Congress's interests in expend ing the funds and consequently exceeded the federal government's Article 1 \, Section 8 spending power.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Dakota _v._Dole SUMMARY:⚖️ South Dakota v. Dole END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-lopez DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950426 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950427 DESCRIPTION:The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is unconstitutional. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution does not give Congress the power to pr ohibit the mere possession of a gun near a school because gun possession b y itself is not an economic activity that affects interstate commerce even indirectly. Notable because it was the first time since the New Deal that the Supreme Court invalidated a law which was passed by Congress ostensib ly permissible under the Commerce Clause.\n\nDecided April 26\, 1995 (argu ed November 8\, 1994).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nDis senting: Stevens\, Souter\, Breyer.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nUnited States v . Lopez\, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)\, is a landmark case of the United States Su preme Court that struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA) \, determining that it was not a valid exercise of Congress's power to reg ulate interstate commerce. It was the first case since 1937 in which the C ourt held that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.\ n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lopez SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Lopez END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:u-s-term-limits-inc-v-thornton DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950522 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950523 DESCRIPTION:The states cannot create qualifications for prospective members of Congress that are stricter than those specified in the Constitution. T his decision invalidates provisions that had imposed term limits on member s of Congress in 23 states.\n\nDecided May 22\, 1995 (argued November 29\, 1994).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme -court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Thomas.\nApplied: th e Seventeenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/eve nts/amendment-17\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-consti tutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nU.S. Term L imits\, Inc. v. Thornton\, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)\, is a landmark U.S. Suprem e Court decision in which the Court ruled that states cannot impose qualif ications for prospective members of the U.S. Congress stricter than those that the Constitution specifies. The decision invalidated 23 states' Congr essional term limit provisions. The parties to the case were U.S. Term Lim its\, a nonprofit advocacy group\, and Arkansas politician Ray Thornton\, among others.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Term_Limits%2C_Inc._v. _Thornton SUMMARY:⚖️ U.S. Term Limits\, Inc. v. Thornton END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:printz-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970628 DESCRIPTION:The interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that requires state and local officials to conduct background checks o n firearm purchasers violates the Tenth Amendment.\n\nDecided June 27\, 19 97 (argued December 3\, 1996).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /trav el/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: Ste vens\, Souter\, Breyer.\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us -constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nPrin tz v. United States\, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)\, was a United States Supreme Co urt case in which the court held that certain interim provisions of the Br ady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth Amendment to the Un ited States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printz_v._Unite d_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Printz v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-morrison DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20000515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20000516 DESCRIPTION:The section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that give s victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court is an unconstitutional intrusion on states' rights\, and it cannot be saved by the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Ame ndment.\n\nDecided May 15\, 2000 (argued January 11\, 2000).\nOpinion of t he Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nDissenting: Souter\, Breyer.\nTopic: Fe deralism.\n\nUnited States v. Morrison\, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)\, is a U.S. S upreme Court decision that found unconstitutional parts of the Violence Ag ainst Women Act of 1994 for exceeding powers granted to the US Congress un der the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Cl ause. Along with United States v. Lopez (1995)\, it was part of a series o f Rehnquist Court cases that limited Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Morrison SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Morrison END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gonzales-v-raich DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20050606 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20050607 DESCRIPTION:Congress may ban the use of marijuana even in states that have approved its use for medicinal purposes.\n\nDecided June 6\, 2005 (argued November 29\, 2004).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/cale ndars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: O'Conno r\, Thomas.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nGonzales v. Raich\, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)\, was a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that\, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution\, Congress may criminalize the production and use of homegrown cannabis even if state law allows its use for medici nal purposes.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonzales_v._Raich SUMMARY:⚖️ Gonzales v. Raich END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bond-v-united-states-2011 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20110616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20110617 DESCRIPTION:An individual litigant has standing to challenge a federal stat ute on grounds of federalism.\n\nDecided June 16\, 2011 (argued February 2 2\, 2011).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Fed eralism.\n\nBond v. United States\, 564 U.S. 211 (2011)\, is a case before the Supreme Court of the United States in which the court held that peopl e\, just like states\, may have standing to raise Tenth Amendment challeng es to a federal law.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_v._United_State s_%282011%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ Bond v. United States (2011) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:arizona-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20120625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20120626 DESCRIPTION:An Arizona law that authorizes local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws is preempted by federal law. Arizona law enforcement may inquire about a resident's legal status during lawful encounters\, but th e state may not implement its own immigration laws.\n\nDecided June 25\, 2 012 (argued April 25\, 2012).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /trav el/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nTopic: Federal ism.\n\nArizona v. United States\, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)\, was a United Stat es Supreme Court case involving Arizona's SB 1070\, a state law intended t o increase the powers of local law enforcement that wished to enforce fede ral immigration laws. The issue is whether the law usurps the federal gove rnment's authority to regulate immigration laws and enforcement. The Court ruled that sections 3\, 5(C)\, and 6 of S. B. 1070 were preempted by fede ral law but left other parts of the law intact\, including a provision tha t allowed law enforcement to investigate a person's immigration status.\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Arizona v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:national-federation-of-independent-business-v-sebelius DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20120628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20120629 DESCRIPTION:The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's expansion of M edicaid is unconstitutional as-written—it is unduly coercive to force th e states to choose between participating in the expansion or forgoing all Medicaid funds. In addition\, the individual health insurance mandate is c onstitutional by virtue of the Taxing and Spending Clause (though not by t he Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause).\n\nDecided June 28 \, 2012 (argued 2012).\nOpinion of the Court: Roberts (Parts I\, II\, and III–C)\nDissenting: Scalia\, Kennedy\, Thomas\, Alito\, Thomas.\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nNational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius\, 5 67 U.S. 519 (2012)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court upheld Congress's power to enact most provisions of the A ffordable Care Act (ACA)\, commonly called Obamacare\, and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA)\, including a requiremen t for most Americans to pay a penalty for forgoing health insurance by 201 4. The Acts represented a major set of changes to the American health care system that had been the subject of highly contentious debate\, largely d ivided on political party lines.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National _Federation_of_Independent_Business_v._Sebelius SUMMARY:⚖️ National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bond-v-united-states-2014 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140602 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140603 DESCRIPTION:Both individuals and states can bring a Tenth Amendment challen ge to federal law.\n\nDecided June 2\, 2014 (argued November 5\, 2013).\nO pinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nApplied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/c alendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-10\nTopic: Federali sm.\n\nBond v. United States\, 572 U.S. 844 (2014)\, was a United States S upreme Court case concerning whether and how international arms control ag reements may regulate local crime. More specifically\, it found that an as sault committed by the defendant-petitioner\, Carol Anne Bond\, was not us age of a chemical weapon under section 229(a)(1) of the Chemical Weapons C onvention Implementation Act (CWCIA)\, despite Bond using dangerous toxica nts to commit the attack. The case followed up on a 2011 opinion of the sa me name involving the same parties.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_ v._United_States_%282014%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ Bond v. United States (2014) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:murphy-v-national-collegiate-athletic-association DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180514 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180515 DESCRIPTION:The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 viol ates the Tenth Amendment because it prohibits the states from passing laws that authorize and regulate sports betting.\n\nDecided May 14\, 2018 (arg ued December 4\, 2017).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alito /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting: Ginsburg.\nApp lied: the Tenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-10\nTopic: Federalism.\n\nMurphy v. National Collegiate At hletic Association\, No. 16-476\, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) [138 S. Ct. 1461]\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case involving the Tenth Amendm ent to the United States Constitution. The issue was whether the U.S. fede ral government has the right to control state lawmaking. The State of New Jersey\, represented by Governor Philip D. Murphy\, sought to have the Pro fessional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) overturned to allow st ate-sponsored sports betting. The case\, formerly titled Christie v. Natio nal Collegiate Athletic Association until Governor Chris Christie left off ice\, was combined with NJ Thoroughbred Horsemen v. NCAA\, No. 16-477.\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murphy_v._National_Collegiate_Athletic_Assoc iation SUMMARY:⚖️ Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:johnson-v-mcintosh DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18230228 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18230301 DESCRIPTION:Private citizens cannot purchase lands from Native Americans.\n \nDecided February 28\, 1823 (argued 1823).\nOpinion of the Court: John Ma rshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief -justice\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nJohnson v. McIntosh\, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)\, also written Johnson v. M‘Intosh\, is a landmark decision of t he U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase l ands from Native Americans\, referred to as "Indians" in the judgment. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall\, the successor in i nterest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to maintain an action of ejectment against the holder of a federal land patent.\n\nhttps ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson_v._McIntosh SUMMARY:⚖️ Johnson v. McIntosh END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:worcester-v-georgia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18320303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18320304 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court laid out the relationship between tribes and the state and federal governments. It is considered to have built the foun dations of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the United States\, becau se the relationship between the Indian Nations and the United States is th at of nations.\n\nDecided March 3\, 1832 (argued February 20\, 1832).\nOpi nion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nDissenting: Baldwin.\nTopic: Native Am erican law.\n\nWorcester v. Georgia\, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)\, is a landmark c ase in which the United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction of Sam uel Worcester and held that the Georgia criminal statute that prohibited n on-Native Americans from being present on Native American lands without a license from the state was unconstitutional. While the state law was an ef fort to restrict white settlement on Cherokee territory\, Worcester reason ed that obeying the law would\, in effect\, be surrendering the sovereignt y of the Cherokee Nation to manage their own territory.\nThe opinion is mo st famous for its dicta\, which laid out the relationship between tribes\, state\, and federal governments. It is considered to have built the found ations of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the United States.\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worcester_v._Georgia SUMMARY:⚖️ Worcester v. Georgia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ex-parte-crow-dog DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18831217 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18831218 DESCRIPTION:U.S. courts do not have criminal jurisdiction in cases where on e Native American murders another on reservation lands. The Supreme Court also ruled that tribes held exclusive jurisdiction over their own internal affairs\, including murder cases. The U.S. Congress responded with the Ma jor Crimes Act\, by which Congress has exercised since absolute (plenary) power over tribal jurisdiction by excluding certain crimes from that juris diction. This case was the beginning of the plenary power legal doctrine t hat has been used in Indian case law to limit tribal sovereignty.\n\nDecid ed December 17\, 1883 (argued November 26\, 1883).\nOpinion of the Court: Stanley Matthews /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stanley-m atthews\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nEx parte Crow Dog\, 109 U.S. 556 ( 1883)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States t hat followed the death of one member of a Native American tribe at the han ds of another on reservation land. Crow Dog was a member of the Brulé ban d of the Lakota Sioux. On August 5\, 1881 he shot and killed Spotted Tail \, a Lakota chief\; there are different accounts of the background to the killing. The tribal council dealt with the incident according to Sioux tra dition\, and Crow Dog paid restitution to the dead man's family. However\, the U.S. authorities then prosecuted Crow Dog for murder in a federal cou rt. He was found guilty and sentenced to hang.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Ex_parte_Crow_Dog SUMMARY:⚖️ Ex parte Crow Dog END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:talton-v-mayes DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18960518 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18960519 DESCRIPTION:Constitutional protections including the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not apply to the actions of American Indian tribal governmen ts.\n\nDecided May 18\, 1896 (argued April 16\, 1896).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: White\nDissenting: Harlan.\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nTalton v. M ayes\, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court ca se\, in which the court decided that the individual rights protections\, w hich limit federal\, and later\, state governments\, do not apply to triba l government. It reaffirmed earlier decisions\, such as the 1831 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case\, that gave Indian tribes the status of "domestic d ependent nations\," the sovereignty of which is independent of the federal government.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talton_v._Mayes SUMMARY:⚖️ Talton v. Mayes END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lone-wolf-v-hitchcock DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19030105 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19030106 DESCRIPTION:Congress may use its plenary power to unilaterally break treaty obligations between the United States and Native American tribes.\n\nDeci ded January 5\, 1903 (argued October 23\, 1902).\nOpinion of the Court: Wh ite\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nLone Wolf v. Hitchcock\, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case brought against t he US government by the Kiowa chief Lone Wolf\, who charged that Native Am erican tribes under the Medicine Lodge Treaty had been defrauded of land b y Congressional actions in violation of the treaty.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Lone_Wolf_v._Hitchcock SUMMARY:⚖️ Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:williams-v-lee DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19590112 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19590113 DESCRIPTION:State courts do not have jurisdiction on Indian reservations wi thout the authorization of Congress.\n\nDecided January 12\, 1959 (argued November 20\, 1958).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/s upreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nWi lliams v. Lee\, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)\, was a landmark case in which the Sup reme Court of the United States held that the State of Arizona does not ha ve jurisdiction to try a civil case between a non-Indian doing business on a reservation with tribal members who reside on the reservation\, the pro per forum for such cases being the tribal court.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Williams_v._Lee SUMMARY:⚖️ Williams v. Lee END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:menominee-tribe-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680527 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680528 DESCRIPTION:Native American treaty rights are not repealed without a clear and unequivocal statement to that effect from Congress.\n\nDecided May 27\ , 1968 (argued January 22\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Dougl as /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDiss enting: Stewart.\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nMenominee Tribe of Indian s v. United States\, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)\, is a case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Menominee Indian Tribe kept their historical hunting and fishing rights even after the federal government ceased to recognize t he tribe. It was a landmark decision in Native American case law.\n\nhttps ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Menominee_Tribe_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Menominee Tribe v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:oneida-indian-nation-of-new-york-v-county-of-oneida DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740122 DESCRIPTION:There is federal subject-matter jurisdiction for possessory lan d claims brought by Indian tribes based upon aboriginal title\, the Nonint ercourse Act\, and Indian treaties.\n\nDecided January 21\, 1974 (argued 1 973).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-j ustices/events/byron-white\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nOneida Indian N ation of New York v. County of Oneida\, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)\, is a landmar k decision by the United States Supreme Court concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The original suit in this matter was the first moder n-day Native American land claim litigated in the federal court system rat her than before the Indian Claims Commission. It was also the first to go to final judgement.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oneida_Indian_Nation_ of_New_York_v._County_of_Oneida SUMMARY:⚖️ Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bryan-v-itasca-county DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760614 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760615 DESCRIPTION:A state does not have the right to assess a tax on the property of a Native American (Indian) living on tribal land absent a specific Con gressional grant of authority to do so.\n\nDecided June 14\, 1976 (argued April 20\, 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nTopic: Native America n law.\n\nBryan v. Itasca County\, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)\, was a landmark ca se in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state did n ot have the right to assess a tax on the property of a Native American (In dian) living on tribal land absent a specific Congressional grant of autho rity to do so.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bryan_v._Itasca_County SUMMARY:⚖️ Bryan v. Itasca County END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:oliphant-v-suquamish-indian-tribe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780306 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780307 DESCRIPTION:Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians\, and hence may not assume such jurisdic tion unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress.\n\nDecided March 6\, 1978 (argued January 9\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnqu ist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist\nDis senting: Marshall.\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nOliphant v. Suquamish I ndian Tribe\, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)\, is a United States Supreme Court case deciding that Indian tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non- Indians. The case was decided on March 6\, 1978\, with a 6–2 majority. T he court opinion was written by William Rehnquist\, and a dissenting opini on was written by Thurgood Marshall\, who was joined by Chief Justice Warr en Burger. Justice William J. Brennan did not participate in the decision. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliphant_v._Suquamish_Indian_Tribe SUMMARY:⚖️ Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-wheeler-1978 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780322 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780323 DESCRIPTION:The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent p rosecution by both an Indian tribe and the federal government of the Unite d States.\n\nDecided March 22\, 1978 (argued January 11\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/even ts/potter-stewart\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nUnited States v. Wheeler \, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which t he Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the federal prosecut ion of a Native American (Indian) who has already been prosecuted by the t ribe.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Wheeler_%281978%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Wheeler (1978) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:santa-clara-pueblo-v-martinez DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780516 DESCRIPTION:Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act does not expressly or im plicitly create a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal courts.\n\nDecided May 15\, 1978 (argued November 29\, 1977). \nOpinion of the Court: Thurgood Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/thurgood-marshall\nDissenting: White.\nTopic: Native Ameri can law.\n\nSanta Clara Pueblo v. Martinez\, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)\, is a lan dmark case in the area of federal Indian law involving issues of great imp ortance to the meaning of tribal sovereignty in the contemporary United St ates. The Supreme Court sustained a law passed by the governing body of th e Santa Clara Pueblo that explicitly discriminated on the basis of sex. In so doing\, the Court advanced a theory of tribal sovereignty that weighed the interests of tribes sufficient to justify a law that\, had it been pa ssed by a state legislature or Congress\, would have almost certainly been struck down as a violation of equal protection.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Santa_Clara_Pueblo_v._Martinez SUMMARY:⚖️ Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:solem-v-bartlett DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840222 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840223 DESCRIPTION:The Supreme Court established three principles to measure Congr ess's intent to diminish a reservation. It decided that opening up reserva tion lands for settlement by non-Indians does not constitute the intent to diminish reservation boundaries and therefore reservation boundaries woul d not be diminished unless specifically determined through legislation.\n\ nDecided February 22\, 1984 (argued December 6\, 1983).\nOpinion of the Co urt: Thurgood Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thu rgood-marshall\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nSolem v. Bartlett\, 465 U.S . 463 (1984)\, was a United States Supreme Court case involving Indian cou ntry jurisdiction in the United States that decided that opening up reserv ation lands for settlement by non-Indians does not constitute the intent t o diminish reservation boundaries. Therefore\, reservation boundaries woul d not be diminished unless specifically determined through acts of Congres s.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solem_v._Bartlett SUMMARY:⚖️ Solem v. Bartlett END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:county-of-oneida-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-new-york-state DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850304 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850305 DESCRIPTION:Indian tribes have a federal common law cause of action\, not p reempted by the Nonintercourse Act\, for possessory claims based upon abor iginal title\; such action is not barred by limitations\, abatement\, rati fication or nonjusticiability\, and due to the Eleventh Amendment\, there is no ancillary jurisdiction for counties' cross-claims against a state.\n \nDecided March 4\, 1985 (argued October 1\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\, joined by Blackmun\, O'Connor (Parts I\, II\, III\, IV\, VI join ed by Brennan\, Marshall\; Part V joined by Burger\, White\, Rehnquist)\nA pplied: the Eleventh Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-11\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nCounty of Oneida v . Oneida Indian Nation of New York State\, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)\, is a land mark United States Supreme Court case concerning aboriginal title in the U nited States. The case\, sometimes referred to as Oneida II\, was "the fir st Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act".\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/County_of_Oneida_v._Oneida_Indian_Nation_of_ New_York_State SUMMARY:⚖️ County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-ass-n DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19880419 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19880420 DESCRIPTION:The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA) does not create a cause of action under which to sue\, nor does it contain any judicially enforceable rights.\n\nDecided April 19\, 1988 (argued November 30\, 1987).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/ supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Brennan.\nT opic: Native American law.\n\nLyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association\, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)\, was a United States Supreme Court lan dmark case in which the Court ruled on the applicability of the Free Exerc ise Clause to the practice of religion on Native American sacred lands\, s pecifically in the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest in California. This area\, also known as the High Country\, was used by the Y urok\, Karuk\, and Tolowa tribes as a religious site.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Lyng_v._Northwest_Indian_Cemetery_Protective_Ass%27n SUMMARY:⚖️ Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-lara DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20040419 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20040420 DESCRIPTION:As an Indian tribe and the United States are separate sovereign s\, both the United States and a Native American (Indian) tribe can prosec ute an Indian for the same acts that constituted crimes in both jurisdicti ons without invoking double jeopardy if the actions of the accused violate d Federal law.\n\nDecided April 19\, 2004 (argued January 21\, 2004).\nOpi nion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/stephen-breyer\nDissenting: Souter.\nTopic: Native American law.\n \nUnited States v. Lara\, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)\, is a United States Supreme Court landmark case which held that both the United States and a Native A merican (Indian) tribe could prosecute an Indian for the same acts that co nstituted crimes in both jurisdictions. The court held that the United Sta tes and the tribe were separate sovereigns\; therefore\, separate tribal a nd federal prosecutions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lara SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Lara END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:herrera-v-wyoming DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20190520 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20190521 DESCRIPTION:Wyoming's statehood did not void the Crow Tribe's right to hunt on "unoccupied lands of the United States" under an 1868 treaty\, and tha t the Bighorn National Forest did not automatically become "occupied" when the forest was created.\n\nDecided May 20\, 2019 (argued January 8\, 2019 ).\nOpinion of the Court: Sonia Sotomayor /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/sonia-sotomayor\nDissenting: Alito.\nTopic: Native America n law.\n\nHerrera v. Wyoming\, 587 U.S. 329 (2019)\, was a United States S upreme Court case in which the Court held that Wyoming's statehood did not void the Crow Tribe's right to hunt on "unoccupied lands of the United St ates" under an 1868 treaty\, and that the Bighorn National Forest did not automatically become "occupied" when the forest was created.\n\nhttps://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Herrera_v._Wyoming SUMMARY:⚖️ Herrera v. Wyoming END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mcgirt-v-oklahoma DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200709 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200710 DESCRIPTION:Oklahoma's land reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th ce ntury remains "Indian country". Native Americans residing in the reservati on cannot be criminally prosecuted by the state of Oklahoma.\n\nDecided Ju ly 9\, 2020 (argued May 11\, 2020).\nOpinion of the Court: Neil Gorsuch /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/neil-gorsuch\nDissenting: Ro berts\, Thomas.\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nMcGirt v. Oklahoma\, 591 U .S. 894 (2020)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case which hel d that the domain reserved for the Muscogee Nation by Congress in the 19th century has never been disestablished and constitutes Indian country for the purposes of the Major Crimes Act\, meaning that the state of Oklahoma has no right to prosecute American Indians for crimes allegedly committed therein. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied the McGirt rationa le to rule nine other Indigenous nations had not been disestablished. As a result\, almost the entirety of the eastern half of what is now the state of Oklahoma remains Indian country\, meaning that criminal prosecutions o f Native Americans for offenses therein falls outside the jurisdiction of Oklahoma’s court system. In these cases\, jurisdiction properly vests wi thin the Indigenous judicial systems and the federal district courts under the Major Crimes Act.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McGirt_v._Oklahoma SUMMARY:⚖️ McGirt v. Oklahoma END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:sharp-v-murphy DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200709 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200710 DESCRIPTION:Oklahoma's land reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th ce ntury remains "Indian country". Native Americans residing in the reservati on cannot be criminally prosecuted by the state of Oklahoma. Reaffirms McG irt v. Oklahoma\n\nDecided July 9\, 2020 (argued November 27\, 2018).\nDis senting: Thomas\, Alito (dissenters did not file or join an opinion).\nTop ic: Native American law.\n\nSharp v. Murphy\, 591 U.S. 977 (2020)\, was a Supreme Court of the United States case of whether Congress disestablished the Muscogee (Creek) Nation reservation. After holding the case from the 2018 term\, the case was decided on July 9\, 2020\, in a per curiam decisi on following McGirt v. Oklahoma that\, for the purposes of the Major Crime s Act\, the reservations were never disestablished and remain Indian count ry.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharp_v._Murphy SUMMARY:⚖️ Sharp v. Murphy END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-cooley DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210602 DESCRIPTION:Native American tribal governments and police have the power to search and detain non-Native individuals suspected of violating state or federal laws on tribal lands.\n\nDecided June 1\, 2021 (argued March 23\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/supreme-cou rt-justices/events/stephen-breyer\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nUnited S tates v. Cooley (2021) was a Supreme Court of the United States case on th e powers of tribal police.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_ v._Cooley SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Cooley END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:oklahoma-v-castro-huerta DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220630 DESCRIPTION:The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdicti on to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.\n\nDecided June 29\, 2022 (argued April 27\, 2022).\nOpinion of t he Court: Brett Kavanaugh /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ brett-kavanaugh\nDissenting: Gorsuch.\nTopic: Native American law.\n\nOkla homa v. Castro-Huerta\, 597 U.S. 629 (2022)\, was a United States Supreme Court case related to McGirt v. Oklahoma\, decided in 2020. In McGirt\, th e Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Congress never properly disestablished the Indian reservations of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma when gra nting its statehood\, and thus almost half the state was still considered to be Native American land. As a result of McGirt\, crimes under the Major Crimes Act by Native Americans in the reservations are treated as federal crimes rather than state crimes.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oklahom a_v._Castro-Huerta SUMMARY:⚖️ Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:national-socialist-party-of-america-v-village-of-skokie DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19770614 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19770615 DESCRIPTION:If a state seeks to impose an injunction in the face of a subst antial claim of First Amendment rights\, it must provide strict procedural safeguards\, including immediate appellate review. Absent such immediate review\, the appellate court must grant a stay of any lower court order re stricting the exercise of speech and assembly rights.\n\nDecided June 14\, 1977.\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calen dars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourtee nth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-14\nTopic: General aspects.\n\nNational Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie\, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)\, arising out of what is sometimes referred to as the Skokie Affair\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme C ourt of the United States dealing with freedom of speech and freedom of as sembly. This case is commonly reviewed in constitutional law classes. Rela ted court decisions are captioned Skokie v. NSPA\, Collin v. Smith and Smi th v. Collin. The Supreme Court ruled 5–4\, per curiam\, granting certio rari and reversing and remanding the Illinois Supreme Court's denial to li ft the lower court's injunction on the NSPA's march. The ruling dictated t hat when citizens assert that their speech is being restrained\, the matte r must be reviewed immediately by the judiciary. By requiring the state co urt to consider the neo-Nazis' appeal without delay\, the Supreme Court de cision allowed the National Socialist Party of America to march in Skokie\ , although they did not do so.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_S ocialist_Party_of_America_v._Village_of_Skokie SUMMARY:⚖️ National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:ward-v-rock-against-racism DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19890622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19890623 DESCRIPTION:Content-neutral restrictions on the time\, place and manner of speech that are found to serve a compelling state interest must be narrowl y tailored to their goal.\n\nDecided June 22\, 1989 (argued February 27\, 1989).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Marshall.\nTopic: General aspects.\n\nWard v. Rock Against Racism\, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)\, was a Uni ted States Supreme Court case.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ward_v._Ro ck_Against_Racism SUMMARY:⚖️ Ward v. Rock Against Racism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:patterson-v-colorado DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19070415 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19070416 DESCRIPTION:Created the bad tendency test\, which permitted restriction of freedom of speech by government if it is believed that a form of speech ha s a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. (Overruled by Schen ck v. United States (1919))\n\nDecided April 15\, 1907 (argued March 5\, 1 907).\nOpinion of the Court: Oliver Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supre me-court-justices/events/oliver-wendell-holmes\nDissenting: Brewer\, Harla n.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amend ments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nPa tterson v. Colorado\, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)\, was a First Amendment case. Be fore 1919\, the primary legal test used in the United States to determine if speech could be criminalized was the bad tendency test. Rooted in Engli sh common law\, the test permitted speech to be outlawed if it had a tende ncy to harm public welfare. One of the earliest cases the Supreme Court he ard addressing punishment after material was published was 1907's Patterso n v. Colorado in which the Court used the bad tendency test to uphold cont empt charges against a newspaper publisher who accused Colorado judges of acting on behalf of local utility companies.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Patterson_v._Colorado SUMMARY:⚖️ Patterson v. Colorado END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mutual-film-corp-v-industrial-commission-of-ohio DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19150223 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19150224 DESCRIPTION:Motion pictures are not entitled to free speech protection beca use they are a business\, not a form of art. (Overruled by Joseph Burstyn\ , Inc. v. Wilson (1952))\n\nDecided February 23\, 1915 (argued 1915).\nOpi nion of the Court: Joseph McKenna /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/joseph-mckenna\nOverruled by Joseph Burstyn\, Inc. v. Wilson (1952 ) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/joseph-burstyn -inc-v-wilson\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nMutual Film C orporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio\, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)\, was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court ruling by a 9–0 vote that the free speech protection of the Ohio Constitution\, which was substantially similar to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution\, did not extend to motion pictures.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Film_C orp._v._Industrial_Commission_of_Ohio SUMMARY:⚖️ Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:schenck-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19190303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19190304 DESCRIPTION:Expressions in which the circumstances are intended to result i n crime that poses a clear and present danger of succeeding can be punishe d without violating the First Amendment. (Overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969))\n\nDecided March 3\, 1919 (argued 1919).\nOpinion of the Court: O liver Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/olive r-wendell-holmes\nOverruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio\, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ( in part) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/branden burg-v-ohio\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutio nal-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the pre ss.\n\nSchenck v. United States\, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)\, was a landmark deci sion of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court\, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.\, concluded that Charles Schenck and oth er defendants\, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction\, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft\, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecu tion\, even though\, "in many places and in ordinary times\, the defendant s\, in saying all that was said in the circular\, would have been within t heir constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon th e circumstances in which it is done." In this case\, Holmes said\, "the wo rds used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to cre ate a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore\, Schenck could be punished.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schenck_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Schenck v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:abrams-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19191110 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19191111 DESCRIPTION:Upheld arrests made under the Sedition Act of 1918 as constitut ional under the clear and present danger test. (Overruled by Brandenburg v . Ohio (1969))\n\nDecided November 10\, 1919 (argued 1919).\nOpinion of th e Court: John Hessin Clarke /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/john-hessin-clarke\nDissenting: Holmes.\nOverruled by Brandenburg v. Ohi o\, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (in part) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court -decisions/events/brandenburg-v-ohio\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel /calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nAbrams v. United States\, 250 U.S. 616 (19 19)\, was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding t he criminal arrests of several anarchists under the Sedition Act of 1918\, accused of inciting discontent by circulating leaflets criticizing the Un ited States' participation in World War I.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wik i/Abrams_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Abrams v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gitlow-v-new-york DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19250608 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19250609 DESCRIPTION:The provisions of the First Amendment that protect the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press apply to the governments of the sta tes through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided June 8\, 1925 (argued April 12\, 1923).\nOpinion of the Court: Edward Ter ry Sanford /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/edward-terry-sa nford\nDissenting: Holmes.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nGitlow v. New York\, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)\, was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Co urt holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutio n had extended the First Amendment's provisions protecting freedom of spee ch and freedom of the press to apply to the governments of U.S. states. Al ong with Chicago\, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (18 97)\, it was one of the first major cases involving the incorporation of t he Bill of Rights. It was also one of a series of Supreme Court cases that defined the scope of the First Amendment's protection of free speech and established the standard to which a state or the federal government would be held when it criminalized speech or writing.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Gitlow_v._New_York SUMMARY:⚖️ Gitlow v. New York END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:stromberg-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19310518 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19310519 DESCRIPTION:A California law that bans red flags is unconstitutional becaus e it violates the First Amendment's protection of symbolic speech as appli ed to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided May 18\, 193 1 (argued April 15\, 1931).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Hughes /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes-chief-j ustice\nDissenting: McReynolds\, Butler.\nApplied: the First Amendment /tr avel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: t he Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/eve nts/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nStromberg v. California\, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)\, is a landmark decision of the Suprem e Court of the United States in which the Court held\, 7–2\, that a Cali fornia statute banning red flags was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the case\, Yetta Stromberg was convicted for displaying a red flag daily i n the youth camp for children at which she worked\, and was charged in acc ordance with California law. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the seven-justice majority that the California statute was unconstitutiona l\, and therefore Stromberg's conviction could not stand.\n\nhttps://en.wi kipedia.org/wiki/Stromberg_v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Stromberg v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:near-v-minnesota DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19310601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19310602 DESCRIPTION:A Minnesota law that imposes prior restraints on the publicatio n of "malicious\, scandalous\, and defamatory" content violates the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDe cided June 1\, 1931 (argued January 30\, 1930).\nOpinion of the Court: Cha rles Evans Hughes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles- evans-hughes-chief-justice\nDissenting: Butler.\nApplied: the First Amendm ent /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApp lied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nNea r v. Minnesota\, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)\, is a landmark decision of the US Su preme Court under which prior restraint on publication was found to violat e freedom of the press as protected under the First Amendment. This princi ple was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" o r "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United State s Constitution. Legal scholar and columnist Anthony Lewis called Near the Court's "first great press case".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Near_v. _Minnesota SUMMARY:⚖️ Near v. Minnesota END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19420309 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19420310 DESCRIPTION:Fighting words—words that by their very utterance inflict inj ury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace—are not protected by the First Amendment.\n\nDecided March 9\, 1942 (argued February 5\, 19 42).\nOpinion of the Court: Frank Murphy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-j ustices/events/frank-murphy\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speec h and of the press.\n\nChaplinsky v. New Hampshire\, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine\, a limitation of the F irst Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Chaplinsky_v._New_Hampshire SUMMARY:⚖️ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:joseph-burstyn-inc-v-wilson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19520526 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19520527 DESCRIPTION:Motion pictures\, as a form of artistic expression\, are protec ted by the First Amendment.\n\nDecided May 26\, 1952 (argued April 24\, 19 52).\nOpinion of the Court: Thomas Campbell Clark /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/thomas-campbell-clark\nApplied: the First Amendmen t /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nAppli ed: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendment s/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nJosep h Burstyn\, Inc. v. Wilson\, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)\, also referred to as the Miracle Decision\, is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Co urt that largely marked the decline of motion picture censorship in the Un ited States. It determined that provisions of the New York Education Law t hat had allowed a censor to forbid the commercial showing of a motion pict ure film that the censor deemed "sacrilegious" were a "restraint on freedo m of speech" and thereby a violation of the First Amendment.\n\nhttps://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Burstyn%2C_Inc._v._Wilson SUMMARY:⚖️ Joseph Burstyn\, Inc. v. Wilson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:roth-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19570624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19570625 DESCRIPTION:Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. (Supe rseded by Miller v. California (1973))\n\nDecided June 24\, 1957 (argued A pril 22\, 1957).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Harlan\, D ouglas.\nOverruled by Miller v. California\, /travel/calendars/landmark-su preme-court-decisions/events/miller-v-california\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nRoth v. United States\, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)\, along with its companion case Alberts v. California\, was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which redefined the constitutional test for determining what constitutes obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court\, in an opinion by Justice William J. Brennan Jr. created a test to determine what constituted obscene material: Whether the average person\, applying contemporary community standards\, would fi nd that the material appeals to a prurient interest in sex\, and whether t he material was utterly without redeeming social value. Although the Court upheld Roth’s conviction and allowed some obscenity prosecutions\, it d rastically loosened obscenity laws. The decision dissatisfied both social conservatives who thought that it had gone too far in tolerating sexual im agery\, and liberals who felt that it infringed on the rights of consentin g adults.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roth_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Roth v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:manual-enterprises-inc-v-day DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19620625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19620626 DESCRIPTION:Images of naked men are not\, per se\, obscene\, extending Oles en in a way that spurred an increase in same-sex erotica that helped spur the rise of the LGBTQ rights movement later in the decade.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1962 (argued 1962).\nOpinion of the Court: Harlan\nDissenting: Clark .\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nMAN ual Enterprises\, Inc. v. Day\, 370 U.S. 478 (1962)\, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that magazines consisting largely of photographs of nude or near-nude male models are no t considered "obscene" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1461\, which prohibits the mailing of obscene material. It was the first case in which the Court engaged in plenary review of a Post Office Department order hold ing obscene matter "nonmailable".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manual_ Enterprises%2C_Inc._v._Day SUMMARY:⚖️ Manual Enterprises\, Inc. v. Day END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-york-times-co-v-sullivan DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19640309 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19640310 DESCRIPTION:Public officials\, to prove they were libelled\, must show not only that a statement is false\, but also that it was published with malic ious intent (knowing the statement was false\, or recklessly disregarding possible falseness).\n\nDecided March 9\, 1964 (argued January 6\, 1964).\ nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/william-j-brennan\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/ca lendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Four teenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ame ndment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nNew York Times Co . v. Sullivan\, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)\, is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that the freedom of speech protections in th e First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limit the ability of public off icials to sue for defamation. The decision held that if a plaintiff in a d efamation lawsuit is a public official or candidate for public office\, th en not only must they prove the normal elements of defamation—publicatio n of a false defamatory statement to a third party—they must also prove that the statement was made with "actual malice"\, meaning the defendant e ither knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether it mi ght be false.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times_Co._v._Sulli van SUMMARY:⚖️ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:dombrowski-v-pfister DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19650426 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19650427 DESCRIPTION:A court may enjoin enforcement of a statute that is so overbroa d in its prohibition of unprotected speech that it substantially prohibits protected speech—especially if the statute is being enforced in bad fai th.\n\nDecided April 26\, 1965 (argued January 25\, 1965).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events /william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Free dom of speech and of the press.\n\nDombrowski v. Pfister\, 380 U.S. 479 (1 965)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case brought forth by Dr . James Dombrowski along with William Kunstler\, founder of the Center for Constitutional Rights\, against the governor of Louisiana\, law enforceme nt officers\, and the chairperson of the state's Legislative Joint Committ ee on Un-American Activities for prosecuting or threatening to prosecute h is organization under several state subversion statutes.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Dombrowski_v._Pfister SUMMARY:⚖️ Dombrowski v. Pfister END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:curtis-publishing-co-v-butts DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670613 DESCRIPTION:News organizations may be liable when printing allegations abou t public figures if the information they disseminate is recklessly gathere d and unchecked.\n\nDecided June 12\, 1967 (argued February 23\, 1967).\nO pinion of the Court: Harlan\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speec h and of the press.\n\nCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts\, 388 U.S. 130 (1967 )\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court establishing the standa rd of First Amendment protection against defamation claims brought by priv ate individuals.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_Publishing_Co._v. _Butts SUMMARY:⚖️ Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-o-brien DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680527 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680528 DESCRIPTION:A criminal prohibition against draft-card burning does not viol ate the First Amendment because its effect on speech is only incidental\, and it is justified by the significant governmental interest in maintainin g an efficient and effective military draft system.\n\nDecided May 27\, 19 68 (argued January 24\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/ calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nDissent ing: Douglas.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitut ional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the p ress.\n\nUnited States v. O'Brien\, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)\, is a landmark de cision of the United States Supreme Court\, ruling that a criminal prohibi tion against burning a draft card did not violate the First Amendment's gu arantee of free speech. Though the court recognized that O'Brien's conduct was expressive as a protest against the Vietnam War\, it considered the l aw justified by a significant government interest unrelated to the suppres sion of speech and was tailored towards that end.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/United_States_v._O%27Brien SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. O'Brien END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:pickering-v-board-of-education DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680603 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680604 DESCRIPTION:Public employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights to speak on matters of public concern\, even critically of their employers \, when they take their jobs.\n\nDecided June 3\, 1968 (argued March 27\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Thurgood Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme- court-justices/events/thurgood-marshall\nApplied: the First Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Free dom of speech and of the press.\n\nPickering v. Board of Education\, 391 U .S. 563 (1968)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United State s held that in the absence of proof of the teacher knowingly or recklessly making false statements the teacher had a right to speak on issues of pub lic importance without being dismissed from their position. The case was l ater distinguished by Garcetti v. Ceballos\, where the Court held that sta tements by public employees made pursuant to their employment have no Firs t Amendment protection.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pickering_v._Boar d_of_Education SUMMARY:⚖️ Pickering v. Board of Education END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:tinker-v-des-moines-independent-community-school-district DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19690224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19690225 DESCRIPTION:Public school students have free speech rights under the First Amendment. Therefore\, wearing armbands as a form of protest on public sch ool grounds qualifies as protected symbolic speech.\n\nDecided February 24 \, 1969 (argued November 12\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Abe Fortas /tr avel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/abe-fortas\nDissenting: Black \, Harlan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitution al-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freed om of speech and of the press.\n\nTinker v. Des Moines Independent Communi ty School District\, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)\, is a landmark decision by the U nited States Supreme Court that recognized the First Amendment rights of s tudents in U.S. public schools. The Tinker test\, also known as the "subst antial disruption" test\, is still used by courts today to determine wheth er a school's interest in preventing disruption outweighs students' First Amendment rights. The Court famously oponed\, "It can hardly be argued tha t either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Tinker_v._Des_Moines_Independent_Community_School_District SUMMARY:⚖️ Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:brandenburg-v-ohio DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19690609 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19690610 DESCRIPTION:The mere advocacy of the use of force or of violation of the la w is protected by the First Amendment. Only inciting others to take direct and immediate unlawful action is without constitutional protection.\n\nDe cided June 9\, 1969 (argued February 27\, 1969).\nApplied: the First Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nAp plied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nBr andenburg v. Ohio\, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)\, is a landmark decision of the Un ited States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. Con stitution. The Court held that the government cannot punish inflammatory s peech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent la wless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically \, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute\, because tha t statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. In the process \, Whitney v. California (1927) was explicitly overruled\, and Schenck v. United States (1919)\, Abrams v. United States (1919)\, Gitlow v. New York (1925)\, and Dennis v. United States (1951) were overturned.\n\nhttps://e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio SUMMARY:⚖️ Brandenburg v. Ohio END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cohen-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710607 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710608 DESCRIPTION:The First Amendment prohibits the states from making the public display of a single four-letter expletive a criminal offense without a mo re specific and compelling reason than a general tendency to disturb the p eace.\n\nDecided June 7\, 1971 (argued February 22\, 1971).\nOpinion of th e Court: Harlan\nDissenting: Blackmun.\nApplied: the First Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nCohen v. Cal ifornia\, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Co urt holding that the First Amendment prevented the conviction of Paul Robe rt Cohen for the crime of disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket display ing "Fuck the Draft" in the public corridors of a California courthouse.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohen_v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Cohen v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-york-times-co-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710701 DESCRIPTION:The federal government's desire to keep the Pentagon Papers cla ssified is not strong enough to justify violating the First Amendment by i mposing prior restraints on the material.\n\nDecided June 30\, 1971 (argue d June 25\, 1971).\nDissenting: Burger\, Harlan\, Blackmun.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amen dment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nNew York Times Co. v. United States\, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)\, often referred to as The Pentagon Papers Case\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United S tates on the First Amendment right to freedom of the press. The ruling mad e it possible for The New York Times and The Washington Post newspapers to publish the then-classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government ce nsorship or punishment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times_Co ._v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ New York Times Co. v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:branzburg-v-hayes DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720630 DESCRIPTION:The First Amendment's protection of press freedom does not give the reporters' privilege in court.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1972 (argued Febr uary 23\, 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Douglas\, Stewart.\nApp lied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nBranzburg v. Hayes\, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court invalidating the use of the First Amendment as a defense for report ers summoned to testify before a grand jury. The case was argued February 23\, 1972\, and decided June 29 of the same year. The reporters lost their case by a vote of 5–4. This case is cited for the rule that in federal courts\, a reporter may not generally avoid testifying in a criminal grand jury\, and is one of a limited number of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the use of reporters' privilege.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Branzburg_v._Hayes SUMMARY:⚖️ Branzburg v. Hayes END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:miller-v-california DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19730621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19730622 DESCRIPTION:To be obscene\, a work must fail the Miller test\, which determ ines if it has any "serious literary\, artistic\, political\, or scientifi c value."\n\nDecided June 21\, 1973 (argued 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e- burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Douglas\, Brennan.\nApplied: the First A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1 \nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nMiller v. California\, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court clarify ing the legal definition of obscenity. The ruling was the origin of the th ree-part judicial test for determining obscene media content that can be b anned by government authorities\, which is now known as the Miller test.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_v._California SUMMARY:⚖️ Miller v. California END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gertz-v-robert-welch-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740626 DESCRIPTION:The First Amendment permits the states to formulate their own s tandards of liability for defamation against private individuals as long a s liability is not imposed without fault. If the state standard is lower t han actual malice\, then only actual damages may be awarded.\n\nDecided Ju ne 25\, 1974 (argued November 14\, 1973).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nD issenting: Burger\, Douglas\, Brennan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freed om of speech and of the press.\n\nGertz v. Robert Welch\, Inc.\, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court establishing t he standard of First Amendment protection against defamation claims brough t by private individuals. The Court held that\, so long as they do not imp ose liability without fault\, states are free to establish their own stand ards of liability for defamatory statements made about private individuals . However\, the Court also ruled that if the state standard is lower than actual malice\, the standard applying to public figures\, then only actual damages may be awarded.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gertz_v._Robert_ Welch%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Gertz v. Robert Welch\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:buckley-v-valeo DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760130 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760131 DESCRIPTION:Spending money to influence elections is a form of constitution ally protected free speech\; therefore\, federal limits on campaign contri butions are constitutional in only a limited number of circumstances.\n\nD ecided January 30\, 1976 (argued November 10\, 1975).\nOpinion of the Cour t: Per curiam\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitut ional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the p ress.\n\nBuckley v. Valeo\, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on campaign finance. A majority of justices held th at\, as provided by section 608 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19 71\, limits on election expenditures are unconstitutional. In a per curiam opinion\, they ruled that expenditure limits contravene the First Amendme nt provision on freedom of speech because a restriction on spending for po litical communication necessarily reduces the quantity of expression. It l imited disclosure provisions and limited the Federal Election Commission's power. Justice Byron White dissented in part and wrote that Congress had legitimately recognized unlimited election spending as "a mortal danger ag ainst which effective preventive and curative steps must be taken".\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buckley_v._Valeo SUMMARY:⚖️ Buckley v. Valeo END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:virginia-state-pharmacy-board-v-virginia-citizens-consumer-council DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760524 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760525 DESCRIPTION:Commercial speech enjoys limited First Amendment protection.\n\ nDecided May 24\, 1976 (argued November 11\, 1975).\nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/harry-blac kmun\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calenda rs/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of spee ch and of the press.\n\nVirginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council\, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)\, was a case in which the United S tates Supreme Court held that a state could not limit pharmacists' right t o provide information about prescription drug prices. This was an importan t case in determining the application of the First Amendment to commercial speech.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_State_Pharmacy_Board_v. _Virginia_Citizens_Consumer_Council SUMMARY:⚖️ Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:federal-communications-commission-v-pacifica-foundation DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780703 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780704 DESCRIPTION:Broadcasting has less First Amendment protection than other for ms of communication because of its pervasive nature. The Federal Communica tions Commission has broad authority to determine what constitutes indecen cy in different contexts.\n\nDecided July 3\, 1978 (argued 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: Stevens (Parts I\, II\, III\, and IV-C)\nDissenting: Brenna n\, Stewart.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the pr ess.\n\nFederal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation\, 438 U.S . 726 (1978)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court t hat upheld the ability of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to r egulate indecent content sent over the broadcast airwaves.\n\nhttps://en.w ikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Communications_Commission_v._Pacifica_Foundation SUMMARY:⚖️ Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:central-hudson-gas-electric-corp-v-public-service-commission DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19800620 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19800621 DESCRIPTION:The United States Supreme Court laid out a four-part test for d etermining when restrictions on commercial speech violated the First Amend ment of the United States Constitution.\n\nDecided June 20\, 1980 (argued March 17\, 1980).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nA pplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nCentral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission\, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)\, was an important case decided by the U nited States Supreme Court that laid out a four-part test for determining when restrictions on commercial speech violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the court . Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. had challenged a Public Service Comm ission regulation that prohibited promotional advertising by electric util ities. Justice Brennan\, Justice Blackmun\, and Justice Stevens wrote sepa rate concurring opinions\, and the latter two were both joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Rehnquist dissented. The case presented the question whet her a regulation of the New York Public Service Commission violates the Fi rst and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional adver tising by an electrical utility.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_ Hudson_Gas_%26_Electric_Corp._v._Public_Service_Commission SUMMARY:⚖️ Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis sion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820703 DESCRIPTION:Nonviolent boycotts and related activities to bring about polit ical\, social\, and economic change are political speech which are entitle d to the protection of the First Amendment.\n\nDecided July 2\, 1982 (argu ed March 3\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nTopic: Freedom of sp eech and of the press.\n\nNational Association for the Advancement of Colo red People v. Claiborne Hardware Co.\, 458 U.S. 886 (1982)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that the broad power o f states to regulate economic activities does not include prohibiting peac eful advocacy of a politically motivated boycott.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/NAACP_v._Claiborne_Hardware_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-york-v-ferber DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820703 DESCRIPTION:Laws that prohibit the sale\, distribution\, and advertisement of child pornography are constitutional even if the content does not meet the conditions necessary for it to be labeled obscene.\n\nDecided July 2\, 1982 (argued April 27\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel /calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nApplied: the First A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1 \nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nNew York v. Ferber\, 458 U .S. 747 (1982)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S Supreme Court\, unanimo usly ruling that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution did not protect the sale or manufacture of child sexual abuse material and th at states could outlaw it.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_v._Fe rber SUMMARY:⚖️ New York v. Ferber END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:connick-v-myers DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19830420 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19830421 DESCRIPTION:Public employers may take adverse action against employees for otherwise protected speech on matters of public concern\, including speech critical of them\, if they have a reasonable belief that the speech is di sruptive to their operations.\n\nDecided April 20\, 1983 (argued November 8\, 1982).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Brennan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment- 1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nConnick v. Myers\, 461 U. S. 138 (1983)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning the F irst Amendment rights of public employees who speak on matters of possible public concern within the workplace context. It was first brought by Shei la Myers\, an Orleans Parish\, Louisiana\, assistant district attorney (AD A). She had been fired by her superior\, District Attorney Harry Connick S r.\, when\, after receiving a transfer she had fiercely resisted in privat e conversations with him and his chief assistant district attorney\, she d istributed a questionnaire to her fellow prosecutors asking about their ex perience with Connick's management practices. At trial\, Judge Jack Gordon of the Eastern District of Louisiana found the firing had been motivated by the questionnaire and was thus an infringement on her right to speak ou t on matters of public concern as a public employee. After the Fifth Circu it affirmed the verdict\, Connick appealed to the Supreme Court.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connick_v._Myers SUMMARY:⚖️ Connick v. Myers END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:posadas-de-puerto-rico-associates-v-tourism-co-of-puerto-rico DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860701 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860702 DESCRIPTION:Illustrated the elasticity of the Central Hudson standards for regulating commercial speech.\n\nDecided July 1\, 1986 (argued April 28\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme- court-justices/events/william-rehnquist\nDissenting: Brennan\, Stevens.\nA pplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nPosadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P uerto Rico\, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)\, was a 1986 appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Ac t of 1948 is in legal compliance with the United States Constitution\, spe cifically as regards freedom of speech\, equal protection and due process. In a 5–4 decision\, the Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico governm ent (law) could restrict advertisement for casino gambling from being targ eted to residents\, even if the activity itself was legal and advertisemen t to tourists was permitted. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Puerto Ri co Supreme Court conclusion\, as construed by the Puerto Rico Superior Cou rt\, that the Act and regulations do not facially violate the First Amendm ent\, nor did it violate the due process or Equal Protection Clauses of th e Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posadas_de_Puerto _Rico_Associates_v._Tourism_Co._of_Puerto_Rico SUMMARY:⚖️ Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto R ico END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bethel-school-district-v-fraser DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860707 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860708 DESCRIPTION:The First Amendment permits a public school to punish a student for giving a lewd and indecent speech at a school assembly even if the sp eech is not obscene.\n\nDecided July 7\, 1986 (argued March 3\, 1986).\nOp inion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justi ces/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Marshall\, Stevens.\ nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendmen ts/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speec h and of the press.\n\nBethel School District v. Fraser\, 478 U.S. 675 (19 86)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court upheld the suspension of a high school student who deliver ed a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly. The case involved fr ee speech in public schools.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bethel_Schoo l_District_v._Fraser SUMMARY:⚖️ Bethel School District v. Fraser END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hazelwood-v-kuhlmeier DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19880113 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19880114 DESCRIPTION:Public school curricular student newspapers that have not been established as forums for student expression are subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection than independent student expression or newsp apers established by policy or practice as forums for student expression.\ n\nDecided January 13\, 1988 (argued October 13\, 1987).\nOpinion of the C ourt: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-wh ite\nDissenting: Brennan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/ us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nHazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al.\ , 484 U.S. 260 (1988)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which held\, in a 5–3 decision\, that student speech in a school-sponsored student newspaper at a public high school could be censo red by school officials without a violation of First Amendment rights if t he school's actions were "reasonably related" to a legitimate pedagogical concern.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazelwood_v._Kuhlmeier SUMMARY:⚖️ Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hustler-magazine-v-falwell DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19880224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19880225 DESCRIPTION:Parodies of public figures\, including those intended to cause emotional distress\, are protected by the First Amendment.\n\nDecided Febr uary 24\, 1988 (argued December 2\, 1987).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquis t-chief-justice\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constit utional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment / travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nHustler Magazine\, Inc. v. Falwell\ , 485 U.S. 46 (1988)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that parodies of public figures\, ev en those intending to cause emotional distress\, are protected by the Firs t and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell SUMMARY:⚖️ Hustler Magazine v. Falwell END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:texas-v-johnson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19890621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19890622 DESCRIPTION:A Texas law that criminalizes the desecration of the American f lag is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment's protecti on of symbolic speech. This decision invalidates laws prohibiting flag des ecration in 48 of the 50 states. Alaska and Wyoming had no such laws.\n\nD ecided June 21\, 1989 (argued March 21\, 1989).\nOpinion of the Court: Wil liam J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j- brennan\nDissenting: Rehnquist\, Stevens.\nApplied: the First Amendment /t ravel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/ev ents/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nTexas v. Johnson\, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Cour t of the United States in which the Court held\, 5–4\, that burning the flag of the United States is protected speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution\, as doing so counts as symbolic speech and politic al speech.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_v._Johnson SUMMARY:⚖️ Texas v. Johnson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:barnes-v-glen-theatre-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19910621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19910622 DESCRIPTION:While nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct\, public ind ecency laws regulating or prohibiting nude dancing are constitutional beca use they further substantial governmental interests in maintaining order a nd protecting morality.\n\nDecided June 21\, 1991 (argued January 8\, 1991 ).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-cour t-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\nDissenting: White.\nApp lied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nBarnes v. Glen Theatre\, Inc.\, 501 U.S. 560 (1991)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the First Amendment and the ability of the government to outlaw certain forms of expressive conduct. It ruled that th e state has the constitutional authority to ban public nudity\, even as pa rt of expressive conduct such as dancing\, because it furthers a substanti al government interest in protecting the morality and order of society. Th is case is perhaps best summarized by a sentence in Justice Souter's concu rring opinion\, which is often paraphrased as "Nudity itself is not inhere ntly expressive conduct."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barnes_v._Glen_ Theatre%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Barnes v. Glen Theatre\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:r-a-v-v-city-of-st-paul DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19920622 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19920623 DESCRIPTION:Saint Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance is a content-based restriction of speech and is therefore unconstitutional.\n\nDecided June 2 2\, 1992 (argued December 4\, 1991).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nR.A.V. v. City of St. Paul\, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)\, is a case in which the Supreme Court o f the United States unanimously invalidated Saint Paul\, Minnesota's Bias- Motivated Crime Ordinance and reversed the conviction of a teenager for bu rning a cross on the lawn of an African-American family. The ordinance was held to violate the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. Th e court reasoned that the ordinance constituted "viewpoint discrimination" that could cause exclusions from the marketplace of ideas.\n\nhttps://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/R.A.V._v._City_of_St._Paul SUMMARY:⚖️ R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:wisconsin-v-mitchell DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19930611 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19930612 DESCRIPTION:Enhanced penalties for hate crimes are constitutional.\n\nDecid ed June 11\, 1993 (argued April 21\, 1993).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnqui st-chief-justice\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-consti tutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of th e press.\n\nWisconsin v. Mitchell\, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)\, was a case in wh ich the United States Supreme Court held that enhanced penalties for hate crimes do not violate criminal defendants' First Amendment rights. It was a landmark precedent pertaining to First Amendment free speech arguments f or hate crime legislation. In effect\, the Court ruled that a state may co nsider whether a crime was committed or initially considered due to an int ended victim's status in a protected class.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/Wisconsin_v._Mitchell SUMMARY:⚖️ Wisconsin v. Mitchell END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:reno-v-american-civil-liberties-union DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970627 DESCRIPTION:The Communications Decency Act\, which regulates certain conten t on the Internet\, is so overbroad that it is an unconstitutional restrai nt on the First Amendment.\n\nDecided June 26\, 1997 (argued March 19\, 19 97).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nApplied: the First Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedo m of speech and of the press.\n\nReno v. American Civil Liberties Union\, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the U nited States\, unanimously ruling that indecency provisions of the 1996 Co mmunications Decency Act violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freed om of speech. This was the first major Supreme Court ruling on the regulat ion of materials distributed via the Internet.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Reno_v._American_Civil_Liberties_Union SUMMARY:⚖️ Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:virginia-v-black DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20030407 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20030408 DESCRIPTION:Any state statute which bans cross burning on the basis that it constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate is a violation o f the First Amendment to the Constitution. However\, states may still ban cross burning with intent to intimidate due to the act's uniquely hateful history.\n\nDecided April 7\, 2003 (argued December 11\, 2002).\nOpinion o f the Court: O'Connor (Parts I\, II\, III)\nDissenting: Thomas.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nVirginia v. Bla ck\, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held\, 5–4\, that any state statute banning cross burning on the basis that it constitutes prima facie eviden ce of intent to intimidate is a violation of the First Amendment to the Co nstitution. Such a provision\, the Court argued\, blurs the distinction be tween proscribable "threats of intimidation" and the Ku Klux Klan's protec ted "messages of shared ideology". In the case\, three defendants were con victed in two separate cases of violating a Virginia statute against cross burning. However\, cross-burning can be a criminal offense if the intent to intimidate is proven. It was argued by former Solicitor General of Virg inia\, William Hurd and Rodney A. Smolla.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Virginia_v._Black SUMMARY:⚖️ Virginia v. Black END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mcconnell-v-fec DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20031210 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20031211 DESCRIPTION:Upheld the constitutionality of most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. (Overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010))\n\nDecided December 10\, 2003 (argued September 8\, 2003).\nOpinio n of the Court: Stevens\, O'Connor (Titles I and II)\nDissenting: Rehnquis t\, Stevens.\nOverruled by Citizens United v. FEC (2010) (in part)\nApplie d: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/even ts/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nMcConnell v. Federal Election Commission\, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)\, is a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the B ipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)\, often referred to as the McCain–F eingold Act.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McConnell_v._FEC SUMMARY:⚖️ McConnell v. FEC END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:garcetti-v-ceballos DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20060530 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20060531 DESCRIPTION:When public employees speak in their capacity as citizens on ma tters of public concern\, even to criticize their employers\, their speech is protected.\n\nDecided May 30\, 2006 (argued October 12\, 2005).\nOpini on of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter\, Breyer.\nApplied: t he First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/a mendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nGarcetti v. Ceba llos\, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)\, is a U.S. Supreme Court decision involving Fi rst Amendment free speech protections for government employees. The plaint iff in the case was a district attorney who claimed that he had been passe d up for a promotion for criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant. The Cour t ruled\, in a 5–4 decision\, that because his statements were made purs uant to his position as a public employee\, rather than as a private citiz en\, his speech had no First Amendment protection.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia .org/wiki/Garcetti_v._Ceballos SUMMARY:⚖️ Garcetti v. Ceballos END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:davis-v-federal-election-commission DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080627 DESCRIPTION:Limitations on financial contributions to political campaigns o f candidates whose opponents are self-funding their own campaigns may not be raised beyond whatever their opponents can legally contribute. Section 319 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is unconstitutional beca use it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.\n\nDecided June 26\, 2008 (argued April 22\, 2008).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Ali to /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nDavis v. Federa l Election Commission\, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)\, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that section 319 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 unconstitutionally infringed on candidates' ri ghts as provided by First Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davi s_v._Federal_Election_Commission SUMMARY:⚖️ Davis v. Federal Election Commission END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20100121 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20100122 DESCRIPTION:Limits on corporate and union political expenditures during ele ction cycles violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Corpor ations and labor unions can spend unlimited sums in support of or in oppos ition to candidates as long as the spending is independent of the candidat es.\n\nDecided January 21\, 2010 (argued March 1\, 2009).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ant hony-kennedy\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the pr ess.\n\nCitizens United v. Federal Election Commission\, 558 U.S. 310 (201 0)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States ruli ng that certain campaign finance restrictions are inconsistent with the Fr ee Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The court struck down Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act\, which prohibited "electioneering communications" paid for by corporations\, labor unions\, and other organi zations. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Citizens United in a 5-4 deci sion\, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing the majority opinion. All Demo cratic-appointed justices dissented.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citi zens_United_v._Federal_Election_Commission SUMMARY:⚖️ Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:snyder-v-phelps DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20110302 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20110303 DESCRIPTION:The Westboro Baptist Church's picketing of funerals cannot be l iable for a tort of emotional distress.\n\nDecided March 2\, 2011 (argued October 6\, 2010).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/s upreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Alito .\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nSny der v. Phelps\, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)\, is a landmark decision by the Suprem e Court of the United States in which the Court held that speech made in a public place on a matter of public concern cannot be the basis of liabili ty for a tort of emotional distress\, even if the speech is viewed as offe nsive or outrageous.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps SUMMARY:⚖️ Snyder v. Phelps END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:brown-v-entertainment-merchants-association DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20110627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20110628 DESCRIPTION:Laws restricting the sale of violent video games to children wi thout parental supervision violate the First Amendment.\n\nDecided June 27 \, 2011 (argued November 2\, 2010).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting : Thomas\, Breyer.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-cons titutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nBrown v. Entertainment Merchants Association\, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court that struck down a 2005 California law banning the sale of certain violent video games to ch ildren without parental supervision. In a 7–2 decision\, the Court affir med the lower court decisions and nullified the law\, ruling that video ga mes were protected speech under the First Amendment as other forms of medi a.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_v._Entertainment_Merchants_Assoc iation SUMMARY:⚖️ Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mccutcheon-v-federal-election-commission DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140402 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140403 DESCRIPTION:Limits on the total amounts of money that individuals can donat e to political campaigns during two-year election cycles violate the First Amendment.\n\nDecided April 2\, 2014 (argued October 8\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events /john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Breyer.\nApplied: the First Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTo pic: Freedom of speech and of the press.\n\nMcCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission\, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)\, was a landmark decision of the US Supr eme Court on campaign finance. The decision held that Section 441 of the F ederal Election Campaign Act of 1971\, which imposed a limit on contributi ons an individual can make over a two-year period to all national party an d federal candidate committees\, is unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/McCutcheon_v._Federal_Election_Commission SUMMARY:⚖️ McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180614 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180615 DESCRIPTION:A law banning politically motivated apparel and accessories ins ide polling places is overbroad and violates the First Amendment.\n\nDecid ed June 14\, 2018 (argued February 28\, 2018).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chie f-justice\nDissenting: Sotomayor.\nTopic: Freedom of speech and of the pre ss.\n\nMinnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky\, 585 U.S. 1 (2018)\, is a land mark decision of the US Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of governmental speech restrictions in a polling place venue. The case challe nged a century-old Minnesota law that prevents voters from wearing clothin g or items considered political while voting. While the Supreme Court prev iously ruled that political campaigning near polling places may be restric ted\, the Minnesota law was challenged as overbroad and violative of free speech rights under the First Amendment. On June 14\, 2018\, the Court rul ed by a 7–2 vote that the Minnesota law was overbroad and violated free speech rights and was therefore unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Minnesota_Voters_Alliance_v._Mansky SUMMARY:⚖️ Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:janus-v-afscme DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180628 DESCRIPTION:No public sector employee\, having refused membership in a trad e union\, may be compelled to pay union dues to said union because of the benefits he may receive from their collective bargaining. "Fair share" agr eements\, when applied to public sector workers\, violate the First Amendm ent protections of free association and freedom of speech.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2018 (argued February 26\, 2018).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alit o /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting : Sotomayor\, Kagan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of speech and o f the press.\n\nJanus v. American Federation of State\, County\, and Munic ipal Employees\, Council 31\, 585 U.S. 878 (2018)\, abbreviated Janus v. A FSCME\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on US labor law\, c oncerning the power of labor unions to collect fees from non-union members . Under the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947\, which applies to most of the priv ate sector\, union security agreements can be allowed by state law. The Su preme Court ruled that such union fees in the public sector violate the Fi rst Amendment right to free speech\, overruling the 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education that had previously allowed such fees.\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janus_v._AFSCME SUMMARY:⚖️ Janus v. AFSCME END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:reynolds-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18790106 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18790107 DESCRIPTION:Religious belief or duty cannot be used as a defense against a criminal indictment.\n\nDecided January 6\, 1879 (argued 1878).\nOpinion o f the Court: Morrison Waite /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/morrison-waite-chief-justice\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nReynolds v. United States\, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)\, was a Supreme Court of the United St ates case which held that religious duty was not a defense to a criminal i ndictment. Reynolds was the first Supreme Court opinion to address the Fir st Amendment's protection of religious liberties\, impartial juries and th e Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Reynolds_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Reynolds v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:davis-v-beason DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18900203 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18900204 DESCRIPTION:The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882 does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment even though polygamy is part of se veral religious beliefs.\n\nDecided February 3\, 1890 (argued 1889).\nOpin ion of the Court: Stephen Johnson Field /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/stephen-johnson-field\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nDavis v. Beason\, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)\, was a United States Supreme Court case a ffirming\, by a 9–0 vote\, that federal laws against polygamy did not co nflict with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davis_v._Beason SUMMARY:⚖️ Davis v. Beason END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cantwell-v-connecticut DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19400520 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19400521 DESCRIPTION:The states cannot interfere with the free exercise of religion. \n\nDecided May 20\, 1940 (argued March 29\, 1940).\nOpinion of the Court: Owen Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/owen-roberts \nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of reli gion.\n\nCantwell v. Connecticut\, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)\, is a landmark cou rt decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amen dment's federal protection of religious free exercise incorporates via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and so applies to state go vernments too.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantwell_v._Connecticut SUMMARY:⚖️ Cantwell v. Connecticut END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:minersville-school-district-v-gobitis DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19400603 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19400604 DESCRIPTION:The First Amendment does not require public schools to excuse s tudents from saluting the American flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegia nce on religious grounds. (Overruled by West Virginia State Board of Educa tion v. Barnette (1943))\n\nDecided June 3\, 1940 (argued April 25\, 1940) .\nOpinion of the Court: Felix Frankfurter /travel/calendars/supreme-court -justices/events/felix-frankfurter\nDissenting: Stone.\nOverruled by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette\, {{ussc|319|624|1943 /trave l/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/west-virginia-state-bo ard-of-education-v-barnette\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment -14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nMinersville School District v. Gobitis \, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)\, was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States restricting the religious rights of public school students under t he First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that public schools could compel students—in this case\, Jehovah's Witnesses —to salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite the students' religious objections to these practices. This decision led to increased persecution of Witnesses in the United States. The Supreme Co urt overruled this decision three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miners ville_School_District_v._Gobitis SUMMARY:⚖️ Minersville School District v. Gobitis END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:murdock-v-pennsylvania DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19430503 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19430504 DESCRIPTION:A Pennsylvania ordinance that imposes a license tax on those se lling religious merchandise violates the Free Exercise Clause.\n\nDecided May 3\, 1943 (argued 1943).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDissenting: Reed\, Frankfurter.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\ nMurdock v. Pennsylvania\, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)\, was a case in which the S upreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance requiring door-to -door salespersons ("solicitors") to purchase a license was an unconstitut ional tax on religious exercise.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murdock_ v._Pennsylvania SUMMARY:⚖️ Murdock v. Pennsylvania END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:west-virginia-state-board-of-education-v-barnette DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19430614 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19430615 DESCRIPTION:Public schools cannot override the religious beliefs of their s tudents by forcing them to salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.\n\nDecided June 14\, 1943 (argued March 11\, 1943).\nOpinio n of the Court: Robert H. Jackson /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/robert-h-jackson\nDissenting: Frankfurter\, Roberts\, Reed.\nAppli ed: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/eve nts/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n \nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette\, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) \, is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amendment protects students from being forced to salute the Amer ican flag or say the Pledge of Allegiance in public school.\n\nhttps://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Virginia_State_Board_of_Education_v._Barnette SUMMARY:⚖️ West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:marsh-v-alabama DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19460107 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19460108 DESCRIPTION:Governments cannot require permits to proselytize\, or bar it o utright\, in public spaces even where those are privately owned.\n\nDecide d January 7\, 1946 (argued December 7\, 1945).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\nDissent ing: Reed.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitution al-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freed om of religion.\n\nMarsh v. Alabama\, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)\, was a case dec ided by the US Supreme Court\, which ruled that a state trespassing statut e could not be used to prevent the distribution of religious materials on a town's sidewalk even though the sidewalk was part of a privately owned c ompany town. The Court based its ruling on the provisions of the First Ame ndment and Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marsh_v. _Alabama SUMMARY:⚖️ Marsh v. Alabama END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:everson-v-board-of-education DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19470210 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19470211 DESCRIPTION:A state law that reimburses the costs of transportation to and from parochial schools does not violate the Establishment Clause of the Fi rst Amendment. The Establishment Clause is incorporated against the states \, and the Constitution requires a sharp separation between government and religion.\n\nDecided February 10\, 1947 (argued November 20\, 1946).\nOpi nion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/eve nts/hugo-black\nDissenting: Jackson\, Rutledge.\nApplied: the First Amendm ent /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApp lied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nEverson v. Board o f Education\, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)\, is a landmark decision of the United Sta tes Supreme Court that applied the Establishment Clause of the First Amend ment to state law. Before this decision\, the clause\, which states\, "Con gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"\, restric ted only the federal government\, while many states continued to grant cer tain religious denominations legislative or effective privileges.\n\nhttps ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Everson_v._Board_of_Education SUMMARY:⚖️ Everson v. Board of Education END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mccollum-v-board-of-education DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19480308 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19480309 DESCRIPTION:The use of public school facilities by religious organizations to give religious instruction to school children violates the Establishmen t Clause.\n\nDecided March 8\, 1948 (argued December 8\, 1947).\nOpinion o f the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hu go-black\nDissenting: Reed.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment -14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nMcCollum v. Board of Education\, 333 U .S. 203 (1948)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case related to the power of a state to use its tax-supported public school system to aid religious instruction. The case was a test of the separation of church an d state with respect to education.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McColl um_v._Board_of_Education SUMMARY:⚖️ McCollum v. Board of Education END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:kunz-v-new-york DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19510115 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19510116 DESCRIPTION:A requirement mandating a permit to speak on religious issues i n public is unconstitutional.\n\nDecided January 15\, 1951 (argued October 17\, 1950).\nOpinion of the Court: Fred M. Vinson /travel/calendars/supre me-court-justices/events/fred-m-vinson-chief-justice\nDissenting: Jackson. \nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nKunz v. New York\, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a New York City ordinance requiring permits for public rel igious meetings on city streets was unconstitutional because it granted of ficials broad discretion to approve or deny permits without clear standard s.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunz_v._New_York SUMMARY:⚖️ Kunz v. New York END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:braunfeld-v-brown DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19610529 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19610530 DESCRIPTION:A Pennsylvania blue law forbidding the sale of various retail p roducts on Sunday was not an unconstitutional interference with religion a s described in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nD ecided May 29\, 1961 (argued December 8\, 1960).\nOpinion of the Court: Ea rl Warren /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chie f-justice\nDissenting: Douglas\, Stewart.\nApplied: the First Amendment /t ravel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Fr eedom of religion.\n\nBraunfeld v. Brown\, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)\, was a lan dmark case on the issue of religious and economic liberty decided by the U nited States Supreme Court. In a 6–3 decision\, the Court held that a Pe nnsylvania blue law forbidding the sale of various retail products on Sund ay was not an unconstitutional interference with religion as described in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikip edia.org/wiki/Braunfeld_v._Brown SUMMARY:⚖️ Braunfeld v. Brown END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:engel-v-vitale DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19620625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19620626 DESCRIPTION:Government-directed prayer in public schools\, even if it is de nominationally neutral and non-mandatory\, violates the Establishment Clau se.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1962 (argued April 3\, 1962).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\ nDissenting: Stewart.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n \nEngel v. Vitale\, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)\, was a landmark United States Sup reme Court case in which the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for s tate officials to compose an official school prayer and encourage its reci tation in public schools\, due to violation of the First Amendment. The ru ling has been the subject of intense debate.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Engel_v._Vitale SUMMARY:⚖️ Engel v. Vitale END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:abington-school-district-v-schempp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630617 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630618 DESCRIPTION:School-sponsored reading of the Bible and recitation of the Lor d's Prayer in public schools is unconstitutional under the Establishment C lause.\n\nDecided June 17\, 1963 (argued 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: Tho mas Campbell Clark /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thomas- campbell-clark\nDissenting: Stewart.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel /calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the F ourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/ amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nAbington School District v. S chempp\, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided 8–1 in favor of the respondent\, Edward Schempp\, on behalf of his son Ellery Schempp\, and declared that school-s ponsored Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public s chools in the United States was unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Abington_School_District_v._Schempp SUMMARY:⚖️ Abington School District v. Schempp END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:sherbert-v-verner DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630617 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630618 DESCRIPTION:Created the Sherbert test\, requiring the government to demonst rate both a compelling interest and that the law in question was narrowly tailored when restricting free exercise of religion. This test was codifie d on the federal level in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Re ligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. (Partially overruled b y Employment Division v. Smith (1990))\n\nDecided June 17\, 1963 (argued A pril 24\, 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Harlan.\nA pplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of religio n.\n\nSherbert v. Verner\, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)\, was a case in which the S upreme Court of the United States held that the Free Exercise Clause of th e First Amendment required the government to demonstrate both a compelling interest and that the law in question was narrowly tailored before it den ied unemployment compensation to someone who was fired because her job req uirements substantially conflicted with her religion.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Sherbert_v._Verner SUMMARY:⚖️ Sherbert v. Verner END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:flast-v-cohen DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680610 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680611 DESCRIPTION:Taxpayers have standing to sue to prevent the disbursement of f ederal funds in contravention of the specific constitutional prohibition a gainst government support of religion.\n\nDecided June 10\, 1968 (argued M arch 12\, 1968).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/supr eme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice\nDissenting: Harlan.\n Topic: Freedom of religion.\n\nFlast v. Cohen\, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)\, was a United States Supreme Court case holding that federal taxpayers have stan ding to seek relief from the courts for claims that federal tax money is b eing used for unconstitutional purposes in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flast_v._C ohen SUMMARY:⚖️ Flast v. Cohen END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:epperson-v-arkansas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19681112 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19681113 DESCRIPTION:States may not require curricula to align with the views of any particular religion.\n\nDecided November 12\, 1968 (argued October 16\, 1 968).\nOpinion of the Court: Abe Fortas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-ju stices/events/abe-fortas\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Am endment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14 \nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nEpperson v. Arkansas\, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) \, is a unanimous landmark United States Supreme Court case that invalidat ed an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of human evolution in the public schools. The Court held that the First Amendment to the United Stat es Constitution prohibits a state from requiring\, in the words of the maj ority opinion\, "that teaching and learning must be tailored to the princi ples or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." The Supreme Court de clared the Arkansas statute unconstitutional because it violated the Estab lishment Clause of the First Amendment. After this decision\, some jurisdi ctions passed laws that required the teaching of creation science alongsid e evolution when evolution was taught. The Court also ruled these laws wer e unconstitutional in the 1987 case\, Edwards v. Aguillard.\n\nhttps://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Epperson_v._Arkansas SUMMARY:⚖️ Epperson v. Arkansas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lemon-v-kurtzman DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710629 DESCRIPTION:For a law to be considered constitutional under the Establishme nt Clause\, the law must have a legitimate secular purpose\, must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion\, and must not result in an excessive entanglement of government and religion (Overru led by Groff v. DeJoy\, 600 U.S. 447 (2023))\n\nDecided June 28\, 1971 (ar gued March 3\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/cale ndars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nApplied : the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nLemon v. Kurtzman\, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)\, was a case argued before the United States Supreme Court. Th e court ruled in an 8–0 decision that Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementar y and Secondary Education Act from 1968 was unconstitutional and in an 8 –1 decision that Rhode Island's 1969 Salary Supplement Act was unconstit utional\, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The a ct had allowed the Superintendent of Public Schools to reimburse private s chools for the salaries of teachers who taught in these private elementary schools from public textbooks and with public instructional materials.\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lemon_v._Kurtzman SUMMARY:⚖️ Lemon v. Kurtzman END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:wisconsin-v-yoder DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720516 DESCRIPTION:Parents may remove their children from public schools for relig ious reasons.\n\nDecided May 15\, 1972 (argued December 8\, 1971).\nOpinio n of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Douglas (in part).\nTopi c: Freedom of religion.\n\nWisconsin v. Jonas Yoder\, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)\ , is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States\, in wh ich the Court held that Amish children could not be placed under compulsor y education past 8th grade. The Court ruled that the Amish parents' fundam ental right to free exercise of religion outweighed the state's interest i n educating their children. The case is often cited as a basis for parents ' right to educate their children outside of traditional private or public schools.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_v._Yoder SUMMARY:⚖️ Wisconsin v. Yoder END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:marsh-v-chambers DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19830705 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19830706 DESCRIPTION:A state legislature's practice of opening its sessions with a p rayer offered by a state-supported chaplain does not violate the Establish ment Clause.\n\nDecided July 5\, 1983 (argued April 20\, 1983).\nOpinion o f the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/eve nts/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Brennan\, Stevens.\nApplied : the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/event s/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nMarsh v. Chambers\, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)\, is a landmark court case in which the Supreme Court of the U nited States held that government funding for chaplains was constitutional because of the "unique history" of the United States. Three days before t he ratification of the First Amendment in 1791\, containing the Establishm ent Clause\, the federal legislature authorised hiring a chaplain for open ing sessions with prayer.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marsh_v._Chambe rs SUMMARY:⚖️ Marsh v. Chambers END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:edwards-v-aguillard DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870620 DESCRIPTION:Teaching creationism in public schools is unconstitutional.\n\n Decided June 19\, 1987 (argued December 10\, 1986).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/willia m-j-brennan\nDissenting: Scalia.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nEdwards v. Aguillard\, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)\, was a United Sta tes Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of teaching creati onism. The Court considered a Louisiana law requiring that where evolution ary science was taught in public schools\, creation science must also be t aught. The constitutionality of the law was successfully challenged in Dis trict Court\, Aguillard v. Treen\, 634 F. Supp. 426\, and the United State s Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed\, Aguillard v. Edwards\, 765 F.2d 1251. The United States Supreme Court ruled that this law violat ed the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because the law was spe cifically intended to advance a particular religion. In its decision\, the court opined that "teaching a variety of scientific theories about the or igins of humankind to school children might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction."\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwards_v._Aguillard SUMMARY:⚖️ Edwards v. Aguillard END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:corporation-of-presiding-bishop-of-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day -saints-v-amos DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19870624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19870625 DESCRIPTION:Title VII of the Civil Rights Act\, exempting religious organiz ations from the prohibition on religious discrimination\, even in secular activities\, did not violate the First Amendment.\n\nDecided June 24\, 198 7 (argued March 31\, 1987).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nApplied: the First Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTo pic: Freedom of religion.\n\nCorporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos\, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)\, is a United States Supreme Court case in which the cour t decided that the exemption of religious organizations from the prohibiti on of religious discrimination in employment in Title VII of the Civil Rig hts Act is constitutional. Appellee Arthur Frank Mayson worked for 16 year s in an organization operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. He was terminated from employment when he "failed to qualify for a temple recommend\, that is\, a certificate that he is a member of the Chu rch and eligible to attend its temples." He filed suit in district court\, arguing that his firing violated discrimination on the basis of religion in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court agreed. The case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed\, h olding that Title VII's exemption of religious organizations from the proh ibition on religious discrimination\, even in secular activities\, did not violate the First Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporation _of_Presiding_Bishop_of_Church_of_Jesus_Christ_of_Latter-day_Saints_v._Amo s SUMMARY:⚖️ Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:employment-division-v-smith DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19900417 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19900418 DESCRIPTION:Neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free E xercise Clause.\n\nDecided April 17\, 1990 (argued November 6\, 1989).\nOp inion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justice s/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: Blackmun.\nApplied: the First Amendme nt /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nAppl ied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendmen ts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nEmployment Division \, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith\, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)\ , is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court\, where the Co urt held that the state could deny unemployment benefits to a person fired for violating a state prohibition on the use of peyote even though the us e of the drug was part of a religious ritual. Although states have the pow er to accommodate otherwise illegal acts performed in pursuit of religious beliefs\, they are not required to do so.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wik i/Employment_Division_v._Smith SUMMARY:⚖️ Employment Division v. Smith END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:lee-v-weisman DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19920624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19920625 DESCRIPTION:Including a clergy-led prayer within the events of a public sch ool graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause.\n\nDecided June 24\, 1992 (argued November 6\, 1991).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kenn edy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDisse nting: Scalia.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitu tional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nLee v . Weisman\, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)\, was a United States Supreme Court decisi on regarding school prayer. It was the first major school prayer case deci ded by the Rehnquist Court. It held that schools may not sponsor clerics t o conduct even non-denominational prayer. The Court followed a broad inter pretation of the Establishment Clause reaffirming the longstanding princip les of the earlier school prayer cases Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_v._Weisman SUMMARY:⚖️ Lee v. Weisman END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:church-of-the-lukumi-babalu-aye-v-city-of-hialeah DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19930611 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19930612 DESCRIPTION:The government must show a compelling interest to pass a law th at targets a religion's ritual (as opposed to a law that happens to burden the ritual but is not directed at it). Failing to show such an interest\, the prohibition of animal sacrifice is a violation of the Free Exercise C lause.\n\nDecided June 11\, 1993 (argued November 4\, 1992).\nOpinion of t he Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ anthony-kennedy\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nChurch of the Lukumi Babal u Aye\, Inc. v. City of Hialeah\, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)\, was a case in whic h the Supreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance passed in Hialeah\, Florida\, forbidding the unnecessary killing of "an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food c onsumption"\, was unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Churc h_of_the_Lukumi_Babalu_Aye_v._City_of_Hialeah SUMMARY:⚖️ Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:rosenberger-v-university-of-virginia DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950630 DESCRIPTION:A university cannot use student dues to fund secular groups whi le excluding religious groups.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1995 (argued March 1\, 1995).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-c ourt-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissenting: Souter.\nApplied: the Fi rst Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nRosenberger v. Rector and Visitors o f the University of Virginia\, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)\, was an opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding whether a state university m ight\, consistent with the First Amendment\, withhold from student religio us publications funding provided to similar secular student publications. The University of Virginia provided funding to every student organization that met funding-eligibility criteria\, which Wide Awake\, the student rel igious publication\, fulfilled. The University's defense claimed that deny ing student activity funding to the religious magazine was necessary to av oid the University's violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amend ment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosenberger_v._University_of_Virgin ia SUMMARY:⚖️ Rosenberger v. University of Virginia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:agostini-v-felton DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970624 DESCRIPTION:Allowing public school teachers to teach at parochial schools d oes not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the material that is t aught is secular and neutral in nature and no "excessive entanglement" bet ween government and religion is apparent.\n\nDecided June 23\, 1997 (argue d April 15\, 1997).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: Sout er\, Ginsburg.\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nAgostini v. Felton\, 521 U. S. 203 (1997)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case\, the Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felt on (1985)\, now finding that it was not a violation of the Establishment C lause of the First Amendment for a state-sponsored education initiative to allow public school teachers to instruct at religious schools\, so long a s the material was secular and neutral in nature and no "excessive entangl ement" between government and religion was apparent. This case is notewort hy in a broader sense as a sign of evolving judicial standards surrounding the First Amendment\, and the changes that have occurred in modern Establ ishment Clause jurisprudence.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agostini_v. _Felton SUMMARY:⚖️ Agostini v. Felton END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20000619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20000620 DESCRIPTION:Prayer in public schools that is initiated and led by students violates the Establishment Clause.\n\nDecided June 19\, 2000 (argued March 29\, 2000).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/su preme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Rehnquist.\nApp lied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/e vents/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nSanta Fe Independent Sch ool Dist. v. Doe\, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)\, was a case heard before the Unite d States Supreme Court. It ruled that a policy permitting student-led\, st udent-initiated school prayer at high school football games violates the E stablishment Clause of the First Amendment. Oral arguments were heard Marc h 29\, 2000. The court announced its decision on June 19\, holding the pol icy unconstitutional in a 6–3 decision.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Santa_Fe_Independent_School_Dist._v._Doe SUMMARY:⚖️ Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:zelman-v-simmons-harris DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20020627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20020628 DESCRIPTION:A government program that provides tuition vouchers for student s to attend a private or religious school of their parents' choosing is co nstitutional because the vouchers are neutral toward religion and\, theref ore\, do not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court developed the private choice test which states that a voucher program in order to b e constitutional must meet all five criteria of the test.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2002 (argued February 20\, 2002).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehn quist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-ch ief-justice\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter\, Breyer.\nApplied: the First Am endment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\ nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nZelman v. Simmons-Harris\, 536 U.S. 639 (2 002)\, was a 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court that upheld an Ohio program that used school vouchers. The Court decided that the pro gram did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment\, as long as parents using the program were allowed to choose among a range of secular and religious schools.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zelman_v._ Simmons-Harris SUMMARY:⚖️ Zelman v. Simmons-Harris END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hosanna-tabor-evangelical-lutheran-church-and-school-v-equal-employment -opportunity-commission DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20120111 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20120112 DESCRIPTION:Ministers cannot sue their churches by claiming termination in violation of employment non-discrimination laws. The Establishment Clause forbids the appointing of ministers by the government\; therefore\, it can not interfere with the freedom of religious groups to select their own min isters under the Free Exercise Clause.\n\nDecided January 11\, 2012 (argue d October 5\, 2011).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fi rst Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran C hurch and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission\, 565 U.S. 171 (2012)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanim ously ruled that federal discrimination laws do not apply to religious org anizations' selection of religious leaders.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wi ki/Hosanna-Tabor_Evangelical_Lutheran_Church_and_School_v._Equal_Employmen t_Opportunity_Commission SUMMARY:⚖️ Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equa l Employment Opportunity Commission END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:town-of-greece-v-galloway DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140505 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140506 DESCRIPTION:A town council's practice of opening its sessions with a sectar ian prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause.\n\nDecided May 5\, 2 014 (argued November 6\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Court: Kennedy (all but Pa rt II-B)\nDissenting: Breyer\, Kagan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedo m of religion.\n\nTown of Greece v. Galloway\, 572 U.S. 565 (2014)\, is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided that the Town of Greece\, New York may permit volunteer chaplains to open each legislati ve session with a prayer. The plaintiffs were Susan Galloway and Linda Ste phens\, represented by Americans United for Separation of Church and State . They argued that the prayers violate the Establishment Clause of the Fir st Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled against the town\, and on May 20\, 2 013 the Supreme Court agreed to rule on the issue. On May 5\, 2014\, the S upreme Court ruled 5–4 in favor of the Town of Greece\, holding that the town's practice of beginning legislative sessions with prayer did not vio late the Establishment Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Town_of_Gr eece_v._Galloway SUMMARY:⚖️ Town of Greece v. Galloway END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140701 DESCRIPTION:Closely held\, for-profit corporations have free exercise right s under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. As applied to such corporations\, the requirement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Ca re Act that employers provide their female employees with no-cost access t o contraception violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.\n\nDecided June 30\, 2014 (argued March 25\, 2014).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Al ito /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenti ng: Ginsburg\, Breyer and Kagan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/cal endars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of religion.\n\nBurwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores\, Inc.\, 573 U.S. 682 (2014)\, is a landmark decision in United States corporate law by the United States Supreme Court allowing privately held for-profit corporations to be exemp t from a regulation that its owners religiously object to\, if there is a less restrictive means of furthering the law's interest\, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. It is the first time that the C ourt has recognized a for-profit corporation's claim of religious belief\, but it is limited to privately held corporations. The decision does not a ddress whether such corporations are protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Burwell_v._Hobby_Lobby_Stores%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:american-legion-v-american-humanist-association DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20190620 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20190621 DESCRIPTION:A war memorial Latin cross displayed on public land does not vi olate the Establishment Clause\, because longstanding monuments should be afforded a presumption of constitutionality.\n\nDecided June 20\, 2019 (ar gued February 27\, 2019).\nOpinion of the Court: Alito (Parts I\, II–B\, II–C\, III\, and IV)\nDissenting: Ginsburg.\nTopic: Freedom of religion .\n\nAmerican Legion v. American Humanist Association\, 588 U.S. 29 (2019) \, was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the separation of c hurch and state related to maintaining the Peace Cross\, a World War I mem orial shaped after a Latin cross\, on government-owned land\, though initi ally built in 1925 with private funds on private lands. The case was a con solidation of two petitions to the court\, that of The American Legion who built the cross\, and of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission who own the land and maintain the memorial. Both petitions chal lenged the Fourth Circuit's ruling that\, regardless of the secular purpos e the cross was built for in honoring the deceased soldiers\, the cross em boldened a religious symbol\, and had ordered it altered or razed. The Sup reme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's ruling in a 7–2 decision\, dete rmining that since the Cross had stood for decades without controversy\, i t did not violate the Establishment Clause and could remain standing.\n\nh ttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Legion_v._American_Humanist_Associat ion SUMMARY:⚖️ American Legion v. American Humanist Association END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200701 DESCRIPTION:A state's "no aid" constitutional provision prohibiting state a id to religious schools violates the Free Exercise clause by explicitly di scriminating against institutions on the basis of religion.\n\nDecided Jun e 30\, 2020 (argued January 22\, 2020).\nOpinion of the Court: John Robert s /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justi ce\nDissenting: Ginsburg\, Breyer\, Sotomayor.\nApplied: the First Amendme nt /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopi c: Freedom of religion.\n\nEspinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue\, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that a state-based scholarship program that provides public funds to allow stu dents to attend private schools cannot discriminate against religious scho ols under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wiki pedia.org/wiki/Espinoza_v._Montana_Department_of_Revenue SUMMARY:⚖️ Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:carson-v-makin DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220622 DESCRIPTION:Excluding "sectarian" schools from a tuition assistance program violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.\n\nDecided June 21\, 2022 (argued December 8\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justic e\nDissenting: Breyer\, Sotomayor.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/c alendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom o f religion.\n\nCarson v. Makin\, 596 U.S. 767 (2022)\, was a landmark Unit ed States Supreme Court case related to the Free Exercise Clause of the Fi rst Amendment to the United States Constitution. It was a follow-up to Esp inoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C arson_v._Makin SUMMARY:⚖️ Carson v. Makin END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:kennedy-v-bremerton-school-district DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220628 DESCRIPTION:The non renewal of a public high school football coach contract due to confliction of separation of church and state. The Court announced that the Lemon test from the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) ha d been abandoned by the Court in later cases. Instead\, the Court announce d\, original meaning and history govern analysis of the Establishment Clau se.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2022 (argued April 25\, 2022).\nOpinion of the Co urt: Neil Gorsuch /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/neil-gor such\nDissenting: Sotomayor.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calenda rs/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of reli gion.\n\nKennedy v. Bremerton School District\, 597 U.S. 507 (2022)\, is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court h eld\, 6–3\, that the government\, while following the Establishment Clau se\, may not suppress an individual from engaging in personal religious ob servance\, as doing so would violate the Free Speech and Free Exercise Cla uses of the First Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kennedy_v._B remerton_School_District SUMMARY:⚖️ Kennedy v. Bremerton School District END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:de-jonge-v-oregon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19370104 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19370105 DESCRIPTION:The freedom of association is incorporated against the states b y the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided January 4 \, 1937 (argued December 9\, 1936).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans H ughes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes -chief-justice\nTopic: Freedom of association.\n\nDe Jonge v. Oregon\, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United Sta tes held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies the Fi rst Amendment right of freedom of assembly to the individual U.S. states. The Court found that Dirk De Jonge had the right to speak at a peaceful pu blic meeting held by the Communist Party\, even though the party generally advocated an industrial or political change in revolution. However\, in t he 1950s with the fear of communism on the rise\, the Court ruled in Denni s v. United States (1951) that Eugene Dennis\, who was the leader of the C ommunist Party\, violated the Smith Act by advocating the forcible overthr ow of the United States government.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Jo nge_v._Oregon SUMMARY:⚖️ De Jonge v. Oregon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:national-association-for-the-advancement-of-colored-people-v-alabama DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19580630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19580701 DESCRIPTION:The freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "a dvancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided June 30\, 1958 (argued 195 8).\nOpinion of the Court: Harlan\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /trav el/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Free dom of association.\n\nNational Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama\, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)\, is a landmark decision of the U S Supreme Court. Alabama sought to prevent the NAACP from conducting furth er business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining ord er\, the state issued a subpoena for various records\, including the NAACP 's membership lists. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Alabama's de mand for the lists violated the right of due process guaranteed by the Fou rteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/National_Association_for_the_Advancement_of_Colored_People_v._ Alabama SUMMARY:⚖️ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v . Alabama END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:hurley-v-irish-american-gay-lesbian-and-bisexual-group-of-boston DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950620 DESCRIPTION:Private citizens organizing a public demonstration have the rig ht to exclude groups whose message they disagree with from participating.\ n\nDecided June 19\, 1995 (argued April 25\, 1995).\nOpinion of the Court: David Souter /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/david-souter \nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedom of association.\n\nHurley v. Irish- American Gay\, Lesbian\, and Bisexual Group of Boston\, 515 U.S. 557 (1995 )\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding free speech rights\, specifically the rights of groups to determine what message thei r activities convey to the public. The Court held that a state may not com pel private citizens organizing a public demonstration to include groups w ho impart a message the organizers do not want their demonstration to pres ent\, even if the state's intent was to prevent discrimination.\n\nhttps:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurley_v._Irish-American_Gay%2C_Lesbian%2C_and_Bise xual_Group_of_Boston SUMMARY:⚖️ Hurley v. Irish-American Gay\, Lesbian\, and Bisexual Group of Boston END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:boy-scouts-of-america-v-dale DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20000628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20000629 DESCRIPTION:Private organizations are allowed to choose their own membershi p and expel members based on their sexual orientation even if such discrim ination would otherwise be prohibited by anti-discrimination legislation d esigned to protect minorities in public accommodations.\n\nDecided June 28 \, 2000 (argued April 26\, 2000).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-j ustice\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter.\nApplied: the First Amendment /trave l/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Freedo m of association.\n\nBoy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale\, 530 U.S. 640 ( 2000)\, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court\, decided on June 28\, 2000\, which held that the constitutional right to freedom of associ ation allowed the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to exclude a homosexual pers on from membership in spite of a state law requiring equal treatment of ho mosexuals in public accommodations. More generally\, the court ruled that a private organization such as the BSA may exclude a person from membershi p when "the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group 's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints". In a 5–4 decision\ , the Supreme Court ruled that opposition to homosexuality is part of BSA' s "expressive message" and that allowing homosexuals as adult leaders woul d interfere with that message.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boy_Scouts _of_America_v._Dale SUMMARY:⚖️ Boy Scouts of America v. Dale END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:edwards-v-south-carolina DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630225 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630226 DESCRIPTION:The Free Petition Clause extends to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided February 25\, 1963 (argued December 13\, 1962).\nOpinion of the Court: Potter Stewart /travel /calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/potter-stewart\nDissenting: Clark .\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-1\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calenda rs/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Freedom of pet ition.\n\nEdwards v. South Carolina\, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)\, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court ruling that the First and Fourteenth Amen dments to the U.S. Constitution forbade state government officials to forc e a crowd to disperse when they are otherwise legally marching in front of a state house.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwards_v._South_Carolina SUMMARY:⚖️ Edwards v. South Carolina END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:california-motor-transport-co-v-trucking-unlimited DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720113 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720114 DESCRIPTION:The Free Petition Clause encompasses petitions to all three bra nches of the federal government—the Congress\, the executive including a dministrative agencies\, and the judiciary.\n\nDecided January 13\, 1972 ( argued November 10\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nApplied: th e First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/am endment-1\nTopic: Freedom of petition.\n\nCalifornia Motor Transport Co. v . Trucking Unlimited\, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court involving the right to make petitions to the government. The right to petition is enshrined in the First Amendment to t he United States Constitution as: "Congress shall make no law...abridging. ..the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of gr ievances." This case involved the claim that one group of companies was us ing state and federal regulatory actions to eliminate competitors. The Sup reme Court ruled that the right to petition is integral to the legal syste m but using lawful means to achieve unlawful restraint of trade is not pro tected in some instances.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Moto r_Transport_Co._v._Trucking_Unlimited SUMMARY:⚖️ California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-cruikshank DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18760327 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18760328 DESCRIPTION:The Second Amendment has no purpose other than to restrict the powers of the federal government. The right to keep and bear arms for a la wful purpose is not a right granted by the Constitution or dependent upon the Constitution for its existence. (Overruled by District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010))\n\nDecided March 27\ , 1876 (argued 1875).\nOpinion of the Court: Morrison Waite /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/morrison-waite-chief-justice\nDissenting : Clifford.\nTopic: Second Amendment rights.\n\nUnited States v. Cruikshan k\, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)\, was a landmark decision of the United States Supr eme Court\, ruling that the U.S. Bill of Rights did not limit the power of private actors or state governments despite the adoption of the Fourteent h Amendment. It reversed the federal criminal convictions for the civil ri ghts violations committed in aid of anti-Reconstruction murders. Decided d uring the Reconstruction Era\, the case represented a major defeat for fed eral efforts to protect the civil rights of African Americans.\n\nhttps:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Cruikshank SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Cruikshank END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:presser-v-illinois DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18860104 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18860105 DESCRIPTION:An Illinois law that prohibits common citizens from forming per sonal military organizations\, performing drills\, and parading is constit utional because such a law does not limit the personal right to keep and b ear arms.\n\nDecided January 4\, 1886 (argued 1885).\nOpinion of the Court : William Burnham Woods /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/wi lliam-burnham-woods\nOverruled by McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) /trav el/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/mcdonald-v-city-of-ch icago\nTopic: Second Amendment rights.\n\nPresser v. Illinois\, 116 U.S. 2 52 (1886)\, was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United Sta tes that held\, "Unless restrained by their own constitutions\, state legi slatures may enact statutes to control and regulate all organizations\, dr illing\, and parading of military bodies and associations except those whi ch are authorized by the militia laws of the United States." It states tha t the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution limited only the power of Congress and the national government to control firearms\, not th at of the states\, and that the right to peaceably assemble in the First A mendment to the United States Constitution was not protected by the clause referred to except to petition the government for a redress of grievances . This decision was overruled in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presser_v._Illinois SUMMARY:⚖️ Presser v. Illinois END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-miller DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19390515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19390516 DESCRIPTION:The federal government and the states can limit access to all w eapons that do not have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."\n\nDecided May 15\, 1939 (argu ed March 30\, 1939).\nOpinion of the Court: James Clark McReynolds /travel /calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/james-clark-mcreynolds\nTopic: Se cond Amendment rights.\n\nUnited States v. Miller\, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that invo lved a Second Amendment to the United States Constitution challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). The case is often cited in the ongoi ng American gun politics debate\, as both sides claim that it supports the ir position.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Miller SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Miller END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:district-of-columbia-v-heller DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080627 DESCRIPTION:The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia and to use it for traditiona lly lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home.\n\nDecided June 26\, 2008 (argued March 18\, 2008).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting : Stevens\, Breyer.\nApplied: the Second Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-2\nTopic: Second Amendment rights .\n\nDistrict of Columbia v. Heller\, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It ruled that the Seco nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects an individual's right to ke ep and bear arms—unconnected with service in a militia—for traditional ly lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home\, and that the Dis trict of Columbia's handgun ban and requirement that lawfully owned rifles and shotguns be kept "unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger loc k" violated this guarantee. It also stated that the right to bear arms is not unlimited and that certain restrictions on guns and gun ownership were permissible. It was the first Supreme Court case to decide whether the Se cond Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self -defense or whether the right was only intended for state militias.\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/District_of_Columbia_v._Heller SUMMARY:⚖️ District of Columbia v. Heller END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20100628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20100629 DESCRIPTION:The individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro cess Clause or Privileges or Immunities Clause.\n\nDecided June 28\, 2010 (argued March 2\, 2010).\nOpinion of the Court: Alito (Parts I\, II–A\, II–B\, II–D\, III–A\, and III–B)\nDissenting: Stevens\, Breyer.\nA pplied: the Second Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendment s/events/amendment-2\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/ us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Second Amendment rights.\n\nMcDonald v. City of Chicago\, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)\, is a landma rk decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that found that the right of an individual to "keep and bear arms"\, as protected under the Se cond Amendment\, is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and is thereb y enforceable against the states. The decision cleared up the uncertainty left in the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) as to the scope of gun rights in regard to the states.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mc Donald_v._City_of_Chicago SUMMARY:⚖️ McDonald v. City of Chicago END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:caetano-v-massachusetts DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160321 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160322 DESCRIPTION:The Second Amendment extends to all bearable arms\, including t hose that were not in existence at the time of the founding.\n\nDecided Ma rch 21\, 2016.\nApplied: the Second Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constit utional-amendments/events/amendment-2\nTopic: Second Amendment rights.\n\n Caetano v. Massachusetts\, 577 U.S. 411 (2016)\, was a case in which the S upreme Court of the United States unanimously vacated a Massachusetts conv iction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense.\n\nhttps://en.w ikipedia.org/wiki/Caetano_v._Massachusetts SUMMARY:⚖️ Caetano v. Massachusetts END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-inc-v-bruen DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220624 DESCRIPTION:The Second Amendment protects an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense in public\, outside the home\; firearms regulatio ns challenged on constitutional grounds must be evaluated against the "his tory and tradition" of such laws in the U.S.\n\nDecided June 23\, 2022 (ar gued November 3\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: Clarence Thomas /travel/ca lendars/supreme-court-justices/events/clarence-thomas\nDissenting: Breyer. \nApplied: the Second Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendm ents/events/amendment-2\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calenda rs/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Second Amendme nt rights.\n\nNew York State Rifle & Pistol Association\, Inc. v. Bruen\, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)\, abbreviated NYSRPA v. Bruen and also known as Bruen or NYSRPA II\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court rel ated to the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case c oncerned the constitutionality of the 1911 Sullivan Act\, a New York State law requiring applicants for a pistol concealed carry license to show "pr oper cause"\, or a special need distinguishable from that of the general p ublic\, in their application.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_St ate_Rifle_%26_Pistol_Association%2C_Inc._v._Bruen SUMMARY:⚖️ New York State Rifle & Pistol Association\, Inc. v. Bruen END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:slaughter-house-cases DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18730414 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18730415 DESCRIPTION:The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the benefits of federal United States citizenship but not to t he benefits of state citizenship.\n\nDecided April 14\, 1873 (argued Janua ry 11\, 1872).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Freeman Miller /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-freeman-miller\nDissenting: Field \, Swayne\, Bradley.\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\nThe Slaughter -House Cases\, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme C ourt of the United States that ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Cla use of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only protects the legal rights that are associated with federal U.S. citizenship\, not thos e that pertain to state citizenship. Though the decision in the Slaughter- House Cases minimized the impact of the Privileges or Immunities Clause on state law\, the Supreme Court would later incorporate the Bill of Rights through substantive due process.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slaughte r-House_Cases SUMMARY:⚖️ Slaughter-House Cases END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:allgeyer-v-louisiana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18970301 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18970302 DESCRIPTION:The liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes economic liberty.\n\nDecided March 1\, 1897 (argued January 6\, 1897).\nOpinion of the Court: Rufus W. Peckham /travel /calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/rufus-w-peckham\nApplied: the Fou rteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/am endment-14\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\nAllgeyer v. Louisiana\, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)\, was a landmark case of the Supreme Court of the Uni ted States in which a unanimous bench struck down a Louisiana statute for violating an individual's liberty of contract. It was the first case in wh ich the Supreme Court interpreted the word liberty in the Due Process Clau se of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean economic liberty. The decision mark ed the beginning of the Lochner era during which the Supreme Court struck many state regulations for infringing on an individual's right to contract . The Lochner era lasted 40 years and ended when West Coast Hotel Co. v. P arrish was decided in 1937.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allgeyer_v._L ouisiana SUMMARY:⚖️ Allgeyer v. Louisiana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:skinner-v-oklahoma DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19420601 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19420602 DESCRIPTION:State eugenics laws mandating sterilization of criminals convic ted of some crimes but not others are unconstitutional as it violates a pe rson's rights given under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clau se of the 14th Amendment.\n\nDecided June 1\, 1942 (argued May 6\, 1942).\ nOpinion of the Court: Douglas\, joined by unanimous\nApplied: the Fourtee nth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendm ent-14\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\nSkinner v. State of Oklahom a\, ex rel. Williamson\, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)\, is a unanimous United State s Supreme Court ruling that held that laws permitting the compulsory steri lization of criminals are unconstitutional as it violates a person's right s given under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution\, speci fically the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The releva nt Oklahoma law applied to "habitual criminals" but excluded white-collar crimes from carrying sterilization penalties.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Skinner_v._Oklahoma SUMMARY:⚖️ Skinner v. Oklahoma END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:international-shoe-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19451203 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19451204 DESCRIPTION:Minimum contacts with the forum state can enable a court in tha t state to exert personal jurisdiction over a party consistent with the Du e Process Clause.\n\nDecided December 3\, 1945 (argued November 14\, 1945) .\nOpinion of the Court: Harlan F. Stone /travel/calendars/supreme-court-j ustices/events/harlan-f-stone-chief-justice\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amend ment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nT opic: Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\nInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington \, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of th e United States in which the Court held that a party\, particularly a corp oration\, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state court if it has "m inimum contacts" with that state. The ruling has important consequences fo r corporations involved in interstate commerce\, their payments to state u nemployment compensation funds\, limits on the power of states imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\, the sufficiency of se rvice of process\, and\, especially\, personal jurisdiction.\n\nhttps://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Shoe_v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ International Shoe v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:goldberg-v-kelly DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19700323 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19700324 DESCRIPTION:The termination of welfare benefits must be preceded by a full evidentiary hearing under the Due Process Clause.\n\nDecided March 23\, 19 70 (argued October 13\, 1969).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan / travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenti ng: Burger\, Black\, Stewart.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/c alendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Fourteen th Amendment rights.\n\nGoldberg v. Kelly\, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)\, is a cas e in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Due Proce ss Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution re quires an evidentiary hearing before a recipient of certain government wel fare benefits can be deprived of such benefits.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Goldberg_v._Kelly SUMMARY:⚖️ Goldberg v. Kelly END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:san-antonio-independent-school-district-v-rodriguez DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19730321 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19730322 DESCRIPTION:The use of property taxes to finance public education does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided March 21\, 1973 (argued Oc tober 12\, 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: Brennan\, Whi te\, Marshall.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-con stitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment ri ghts.\n\nSan Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez\, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that San Antonio Independent School District's financing system\, which wa s based on local property taxes\, was not a violation of the Fourteenth Am endment's Equal Protection Clause.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_An tonio_Independent_School_District_v._Rodriguez SUMMARY:⚖️ San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:richardson-v-ramirez DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740625 DESCRIPTION:Disenfranchising convicted felons beyond their sentence and par ole does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.\n\nDecided June 24\, 197 4 (argued January 15\, 1974).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /tr avel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist\nDissenting : Marshall.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-consti tutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment right s.\n\nRichardson v. Ramirez\, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held\, 6–3\ , that convicted felons could be barred from voting beyond their sentence and parole without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Such felony disenfranchisement is practice d in a number of states.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richardson_v._Ra mirez SUMMARY:⚖️ Richardson v. Ramirez END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:mathews-v-eldridge DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760225 DESCRIPTION:When procedural due process applies\, courts must consider the government's interests\, the individual's interests\, and the likelihood o f making an inaccurate decision using the existing procedures as well as t he probable value of additional procedural safeguards.\n\nDecided February 24\, 1976 (argued October 6\, 1975).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDisse nting: Brennan.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constit utional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment rights. \n\nMathews v. Eldridge\, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that held that individuals have a s tatutorily granted property right in Social Security benefits\, and the te rmination of such benefits implicates due process but does not require a p re-termination hearing. The case is significant in the development of Amer ican administrative law.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathews_v._Eldri dge SUMMARY:⚖️ Mathews v. Eldridge END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:cleveland-board-of-education-v-loudermill DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850319 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850320 DESCRIPTION:Public employees are entitled to some form of hearing prior to termination for cause\, overruling Arnett v. Kennedy.\n\nDecided March 19\ , 1985 (argued December 3\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Rehnq uist.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitution al-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Fourteenth Amendment rights.\n\n Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill\, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)\, was a U nited States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that:certain publi c-sector employees can have a property interest in their employment\, per Constitutional Due Process. See Board of Regents v. Roth\nthis property ri ght entails a right to "some kind of hearing" before being terminated—a right to oral or written notice of charges against them\, an explanation o f the employer's evidence\, and an opportunity to present their sides of t he story.\nthus\, the pretermination hearing should be an initial check ag ainst mistaken decisions—not a full evidentiary hearing\, but essentiall y a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. \nin this case\, because the respondents alleged that they had no chance t o respond\, the District Court erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cleveland_Board_of_Education_v._Lo udermill SUMMARY:⚖️ Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:marbury-v-madison DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18030224 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18030225 DESCRIPTION:Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional bec ause it attempts to expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that permitted by the Constitution. Congress cannot pass laws that contradict the Constitution. This case featured the first example of judic ial nullification of a federal law and it was the point at which the Supre me Court adopted a monitoring role over government actions.\n\nDecided Feb ruary 24\, 1803 (argued February 11\, 1803).\nOpinion of the Court: John M arshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chie f-justice\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nMarbury v. Madison\, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that established the principle of judicial review\, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes they find to viola te the Constitution of the United States. Decided in 1803\, Marbury is reg arded as the single most important decision in American constitutional law . It established that the U.S. Constitution is actually law\, not merely a statement of political principles and ideals. It also helped define the b oundary between the constitutionally separate executive and judicial branc hes of the federal government.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_v. _Madison SUMMARY:⚖️ Marbury v. Madison END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:little-v-barreme DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18040227 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18040228 DESCRIPTION:The president does not have "inherent authority" or "inherent p owers" that allow him to ignore a law passed by the US Congress. President ial orders which contradict acts of Congress are illegal\, and military of ficers are responsible for the execution of illegal commands\, despite the nature of military chain of command.\n\nDecided February 27\, 1804 (argue d December 16\, 1801).\nOpinion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nTopic: Sepa ration of powers.\n\nLittle v. Barreme\, 6 U.S. 170 (1804)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court found that the President of t he United States does not have "inherent authority" or "inherent powers"\, either as commander in chief or under the Faithful Execution Clause\, to modify a procedure that Congress has provided\, even if the executive acti on was compatible with the legislative intent.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Little_v._Barreme SUMMARY:⚖️ Little v. Barreme END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-klein DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18720129 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18720130 DESCRIPTION:The principle of separation of powers prohibits Congress from p rescribing a rule of decision for the federal courts to follow in particul ar pending cases\, because the legislative branch cannot impair the exclus ive powers of another branch.\n\nDecided January 29\, 1872.\nOpinion of th e Court: Salmon P. Chase /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/s almon-p-chase-chief-justice\nDissenting: Miller.\nTopic: Separation of pow ers.\n\nUnited States v. Klein\, 80 U.S. 128 (1871)\, was a landmark Unite d States Supreme Court case stemming from the American Civil War (1861–1 865) where Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase held that a Congressional statute "impairing the effect of a pardon\, and thus infringing the constitutiona l power of the Executive" was unconstitutional.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/United_States_v._Klein SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Klein END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:chae-chan-ping-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18890513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18890514 DESCRIPTION:Congress has the power to enact immigration and nationality law s\, even those that abrogate prior treaties\, immigration and nationality laws are an exclusively federal matter\, and immigration and nationality l aws are owed broad judicial deference\, subject only to minimal judicial r eview.\n\nDecided May 13\, 1889 (argued 1889).\nOpinion of the Court: Step hen Johnson Field /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stephen- johnson-field\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nChae Chan Ping v. United St ates\, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)\, or The Chinese Exclusion Case\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that upheld the consti tutionality of the Scott Act of 1888\, a follow-up to the Chinese Exclusio n Act. The Scott Act barred Chinese laborers from reentry to the United St ates.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chae_Chan_Ping_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Chae Chan Ping v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:myers-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19261025 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19261026 DESCRIPTION:The president has the exclusive power to remove executive branc h officials\, and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other le gislative body.\n\nDecided October 25\, 1926 (argued December 5\, 1923).\n Opinion of the Court: William Howard Taft /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/william-howard-taft-chief-justice\nDissenting: Holmes\, Mc Reynolds\, Brandeis.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nMyers v. United Stat es\, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)\, was a United States Supreme Court decision rulin g that the president's exclusive power to remove executive branch official s is vested in the Office of the Presidency by Article Two of the United S tates Constitution\, and the Take Care Clause generally limits Congress fr om restricting this power.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers_v._Unite d_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Myers v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:j-w-hampton-jr-co-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19280409 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19280410 DESCRIPTION:Congressional delegation of legislative authority is an implied power of Congress that is constitutional so long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the executive branch.\n\nDecided April 9 \, 1928 (argued March 1\, 1928).\nOpinion of the Court: William Howard Taf t /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-howard-taft-chie f-justice\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nJ. W. Hampton\, Jr. & Co. v. Un ited States\, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)\, is a landmark case in the United State s in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that congressional delegation of legislative authority is an implied power of Congress that is constitutional so long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the executive branch.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._W._Ham pton%2C_Jr._%26_Co._v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ J. W. Hampton\, Jr. & Co. v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:springer-v-government-of-the-philippine-islands DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19280514 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19280515 DESCRIPTION:American Constitutions\, both state and federal\, divides the g overnment into three separate departments—the legislative\, executive\, and judicial. This separation and the consequent exclusive character of th e powers conferred upon each of the three departments is basic and vital —not merely a matter of governmental mechanism. It may be stated then\, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system\, that\, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred\ , the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power\; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power\; the judi ciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power.\n\nDecided Ma y 14\, 1928 (argued April 10\, 1928).\nOpinion of the Court: George Suther land /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/george-sutherland\nDi ssenting: Holmes\, McReynolds.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nSpringer v . Government of the Philippine Islands\, 277 U.S. 189 (1928)\, was a decis ion of the United States Supreme Court concerning the Appointments Clause. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Springer_v._Government_of_the_Philippine _Islands SUMMARY:⚖️ Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:humphrey-s-executor-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19350527 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19350528 DESCRIPTION:The president may not remove an appointee to an independent reg ulatory agency except for reasons that Congress has provided by law. (Over ruled by Trump v. Slaughter (2026))\n\nDecided May 27\, 1935 (argued May 1 \, 1935).\nOpinion of the Court: George Sutherland /travel/calendars/supre me-court-justices/events/george-sutherland\nOverruled by {{ussc\nTopic: Se paration of powers.\n\nHumphrey's Executor v. United States\, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)\, was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that ruled that the U .S. Congress may limit the power of the president of the United States to fire certain government officials\, even though the president is the chief executive of the U.S. government. The Court ruled that the U.S. Constitut ion allows Congress to restrict the president's authority to dismiss the l eaders of independent agencies that are "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judi cial" in nature.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphrey%27s_Executor_v. _United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Humphrey's Executor v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:nixon-v-general-services-administration DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19770628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19770629 DESCRIPTION:Congress has the power to pass a law that directs the seizure a nd disposition of the papers and tapes of a former president that are with in the control of the executive branch.\n\nDecided June 28\, 1977 (argued April 20\, 1977).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Burger\, Rehnquist.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nNixon v. General Services Admi nistration\, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)\, is a landmark court case concerning the principle of presidential privilege and whether the public is allowed to view a President's “confidential documents”. The Presidential Recordin gs and Materials Preservation Act\, signed into law by President Gerald Fo rd in 1974\, ordered that the Administrator of the General Services Admini stration obtain President Richard Nixon’s presidential papers and tape r ecordings. In addition\, the Act further ordered that government archivist s seize these materials. These archivists would preserve the material deem ed historic and return to former President Nixon the materials deemed priv ate. Furthermore\, this Act stated that material that was preserved could be used in judicial hearings and proceedings. Immediately after this Act w as enacted\, Richard Nixon filed a lawsuit in a federal district court cla iming that the Act violated the principle of separation of powers\, the pr inciple of presidential privilege\, Nixon's personal privacy\, his First A mendment right of association\, and further asserted that it amounted to a constitutionally prohibited Bill of Attainder.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Nixon_v._General_Services_Administration SUMMARY:⚖️ Nixon v. General Services Administration END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:morrison-v-olson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19880629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19880630 DESCRIPTION:The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 is constitutional because it does not increase the power of the judiciary or legislative branches at the expense of the executive branch. Its restriction on the power of the United States Attorney General to remove an inferior officer only for good cause does not violate the Appointments Clause.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1988 (argued April 26\, 1988).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquist-chief-justice\ nDissenting: Scalia.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nMorrison v. Olson\, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)\, was a United States Supreme Court decision holding t hat the Ethics in Government Act was constitutional. It also set important precedent determining the scope of Congress's ability to encumber the pre sident's authority to remove officers of the United States from office. In 2020\, in the case Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau\ , the Supreme Court distinguished Morrison as a narrow exception applying only to inferior officers.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morrison_v._Ol son SUMMARY:⚖️ Morrison v. Olson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:plaut-v-spendthrift-farm-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19950418 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19950419 DESCRIPTION:Congress is unable to make any law or provision therein to reop en cases which have been previously adjudicated by or within federal court s. Congress violates the separation of powers principle when it orders fed eral courts to reopen their final judgments.\n\nDecided April 18\, 1995 (a rgued November 30\, 1994).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: Stevens .\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nPlaut v. Spendthrift Farm\, Inc.\, 514 U.S. 211 (1995)\, was a landmark case about separation of powers in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Congress may not retroact ively require federal courts to reopen final judgments. Writing for the Co urt\, Justice Scalia asserted that such action amounted to an unauthorized encroachment by Congress upon the powers of the judiciary and\, therefore \, violated the separation of powers as a constitutional concept.\n\nhttps ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plaut_v._Spendthrift_Farm%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:clinton-v-city-of-new-york DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19980625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19980626 DESCRIPTION:The Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional because it allows th e president to amend or repeal parts of statutes without the pre-approval of Congress. According to the Presentment Clause of the Constitution\, Con gress must initiate all changes to existing laws.\n\nDecided June 25\, 199 8 (argued April 27\, 1998).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /trav el/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: Breyer.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nClinton v. City of New York\, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States in which the Court held\, 6–3\, that the line-item veto\, as i mplemented in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996\, violated the Presentment Cl ause of the United States Constitution because it impermissibly gave the p resident of the United States the power to unilaterally amend or repeal pa rts of statutes that had been duly passed by the United States Congress. J ustice John Paul Stevens wrote for the six-justice majority that the line- item veto gave the president power over legislation unintended by the Cons titution\, and was therefore a violation of the separation of powers betwe en the two branches.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_v._City_of_N ew_York SUMMARY:⚖️ Clinton v. City of New York END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:nlrb-v-noel-canning DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140627 DESCRIPTION:For purposes of the Recess Appointment Clause\, the Senate is i n session when it says that it is if\, under its own rules\, it retains th e capacity to transact business. D.C. Circuit affirmed.\n\nDecided June 26 \, 2014 (argued January 13\, 2014).\nOpinion of the Court: Stephen Breyer /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/stephen-breyer\nTopic: Sep aration of powers.\n\nNational Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning\, 573 U.S. 513 (2014)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Cou rt unanimously ruled that the president of the United States cannot use th eir authority under the Recess Appointment Clause of the United States Con stitution to appoint public officials unless the United States Senate is i n recess and not able to transact Senate business. The Court held that the clause allows the president to make appointments during both intra-sessio n and inter-session recesses but only if the recess is of sufficient lengt h\, and if the Senate is actually unavailable for deliberation\, thereby l imiting future recess appointments. The Court also ruled that any office v acancy can be filled during the recess\, regardless of when it arose. The case arose out of President Barack Obama's appointments of Sharon Block\, Richard Griffin\, and Terence Flynn to the National Labor Relations Board and Richard Cordray as the director of the Consumer Financial Protection B ureau.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLRB_v._Noel_Canning SUMMARY:⚖️ NLRB v. Noel Canning END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bank-markazi-v-peterson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160420 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160421 DESCRIPTION:A law which only applied to a specific case\, identified by doc ket number\, and eliminated all of the defenses that one party had raised does not violate the separation of powers in the United States Constitutio n between the legislative (Congress) and judicial branches of government.\ n\nDecided April 20\, 2016 (argued January 13\, 2016).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: Ruth Bader Ginsburg /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ru th-bader-ginsburg\nDissenting: Roberts.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nB ank Markazi v. Peterson\, 578 U.S. 212 (2016)\, was a United States Suprem e Court case that found that a law which only applied to a specific case\, identified by docket number\, and eliminated all of the defenses one part y had raised does not violate the separation of powers in the United State s Constitution between the legislative (Congress) and judicial branches of government. The plaintiffs\, in the case had initially obtained judgments against Iran for its role in supporting state-sponsored terrorism\, parti cularly the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings and 1996 Khobar Towers bombing\, and sought execution against a bank account in New York held\, through Eu ropean intermediaries\, on behalf of Bank Markazi\, the Central Bank of th e Islamic Republic of Iran. The plaintiffs obtained court orders preventin g the transfer of funds from the account in 2008 and initiated their lawsu it in 2010. Bank Markazi raised several defenses\, including that the acco unt was not an asset of the bank\, but rather an asset of its European int ermediary\, under both New York state property law and §201(a) of the Ter rorism Risk Insurance Act. In response to concerns that existing laws were insufficient for the account to be used to settle the judgments\, Congres s added an amendment to a 2012 bill\, codified after enactment as 22 U.S.C . § 8772\, that identified the pending lawsuit by docket number\, applie d only to the assets in the identified case\, and effectively abrogated ev ery legal basis available to Bank Markazi to prevent the plaintiffs from e xecuting their claims against the account. Bank Markazi then argued that § 8772 was an unconstitutional breach of the separation of power between the legislative and judicial branches of government\, because it effectiv ely directed a particular result in a single case without changing the gen erally applicable law. The United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of New York and\, on appeal\, the United States Court of Appeals f or the Second Circuit both upheld the constitutionality of § 8772 and cl eared the way for the plaintiffs to execute their judgments against the ac count\, which held about $1.75 billion in cash.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Bank_Markazi_v._Peterson SUMMARY:⚖️ Bank Markazi v. Peterson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trump-v-slaughter DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20260630 DESCRIPTION:The Constitution's separation of powers prohibits Congress from requiring the President to have cause before removing a subordinate.\n\nD ecided June 29\, 2026 (argued December 8\, 2025).\nOpinion of the Court: J ohn Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-c hief-justice\nDissenting: Sotomayor.\nTopic: Separation of powers.\n\nTrum p v. Slaughter is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision regardin g the constitutionality of statutory removal protections for the Federal T rade Commission (FTC) previously upheld in Humphrey's Executor v. United S tates (1935) and whether a federal court may prevent removal from public o ffice.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._Slaughter SUMMARY:⚖️ Trump v. Slaughter END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-ex-rel-accardi-v-shaughnessy DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19540315 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19540316 DESCRIPTION:Administrative agencies are obliged to follow their own regulat ions\, policies and procedures. Under the Accardi Doctrine\, federal agenc ies which do not follow their own regulations or procedures run the risk o f having their actions invalidated if challenged in court.\n\nDecided Marc h 15\, 1954 (argued February 2\, 1954).\nOpinion of the Court: Thomas Camp bell Clark /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thomas-campbell -clark\nDissenting: Jackson.\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nUnited States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy\, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)\, is a landmark Unite d States Supreme Court administrative law case. The Court held that admini strative agencies in the Federal Government are obliged to follow their ow n regulations\, policies and procedures. Under the Accardi doctrine\, name d after this case\, federal agencies which do not follow their own regulat ions or procedures run the risk of having their actions invalidated if cha llenged in court.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_ex_rel._A ccardi_v._Shaughnessy SUMMARY:⚖️ United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:citizens-to-preserve-overton-park-v-volpe DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19710302 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19710303 DESCRIPTION:The case established the basic legal framework for judicial rev iew of the actions of administrative agencies.\n\nDecided March 2\, 1971 ( argued January 11\, 1971).\nOpinion of the Court: Thurgood Marshall /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/thurgood-marshall\nDissenting: B lack.\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nCitizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe\, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that established the basic legal framework for judici al review of the actions of administrative agencies. It substantially narr owed the Administrative Procedure Act's Section 701(a)(2) exception from j udicial review. It also stands as a notable example of the power of litiga tion by grassroots citizen movements to block government action.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens_to_Preserve_Overton_Park_v._Volpe SUMMARY:⚖️ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:chevron-u-s-a-inc-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840626 DESCRIPTION:An interpretation by a government agency of its own mandate fro m Congress is entitled to judicial deference if the authority is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is permissible under the statute\, regard less as to whether it is the best possible interpretation or an interpreta tion the Court would have made. (Overruled by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024))\n\nDecided June 25\, 1984 (argued February 29\, 1984).\nO pinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-jus tices/events/john-paul-stevens\nOverruled by Loper Bright Enterprises v. R aimondo (2024) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/l oper-bright-enterprises-v-raimondo\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nChevron U.S.A.\, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council\, Inc.\, 467 U.S. 837 ( 1984)\, was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that set forth the legal test used when U.S. federal courts must defer to a government agency's interpretation of a law or statute. The decision art iculated a doctrine known as "Chevron deference". Chevron deference consis ted of a two-part test that was deferential to government agencies: first\ , whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at question\, and second\, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible constr uction of the statute".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.%2C _Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Chevron U.S.A.\, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:auer-v-robbins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970219 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970220 DESCRIPTION:Agencies have the highest level of deference in interpreting th eir own regulations. However\, deference is warranted only if the language of the regulation is ambiguous unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsis tent with the regulation. The case expands Chevron deference by giving the agency the highest deference.\n\nDecided February 19\, 1997 (argued Decem ber 10\, 1996).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/su preme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\n Auer v. Robbins\, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)\, is a United States Supreme Court c ase that concerns the standard that the Court should apply when it reviews an executive department's interpretation of regulations established under federal legislation. The specific issue was whether sergeants and lieuten ants in the St. Louis Police Department should be paid for working overtim e. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 established the overtime pay requi rement\, and the US Department of Labor issued regulations to determine if an employee was covered by the overtime requirement.\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Auer_v._Robbins SUMMARY:⚖️ Auer v. Robbins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:massachusetts-v-environmental-protection-agency DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20070402 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20070403 DESCRIPTION:Greenhouse gases are air pollutants\, and the Environmental Pro tection Agency may regulate their emission under the Clean Air Act.\n\nDec ided April 2\, 2007 (argued November 29\, 2006).\nOpinion of the Court: Jo hn Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul- stevens\nDissenting: Roberts\, Scalia.\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nMass achusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency\, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)\, is a 5–4 U.S. Supreme Court case in which Massachusetts\, along with eleven o ther states and several cities of the United States\, represented by James Milkey\, brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) r epresented by Gregory G. Garre to force the federal agency to regulate the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) that pollut e the environment and contribute to climate change.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Massachusetts_v._Environmental_Protection_Agency SUMMARY:⚖️ Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:michigan-v-epa DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20150629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20150630 DESCRIPTION:The Environmental Protection Agency must consider costs when it regulates power plants under the Clean Air Act.\n\nDecided June 29\, 2015 (argued March 25\, 2015).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/c alendars/supreme-court-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: Kagan.\ nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nMichigan v. Environmental Protection Agency \, 576 U.S. 743 (2015)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court analyzed whether the Environmental Protection Agency must consider costs when deciding to regulate\, rather than later in the proce ss of issuing the regulation.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_v. _EPA SUMMARY:⚖️ Michigan v. EPA END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:west-virginia-v-epa DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220630 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220701 DESCRIPTION:The Environmental Protection Agency only has limited authority to set caps on carbon emissions. Under the major questions doctrine\, Cong ress is presumed not to delegate questions of vast economic and political significance to an agency except with clear statutory authorization.\n\nDe cided June 30\, 2022 (argued February 28\, 2022).\nOpinion of the Court: J ohn Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-c hief-justice\nDissenting: Kagan.\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nWest Virgi nia v. Environmental Protection Agency\, 597 U.S. 697 (2022)\, is a landma rk decision of the U.S. Supreme Court relating to the Clean Air Act\, and the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can regulate carbon dioxide emissions related to climate change.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/West_Virginia_v._EPA SUMMARY:⚖️ West Virginia v. EPA END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:loper-bright-enterprises-v-raimondo DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240629 DESCRIPTION:The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise th eir independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within it s statutory authority\, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretati on of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous\; Chevron is overruled .\n\nDecided June 28\, 2024 (argued January 17\, 2024).\nOpinion of the Co urt: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-rob erts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Kagan.\nTopic: Administrative law.\n\nLope r Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo\, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)\, is a landmark dec ision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the field of administra tive law\, the law governing regulatory agencies. Together with its compan ion case\, Relentless\, Inc. v. Department of Commerce\, it overruled the principle of Chevron deference established in Chevron U.S.A.\, Inc. v. Nat ural Resources Defense Council\, Inc. (1984)\, which had directed courts t o defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguity in a law that the agency enforces.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loper_Bright_En terprises_v._Raimondo SUMMARY:⚖️ Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:youngstown-sheet-tube-co-v-sawyer DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19520602 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19520603 DESCRIPTION:The president cannot seize private property in the absence of e ither specifically enumerated authority under the Constitution or statutor y authority given to them by Congress. Commander-in-chief powers do not ex tend to labor disputes.\n\nDecided June 2\, 1952 (argued 1952).\nOpinion o f the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hu go-black\nDissenting: Vinson.\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer\, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\, also commonly referred to as the St eel Seizure Case or the Youngstown Steel case\, is a landmark United State s Supreme Court decision that limited the power of the president of the Un ited States to seize private property. The case served as a check on the m ost far-reaching claims of executive power at the time and signaled the Co urt's increased willingness to intervene in political questions.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youngstown_Sheet_%26_Tube_Co._v._Sawyer SUMMARY:⚖️ Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-nixon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19740724 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19740725 DESCRIPTION:The doctrine of executive privilege is legitimate\; however\, t he president cannot invoke it in criminal cases to withhold evidence.\n\nD ecided July 24\, 1974 (argued July 8\, 1974).\nOpinion of the Court: Warre n E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burge r-chief-justice\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nUnited States v. Nixon\, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court unanimously ordered President Richard Nixon to deliver tape recordings and other subpoenaed materials related to the Watergate s candal to a federal district court. Decided on July 24\, 1974\, the ruling was important to the late stages of the Watergate scandal\, amidst an ong oing process to impeach Richard Nixon. United States v. Nixon is considere d a crucial precedent limiting the power of any U.S. president to claim ex ecutive privilege.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Nixon SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Nixon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:harlow-v-fitzgerald DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820625 DESCRIPTION:Presidential aides were not entitled to absolute immunity\, but instead deserved qualified immunity.\n\nDecided June 24\, 1982 (argued No vember 30\, 1981).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: Burger.\nTop ic: Domestic.\n\nHarlow v. Fitzgerald\, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)\, was a case d ecided by the United States Supreme Court involving the doctrines of quali fied immunity and absolute immunity.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harl ow_v._Fitzgerald SUMMARY:⚖️ Harlow v. Fitzgerald END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:nixon-v-fitzgerald DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19820624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19820625 DESCRIPTION:The president is entitled to absolute immunity from legal liabi lity for civil damages based on his official acts. The president is not im mune from criminal charges stemming from his official or unofficial acts w hile he is in office.\n\nDecided June 24\, 1982 (argued November 30\, 1981 ).\nOpinion of the Court: Powell\nDissenting: White\, Blackmun.\nTopic: Do mestic.\n\nNixon v. Fitzgerald\, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)\, was a United States Supreme Court decision written by Justice Lewis Powell dealing with presi dential immunity from civil liability for actions taken while in office. T he Court held that a president "is entitled to absolute immunity from dama ges liability predicated on his official acts."\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.or g/wiki/Nixon_v._Fitzgerald SUMMARY:⚖️ Nixon v. Fitzgerald END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:clinton-v-jones DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19970527 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19970528 DESCRIPTION:The president has no immunity that could require civil law liti gation against them involving a dispute unrelated to the office of Preside nt to be stayed until the end of their term. Such a delay would deprive th e parties to the suit of the right to a speedy trial that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.\n\nDecided May 27\, 1997 (argued January 13\, 1997). \nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court- justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nClinton v. Jones\, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court case estab lishing that a sitting president of the United States has no immunity from civil law litigation\, in federal court\, for acts done before taking off ice and unrelated to the office. In particular\, there is no temporary imm unity and thus no delay of federal cases until the president leaves office .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_v._Jones SUMMARY:⚖️ Clinton v. Jones END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trump-v-mazars-usa-llp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200709 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200710 DESCRIPTION:The court laid out a four-factor balancing test that lower cour ts must weigh before determining if congressional subpoenas involving the president and his papers are valid.\n\nDecided July 9\, 2020 (argued May 1 2\, 2020).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/supreme-c ourt-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Thomas\, Alit o.\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nTrump v. Mazars USA\, LLP\, 591 U.S. ___ (2020) wa s a landmark US Supreme Court case involving subpoenas issued by committee s of the US House of Representatives to obtain the tax returns of Presiden t Donald Trump\, who had litigated against his personal accounting firm to prevent this disclosure\, although the committees had been cleared by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Maza rs was consolidated with Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Trump_v._Mazars_USA%2C_LLP SUMMARY:⚖️ Trump v. Mazars USA\, LLP END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trump-v-vance DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200709 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200710 DESCRIPTION:Article II and the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution do not categorically preclude\, or require a heightened standard for\, the i ssuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting president.\n\nDecided Ju ly 9\, 2020 (argued May 12\, 2020).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /t ravel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\n Dissenting: Thomas\, Alito.\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nTrump v. Vance\, 591 U.S. 786 (2020)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case arising from a subpoena issued in August 2019 by Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Van ce Jr. against Mazars\, then-President Donald Trump's accounting firm\, fo r Trump's tax records and related documents\, as part of his ongoing inves tigation into the Stormy Daniels scandal. Trump commenced legal proceeding s to prevent their release.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._Vanc e SUMMARY:⚖️ Trump v. Vance END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trump-v-united-states-2024 DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240701 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240702 DESCRIPTION:The president has absolute immunity for official actions taken under his core constitutional powers\, presumptive immunity for other offi cial actions\, and no immunity for unofficial actions.\n\nDecided July 1\, 2024 (argued April 25\, 2024).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDiss enting: Sotomayor\, Jackson.\nTopic: Domestic.\n\nTrump v. United States\, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of th e United States holding that presidential immunity from criminal prosecuti on presumptively extends to all of a president's "official acts" – with absolute immunity for official acts within an exclusive presidential auth ority that Congress cannot regulate such as the pardon\, command of the mi litary\, execution of laws\, or control of the executive branch. Trump is a federal case that was ultimately dismissed by federal district court jud ge Tanya Chutkan\, following Trump's 2024 election. Trump's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case\, citing the Department of Justice's policy n ot to prosecute sitting presidents. This case would have determined whethe r then-president Donald Trump and others engaged in election interference during the 2020 election\, including events during the January 6\, 2021\, attack on the U.S. Capitol. It is the first time a case concerning crimina l prosecution for alleged official acts of a president was brought before the Supreme Court.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._United_States _%282024%29 SUMMARY:⚖️ Trump v. United States (2024) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:the-paquete-habana DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19000108 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19000109 DESCRIPTION:The president may not issue exemptions to customary internation al law at discretion. Federal courts may look to customary international l aw because it is an integrated part of American law.\n\nDecided January 8\ , 1900 (argued 1899).\nOpinion of the Court: Horace Gray /travel/calendars /supreme-court-justices/events/horace-gray\nDissenting: Fuller.\nTopic: Fo reign.\n\nThe Paquete Habana\; The Lola\, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)\, was a land mark decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the applicabil ity and recognition of international law by the United States. The Court h eld that the capture of fishing vessels as prizes of war violated customar y international law\, which is integrated with U.S. law and binding as suc h. Paquete Habana influenced subsequent court decisions that incorporated international law regarding other matters. The case is also notable for ci ting a wide breadth of historical and international sources\, including ju rists from around the world and foreign state practices going back centuri es.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Paquete_Habana SUMMARY:⚖️ The Paquete Habana END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:united-states-v-curtiss-wright-export-corp DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19361221 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19361222 DESCRIPTION:The Constitution implies that the ability to conduct foreign po licy is vested entirely in the president. The president has plenary power in the foreign affairs field that does not depend on congressional delegat ion.\n\nDecided December 21\, 1936 (argued 1936).\nOpinion of the Court: G eorge Sutherland /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/george-su therland\nDissenting: McReynolds.\nTopic: Foreign.\n\nUnited States v. Cur tiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning foreign affairs\, in wh ich the Supreme Court held that the President has primacy with respect to\ , and that federal government has broad authority over\, foreign affairs.\ n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Curtiss-Wright_Export_Co rp. SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:medellin-v-texas DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20080325 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20080326 DESCRIPTION:International treaties are not binding domestic law unless Cong ress enacts statutes implementing them or unless the treaties are self-exe cuting. Also\, decisions of the International Court of Justice are not bin ding domestic law\, and without authority from Congress or the Constitutio n\, the president lacks the power to enforce international treaties or dec isions of the International Court of Justice.\n\nDecided March 25\, 2008 ( argued October 10\, 2007).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissentin g: Breyer.\nTopic: Foreign.\n\nMedellín v. Texas\, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)\, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that held even when a tr eaty constitutes an international commitment\, it is not binding domestic law unless it has been implemented by an act of the U.S. Congress or conta ins language expressing that it is "self-executing" upon ratification. The Court also ruled that decisions of the International Court of Justice are not binding upon the U.S. and\, like treaties\, cannot be enforced by the president without authority from Congress or the U.S. Constitution.\n\nht tps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medell%C3%ADn_v._Texas SUMMARY:⚖️ Medellín v. Texas END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:zivotofsky-v-kerry DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20150608 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20150609 DESCRIPTION:The president\, as head of the executive branch\, has exclusive power to recognize (or not recognize) foreign nations.\n\nDecided June 8\ , 2015 (argued November 3\, 2014).\nOpinion of the Court: Anthony Kennedy /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/anthony-kennedy\nDissentin g: Roberts\, Scalia.\nTopic: Foreign.\n\nZivotofsky v. Kerry\, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision that held that the pres ident\, as head of the executive branch\, has exclusive power to recognize formally a foreign sovereign and its territorial boundaries\; as such\, C ongress may not require the State Department to indicate in passports that Jerusalem is part of Israel.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zivotofsky_ v._Kerry SUMMARY:⚖️ Zivotofsky v. Kerry END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:trump-v-hawaii DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180627 DESCRIPTION:Presidential Proclamation 9645 did not violate the INA or the E stablishment Clause by suspending the entry of aliens from several nations . Substantial deference must be accorded to the Executive in the conduct o f foreign affairs and the exclusion of aliens.\n\nDecided June 26\, 2018 ( argued April 25\, 2018).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Breyer\, Sotomayor.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendars/us-co nstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Foreign.\n\nTrump v. Ha waii\, 585 U.S. 667 (2018)\, is a landmark decision of the United States S upreme Court involving Presidential Proclamation 9645 signed by President Donald Trump\, which restricted travel into the United States by people fr om several nations\, or by refugees without valid travel documents. Hawaii and several other states and groups challenged the Proclamation and two p redecessor executive orders also issued by Trump on statutory and constitu tional grounds. Citing a variety of statements by Trump and administration officials\, they argued that the proclamation and its predecessor orders were motivated by Islamophobic animus.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr ump_v._Hawaii SUMMARY:⚖️ Trump v. Hawaii END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:learning-resources-inc-v-trump DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260220 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20260221 DESCRIPTION:The president does not have the power to impose tariffs using I EEPA except where Congress has specifically delegated the power to do so. This ruling favors the major questions doctrine\, without specifically inv oking it.\n\nDecided February 20\, 2026 (argued November 5\, 2025).\nOpini on of the Court: Roberts (parts I\, II–A–1\, and II–B)\nDissenting: Thomas\, Kavanaugh.\nTopic: Foreign.\n\nLearning Resources\, Inc. v. Trump \, 607 U.S. 229 (2026)\, is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that the International Emergency Economic P owers Act (IEEPA)\, an economic sanctions law\, does not authorize the pre sident to unilaterally set tariffs. The ruling vacated many of the tariffs implemented during the second Trump administration.\n\nhttps://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/Learning_Resources%2C_Inc._v._Trump SUMMARY:⚖️ Learning Resources\, Inc. v. Trump END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:baker-v-carr DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19620326 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19620327 DESCRIPTION:The redistricting of state legislative districts is not a polit ical question\, so it is justiciable by the federal courts.\n\nDecided Mar ch 26\, 1962 (argued 1961).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /tra vel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Frankfurter\, Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Voting and redi stricting.\n\nBaker v. Carr\, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that redistricting quali fies as a justiciable question under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal prot ection clause\, thus enabling federal courts to hear Fourteenth Amendment- based redistricting cases. The court summarized its Baker holding in a lat er decision as follows: "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Ame ndment limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the geogra phical districts from which representatives are chosen either for the Stat e Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives.". The court had previously held in Gomillion v. Lightfoot that districting claims over ra cial discrimination could be brought under the Fifteenth Amendment.\n\nhtt ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baker_v._Carr SUMMARY:⚖️ Baker v. Carr END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:gray-v-sanders DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19630318 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19630319 DESCRIPTION:Formulated the "one person\, one vote" standard. State election s must adhere to the "one person\, one vote" principle.\n\nDecided March 1 8\, 1963 (argued January 17\, 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Dou glas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDi ssenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us- constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Voting and redistric ting.\n\nGray v. Sanders\, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)\, was a Supreme Court of th e United States case dealing with equal representation in regard to the Am erican election system and formulated the famous "one person\, one vote" s tandard applied in this case for "counting votes in a Democratic primary e lection for the nomination of a United States Senator and statewide office rs — which was practically equivalent to election."\n\nhttps://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Gray_v._Sanders SUMMARY:⚖️ Gray v. Sanders END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:wesberry-v-sanders DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19640217 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19640218 DESCRIPTION:The Constitution requires that the members of the House of Repr esentatives be selected from districts composed\, as nearly as is practica ble\, of equal population.\n\nDecided February 17\, 1964 (argued November 18\, 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Harlan.\nTopic: Voting and red istricting.\n\nWesberry v. Sanders\, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)\, was a landmark U. S. Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that districts in the Unite d States House of Representatives must be approximately equal in populatio n. Along with Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964)\, it was pa rt of a series of Warren Court cases that applied the principle of "one pe rson\, one vote" to U.S. legislative bodies.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Wesberry_v._Sanders SUMMARY:⚖️ Wesberry v. Sanders END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:reynolds-v-sims DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19640615 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19640616 DESCRIPTION:The populations of state legislative districts must be as equal as mathematically possible so as to ensure equal protection.\n\nDecided J une 15\, 1964 (argued November\, 1963).\nOpinion of the Court: Earl Warren /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/earl-warren-chief-justice \nDissenting: Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Voting and redis tricting.\n\nReynolds v. Sims\, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)\, was a landmark Unite d States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the single-seat electoral districts of state legislative chambers must be roughly equal in population. Along with Baker v. Carr (1962) and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964 )\, it was part of a series of Warren Court cases that applied the princip le of "one man\, one vote]]" to U.S. legislative bodies.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Reynolds_v._Sims SUMMARY:⚖️ Reynolds v. Sims END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:harper-v-virginia-state-board-of-elections DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19660324 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19660325 DESCRIPTION:A state's conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt.\n\nDecided March 24\, 1966 (argued 1966).\nOpinion of the Court: Willi am O. Douglas /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-do uglas\nDissenting: Black\, Harlan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Vot ing and redistricting.\n\nHarper v. Virginia State Board of Elections\, 38 3 U.S. 663 (1966)\, was a case in which the United States Supreme Court fo und that Virginia's poll tax was unconstitutional under the Equal Protecti on Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the late 19th and early 20th cen turies\, eleven southern states established poll taxes as part of their di senfranchisement of most blacks and many poor whites. The Twenty-fourth Am endment to the United States Constitution (1964) prohibited poll taxes in federal elections\; five states continued to require poll taxes for voters in state elections. By this ruling\, the Supreme Court banned the use of poll taxes in state elections.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harper_v._ Virginia_State_Board_of_Elections SUMMARY:⚖️ Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:avery-v-midland-county DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19680401 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19680402 DESCRIPTION:Local government districts have to be roughly equal in populati on.\n\nDecided April 1\, 1968 (argued November 14\, 1967).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron- white\nDissenting: Harlan\, Fortas\, Stewart.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Ame ndment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\ nTopic: Voting and redistricting.\n\nAvery v. Midland County\, 390 U.S. 47 4 (1968)\, is a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that local gov ernment districts had to be roughly equal in population.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Avery_v._Midland_County SUMMARY:⚖️ Avery v. Midland County END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:shaw-v-reno DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19930628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19930629 DESCRIPTION:Redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of stric t scrutiny under the equal protection clause while bodies doing redistrict ing must be conscious of race to the extent that they must ensure complian ce with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.\n\nDecided June 28\, 1993 (argued A pril 20\, 1993).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nDissenting: White\, Blackmun\, Stevens.\nTopic: Voting and redistricting.\n\nShaw v. Reno\, 5 09 U.S. 630 (1993)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in th e area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. After the 1990 census\, North Carolina qualified to have a 12th district and drew it in a distinc t snake-like manner to create a "majority-minority" Black district. From there\, Ruth O. Shaw sued to challenge this proposed plan with the argumen t that this 12th district was unconstitutional and violated the Fourteenth Amendment under the Equal Protection Clause. In contrast\, Janet Reno\, t he Attorney General\, argued that the district would allow for minority gr oups to have a voice in elections. In the decision\, the court ruled in a 5–4 majority that redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and on the basis tha t it violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it was drawn solely based o n race.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaw_v._Reno SUMMARY:⚖️ Shaw v. Reno END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013647Z UID:bush-v-gore DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20001212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20001213 DESCRIPTION:The recount of ballots in Florida during the 2000 presidential election violated the Equal Protection Clause because different standards of counting were used in the counties that were subjected to the recount. This decision effectively resolved the election in favor of the Republican nominee\, George W. Bush.\n\nDecided December 12\, 2000 (argued December 11\, 2000).\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter\, Ginsburg.\nApplied: the Fourte enth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amend ment-14\nTopic: Voting and redistricting.\n\nBush v. Gore\, 531 U.S. 98 (2 000)\, is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court on Decemb er 12\, 2000\, that settled a recount dispute in Florida's 2000 presidenti al election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. On December 8\, 2000\, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a statewide recount of all undervotes\, ove r 61\,000 ballots that the vote tabulation machines had missed. The Bush c ampaign immediately asked the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the decision and halt the recount. On December 9\, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorar i and issued the stay. The case was argued before the Court on December 11 . On December 12 the Court held\, in a 5–4 per curiam decision\, that no constitutional recount could be conducted in the remaining time\, which w as short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the f ederal "safe harbor" for its electors to be free from challenge.\n\nhttps: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_v._Gore SUMMARY:⚖️ Bush v. Gore END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:rucho-v-common-cause DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20190627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20190628 DESCRIPTION:Partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyo nd the reach of the federal courts.\n\nDecided June 27\, 2019 (argued Marc h 26\, 2019).\nOpinion of the Court: John Roberts /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/john-roberts-chief-justice\nDissenting: Kagan.\nTo pic: Voting and redistricting.\n\nRucho v. Common Cause\, 588 U.S. 684 (20 19)\, is a landmark case of the United States Supreme Court concerning par tisan gerrymandering. The Court ruled that while partisan gerrymandering m ay be "incompatible with democratic principles"\, the federal courts canno t review such allegations\, as they present nonjusticiable political quest ions outside the jurisdiction of these courts.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Rucho_v._Common_Cause SUMMARY:⚖️ Rucho v. Common Cause END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:chiafalo-v-washington DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200706 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200707 DESCRIPTION:States have the ability to require Presidential electors to vot e for the candidate who wins the state's popular vote and to remove and/or punish electors who violate pledges to that effect.\n\nDecided July 6\, 2 020 (argued May 13\, 2020).\nOpinion of the Court: Elena Kagan /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/elena-kagan\nTopic: Voting and redist ricting.\n\nChiafalo v. Washington\, 591 U.S. 578 (2020)\, was a United St ates Supreme Court case on the issue of "faithless electors" in the Electo ral College stemming from the 2016 United States presidential election. Th e Court ruled unanimously\, by a vote of 9–0\, that states have the abil ity to enforce an elector's pledge in presidential elections. Chiafalo dea ls with electors who received US$1\,000 fines for not voting for the nomin ees of their party in the state of Washington. The case was originally con solidated with Colorado Department of State v. Baca\, 591 U.S. ___ (2020)\ , a similar case based on a challenge to a Colorado law providing for the removal and replacement of an elector who does not vote for the presidenti al candidate who received the most votes in the state\, with the electors claiming they have discretion to vote as they choose under the Twelfth Ame ndment to the United States Constitution. On March 10\, 2020\, Justice Son ia Sotomayor recused herself in the Colorado case due to a prior relations hip to a respondent\, and the cases were decided separately on July 6\, 20 20. Baca was a per curiam decision that followed from the unanimous ruling in Chiafalo against the faithless electors and in favor of the state.\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiafalo_v._Washington SUMMARY:⚖️ Chiafalo v. Washington END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:brnovich-v-democratic-national-committee DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210701 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210702 DESCRIPTION:Arizona's voting restrictions regarding provisional ballot coun ting do not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.\n\nDecided July 1\, 2021 (argued March 2\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alit o /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting : Kagan.\nApplied: the Fifteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-15\nTopic: Voting and redistricting.\n\nB rnovich v. Democratic National Committee\, 594 U.S. 647 (2021)\, was a Uni ted States Supreme Court case related to voting rights established by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)\, and specifically the applicability of Se ction 2's general provision barring discrimination against minorities in s tate and local election laws in the wake of the 2013 Supreme Court decisio n Shelby County v. Holder\, which effectively removed the requirement that jurisdictions covered under Section 4(b) get preclearance to change their election procedures. Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee involved t wo of Arizona's election policies: one outlawing ballot collection and ano ther banning out-of-precinct voting. The Supreme Court ruled in a 6–3 de cision in July 2021 that neither of Arizona's election policies violated t he VRA or had a racially discriminatory purpose.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.o rg/wiki/Brnovich_v._Democratic_National_Committee SUMMARY:⚖️ Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:louisiana-v-callais DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260429 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20260430 DESCRIPTION:Plaintiffs challenging state district maps under Section 2 of t he Voting Rights Act of 1965 must demonstrate that a state intentionally r edistricted to diminish representation for minority voters.\n\nDecided Apr il 29\, 2026 (argued March 24\, 2025).\nOpinion of the Court: Samuel Alito /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/samuel-alito\nDissenting: Kagan.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constituti onal-amendments/events/amendment-14\nApplied: the Fifteenth Amendment /tra vel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-15\nTopic: Vot ing and redistricting.\n\nLouisiana v. Callais\, consolidated with Robinso n v. Callais\, 608 U.S. ___ (2026)\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning racial gerrymandering and redistric ting in the state of Louisiana following the 2020 United States census. Af ter the Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Milligan\, the Louisiana legi slature produced a new map under court orders\, allocating two of the stat e's six districts as majority-minority districts using the state's 2020 ce nsus demographics and in compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Ac t. The new maps were challenged as racially-gerrymandered and a constituti onal violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In a 6–3 deci sion\, the Court ruled along ideological lines that affirmed the federal d istrict panel's judgement that the new redistricting map was an unconstitu tional racial gerrymander under the Fifteenth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_v._Callais SUMMARY:⚖️ Louisiana v. Callais END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:pennsylvania-coal-co-v-mahon DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19221211 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19221212 DESCRIPTION:Whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compens ation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property.\n\ nDecided December 11\, 1922 (argued November 14\, 1922).\nOpinion of the C ourt: Oliver Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/event s/oliver-wendell-holmes\nDissenting: Brandeis.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendme nt /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nAppl ied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendmen ts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Takings Clause.\n\nPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon\, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of th e United States held that whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking re quiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of t he property.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pennsylvania_Coal_Co._v._Mah on SUMMARY:⚖️ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:united-states-v-causby DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19460527 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19460528 DESCRIPTION:The ownership of property does not extend infinitely upward\, a nd navigable airspace is public domain.\n\nDecided May 27\, 1946 (argued M ay 1\, 1946).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /travel/calendars/ supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nDissenting: Black\, Burto n.\nTopic: Takings Clause.\n\nUnited States v. Causby\, 328 U.S. 256 (1946 )\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court decision related to ownersh ip of airspace above private property. The United States government claime d a public right to fly over Thomas Lee Causby's farm located near an airp ort in Greensboro\, North Carolina. Causby argued that the government's lo w-altitude flights entitled him to just compensation under the Takings Cla use of the Fifth Amendment.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States _v._Causby SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Causby END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:berman-v-parker DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19541122 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19541123 DESCRIPTION:Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment\, private prope rty can be taken for a public purpose as long as just compensation is paid from whom the property was taken.\n\nDecided November 22\, 1954 (argued O ctober 19\, 1954).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /travel/calen dars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nApplied: the Fifth A mendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5 \nTopic: Takings Clause.\n\nBerman v. Parker\, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)\, is a l andmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that interpreted the T akings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Th e Court voted 8–0 to hold that private property could be taken for a pub lic purpose with just compensation. The case laid the foundation for the C ourt's later important public use cases\, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midk iff\, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) and Kelo v. City of New London\, 545 U.S. 469 (2 005).\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berman_v._Parker SUMMARY:⚖️ Berman v. Parker END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:penn-central-transportation-co-v-new-york-city DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19780626 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19780627 DESCRIPTION:Whether a regulatory action that diminishes the value of a clai mant's property constitutes a "taking" of that property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment depends on several factors\, including the economi c impact of the regulation on the claimant\, particularly the extent to wh ich the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectat ions\, as well as the character of the governmental action.\n\nDecided Jun e 26\, 1978 (argued April 17\, 1978).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Br ennan /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nD issenting: Rehnquist.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-c onstitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Takings Clause.\n\nPen n Central Transportation Co. v. New York City\, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision on compensation for regulat ory takings. Penn Central sued the government of New York City after the N ew York City Landmark Preservation Commission denied its bid to build a la rge office building on top of Grand Central Terminal. The Supreme Court ru led in the city's favor.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penn_Central_Tra nsportation_Co._v._New_York_City SUMMARY:⚖️ Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19920629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19920630 DESCRIPTION:Established the "total takings" test\, i.e. has the owner been deprived of all possible beneficial use of the property\, in determining w hether a regulation limiting use of the property constitutes a regulatory taking.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1992 (argued March 2\, 1992).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ant onin-scalia\nDissenting: Blackmun\, Stevens.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nApplie d: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments /events/amendment-14\nTopic: Takings Clause.\n\nLucas v. South Carolina Co astal Council\, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)\, was a case in which the Supreme Cou rt of the United States established the "total takings" test for evaluatin g whether a particular regulatory action constitutes a regulatory taking t hat requires compensation.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucas_v._South _Carolina_Coastal_Council SUMMARY:⚖️ Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:dolan-v-city-of-tigard DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19940624 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19940625 DESCRIPTION:A government agency may not take property in exchange for benef its that are unrelated to the agency's interest in the property.\n\nDecide d June 24\, 1994 (argued March 23\, 1994).\nOpinion of the Court: William Rehnquist /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-rehnquis t-chief-justice\nDissenting: Stevens\, Souter.\nApplied: the Fifth Amendme nt /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopi c: Takings Clause.\n\nDolan v. City of Tigard\, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)\, more commonly Dolan v. Tigard\, is a United States Supreme Court case. It is a landmark case regarding the practice of zoning and property rights\, and has served to establish limits on the ability of cities and other governme nt agencies to use zoning and land-use regulations to compel property owne rs to make unrelated public improvements as a condition to getting zoning approval\, citing the violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. \n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolan_v._City_of_Tigard SUMMARY:⚖️ Dolan v. City of Tigard END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:lingle-v-chevron-u-s-a-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20050523 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20050524 DESCRIPTION:Contrary to the holding of Agins v. City of Tiburon\, which hel d that a government regulation of private property effects a taking if suc h regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests\, t he test of whether a governmental regulation substantially advances a legi timate state interest is irrelevant to determining whether the regulation effects an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fi fth Amendment.\n\nDecided May 23\, 2005 (argued February 22\, 2005).\nOpin ion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-just ices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/cale ndars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-5\nTopic: Takings Clau se.\n\nLingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.\, 544 U.S. 528 (2005)\, was a landmar k case in United States regulatory takings law whereby the Court expressly overruled precedent created in Agins v. City of Tiburon. Agins held that a government regulation of private property effects a taking if such regul ation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Writing f or the Court\, Justice O’Connor found the test untenable for a number of reasons\, but declined to grant Chevron relief because Chevron’s motion before the court was limited to a discussion of the “substantially adva nces” theory which had just been struck down. The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit for a determination of whether the statute exacted a taking according to the formula of Penn Central.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Lingle_v._Chevron_U.S.A._Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:kelo-v-city-of-new-london DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20050623 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20050624 DESCRIPTION:Local governments may seize property for economic development p urposes. Noted for converting the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause to "public purpose."\n\nDecided June 23\, 2005 (argued February 22\ , 2005).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: O'Connor\, Thomas.\ nApplied: the Fifth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendmen ts/events/amendment-5\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars /us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Takings Clause.\ n\nKelo v. City of New London\, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)\, is a landmark decisi on by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held\, 5 –4\, that the use of eminent domain to transfer land from one private ow ner to another private owner to further economic development does not viol ate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the case\, plaintiff Sus ette Kelo sued the city of New London\, Connecticut\, for violating her ci vil rights after the city tried to acquire her house's property through em inent domain so that the land could be used as part of a "comprehensive re development plan". Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the five-justice ma jority that the city's use of eminent domain was permissible under the Tak ings Clause because the general benefits the community would enjoy from ec onomic growth qualified as "public use".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Kelo_v._City_of_New_London SUMMARY:⚖️ Kelo v. City of New London END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:laidlaw-v-organ DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18170315 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18170316 DESCRIPTION:Established the contract law principle caveat emptor in the Uni ted States.\n\nDecided March 15\, 1817.\nOpinion of the Court: John Marsha ll /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-marshall-chief-jus tice\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nLaidlaw v. Organ\, 15 U .S. 178 (1817)\, is a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United Stat es that established the rule that buyers need not disclose advantageous in formation to sellers. This rule should not be confused with either caveat emptor—a rule placing the burden of due diligence on the purchaser of go ods—or caveat venditor—the rule that vendor sales come with an implied warranty.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laidlaw_v._Organ SUMMARY:⚖️ Laidlaw v. Organ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:dartmouth-college-v-woodward DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18190225 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18190226 DESCRIPTION:The Contract Clause of the Constitution applies to both public and private corporations.\n\nDecided February 25\, 1819 (argued 1818).\nOp inion of the Court: John Marshall /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/john-marshall-chief-justice\nDissenting: Duvall.\nTopic: Businesse s/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nTrustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward\, 1 7 U.S. 518 (1819)\, often called simply The Dartmouth College Case\, is a landmark decision in United States corporate law from the United States Su preme Court dealing with the application of the Contracts Clause of the Un ited States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the president of Dartmouth College was deposed by its trustees\, leading to th e New Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a pu blic institution and thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court upheld the sanct ity of the original charter of the college\, which predated the creation o f the State.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_College_v._Woodwar d SUMMARY:⚖️ Dartmouth College v. Woodward END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:lochner-v-new-york DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19050417 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19050418 DESCRIPTION:The freedom of contract is implicit in the Due Process Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nDecided April 17\, 1905 (argued February 24 \, 1905).\nOpinion of the Court: Rufus W. Peckham /travel/calendars/suprem e-court-justices/events/rufus-w-peckham\nDissenting: Harlan\, Holmes.\nApp lied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendme nts/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nLoch ner v. New York\, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)\, was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court holding that a New York State statute that prescribed maxim um working hours for bakers violated the bakers' right to freedom of contr act under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The decision has since been effectively overturned.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lo chner_v._New_York SUMMARY:⚖️ Lochner v. New York END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:hale-v-henkel DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19060312 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19060313 DESCRIPTION:Corporate employees cannot assert the privilege against self-in crimination on behalf of their employer.\n\nDecided March 12\, 1906 (argue d 1906).\nOpinion of the Court: Henry Billings Brown /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/henry-billings-brown\nDissenting: Brewer.\nTopi c: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nHale v. Henkel\, 201 U.S. 43 (190 6)\, was a major United States Supreme Court case in which the Court estab lished the power of a federal grand jury engaged in an investigation into corporate malfeasance to require the corporation in question to surrender its records.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hale_v._Henkel SUMMARY:⚖️ Hale v. Henkel END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:standard-oil-co-of-new-jersey-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19110515 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19110516 DESCRIPTION:The monopolization of the American petroleum industry by Standa rd Oil violated the Sherman Antitrust Act\, and Standard Oil would be forc ed to break apart into smaller companies. This case established that antit rust law only bans "unreasonable" trade restraints.\n\nDecided May 15\, 19 11 (argued 1910).\nOpinion of the Court: White\nTopic: Businesses/Corporat ions/Contracts.\n\nStandard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States\, 221 U .S. 1 (1911)\, was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that ruled that John D. Rockefeller's petroleum conglomerate Standard Oil had illegally mo nopolized the American petroleum industry and ordered the company to break itself up. The decision also held\, however\, that U.S. antitrust law ban s only "unreasonable" restraints on trade\, an interpretation that came to be known as the "rule of reason".\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standa rd_Oil_Co._of_New_Jersey_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:federal-baseball-club-v-national-league DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19220529 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19220530 DESCRIPTION:Professional baseball does not constitute interstate commerce s ince road games are not very profitable\, and therefore it is exempt from the Sherman Act's antitrust provisions. This was one of the last antitrust exemptions granted by the Court under the less expansive reading of the I nterstate Commerce Clause that saw it as chiefly concerned with the manufa cture and shipping of goods across state lines\, and the only one that rem ains in force\; Congress has limited some aspects of it but has not repeal ed it. No other professional sport has been held exempt from antitrust law .\n\nDecided May 29\, 1922 (argued April 19\, 1922).\nOpinion of the Court : Oliver Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ol iver-wendell-holmes\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nFederal Baseball Club v. National League\, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)\, is a case in whic h the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not appl y to Major League Baseball.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Baseb all_Club_v._National_League SUMMARY:⚖️ Federal Baseball Club v. National League END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:west-coast-hotel-co-v-parrish DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19370329 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19370330 DESCRIPTION:Minimum wage legislation is a valid regulation of freedom of co ntract\; seen as ending the Lochner era.\n\nDecided March 29\, 1937 (argue d 1936).\nOpinion of the Court: Charles Evans Hughes /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/charles-evans-hughes-chief-justice\nDissenting: Sutherland.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/us-const itutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/C ontracts.\n\nWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish\, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)\, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the constitutionality of state minimum wage legislation. The court's decision overturned an earlier holding in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) and is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era\, a period in Americ an legal history during which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legis lation aimed at regulating business.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West _Coast_Hotel_Co._v._Parrish SUMMARY:⚖️ West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:gregory-v-helvering DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19350107 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19350108 DESCRIPTION:Taxpayers have the right to decrease the amount of their taxes or to avoid them altogether by means which the law permits. However\, a bu siness reorganization must have economic substance in order to affect tax liability.\n\nDecided January 7\, 1935 (argued 1934).\nOpinion of the Cour t: George Sutherland /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/georg e-sutherland\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nGregory v. Helv ering\, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)\, was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court concerned with U.S. income tax law. The case is cited as pa rt of the basis for two legal doctrines: the business purpose doctrine and the doctrine of substance over form. The business purpose doctrine is ess entially that if a transaction has no substantial business purpose other t han the avoidance or reduction of Federal tax\, the tax law will not regar d the transaction. The doctrine of substance over form is essentially that for Federal tax purposes\, a taxpayer is bound by the economic substance of a transaction if the economic substance varies from its legal form.\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregory_v._Helvering SUMMARY:⚖️ Gregory v. Helvering END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:united-states-v-south-eastern-underwriters-association DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19440605 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19440606 DESCRIPTION:Businesses whose interstate aspect consists of negotiating and executing contracts with clients\, such as insurers\, are interstate comme rce subject to antitrust law.\n\nDecided June 5\, 1944 (argued January 11\ , 1944).\nOpinion of the Court: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court -justices/events/hugo-black\nDissenting: Stone\, Frankfurter\, Jackson.\nT opic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nUnited States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association\, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)\, is a United States Supre me Court case in which the Court held that the Sherman Act\, the federal a ntitrust statute\, applied to insurance. To reach this decision\, the Cour t held that insurance could be regulated by the United States Congress und er the Commerce Clause\, overturning Paul v. Virginia. Congress responded by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 which limited antitrust laws ' applicability to the business and assured state authority would continue over insurance.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._South-E astern_Underwriters_Association SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:united-states-v-paramount-pictures-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19480503 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19480504 DESCRIPTION:Practice of block booking and ownership of theater chains by fi lm studios (vertical integration) constituted anti-competitive and monopol istic trade practices. As a result of the decision\, the studios were forc ed to sell the chains they owned\, an action which combined with the adven t of television put them in a difficult financial position for almost a qu arter-century\, gave stars more bargaining power which ended the contract player system and along with it the Golden Age of Hollywood.\n\nDecided Ma y 3\, 1948 (argued 1948).\nOpinion of the Court: William O. Douglas /trave l/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/william-o-douglas\nTopic: Busine sses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nUnited States v. Paramount Pictures\, Inc. \, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)\, is a landmark United States Supreme Court antitru st case that decided the fate of film studios owning their own theaters an d holding exclusivity rights on which theatres would show their movies. It would also change the way Hollywood movies were produced\, distributed\, and exhibited. It also opened the door for more foreign and independent fi lms to be shown in American theaters. The Supreme Court affirmed the Unite d States District Court for the Southern District of New York's ruling tha t the existing distribution scheme was in violation of United States antit rust law\, which prohibits certain exclusive dealing arrangements.\n\nhttp s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Paramount_Pictures%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ United States v. Paramount Pictures\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:prima-paint-corp-v-flood-conklin-manufacturing-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19670612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19670613 DESCRIPTION:Where contracts have arbitration clauses\, courts must treat th e clause as a separate contract.\n\nDecided June 12\, 1967 (argued March 1 6\, 1967).\nOpinion of the Court: Abe Fortas /travel/calendars/supreme-cou rt-justices/events/abe-fortas\nDissenting: Black.\nTopic: Businesses/Corpo rations/Contracts.\n\nPrima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.\, 388 U.S. 395 (1967)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision that establish ed what has become known as the "separability principle" in contracts with arbitration clauses. Following an appellate court ruling a decade earlier \, it reads the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require that any cha llenges to the enforceability of such a contract first be heard by an arbi trator\, not a court\, unless the claim is that the clause itself is unenf orceable.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prima_Paint_Corp._v._Flood_%26_ Conklin_Manufacturing_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:southland-corp-v-keating DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840123 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840124 DESCRIPTION:The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs contracts executed un der state law as well as federal law.\n\nDecided January 23\, 1984 (argued October 4\, 1983).\nOpinion of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calend ars/supreme-court-justices/events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissentin g: O'Connor.\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nSouthland Corp. v. Keating\, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)\, is a United States Supreme Court decisio n concerning arbitration. It was originally brought by 7-Eleven franchisee s in California state courts\, alleging breach of contract by the chain's then parent corporation. Southland pointed to the arbitration clauses in t heir franchise agreements and said it required disputes to be resolved tha t way\; the franchisees cited state franchising law voiding any clause in an agreement that required franchisees to waive their rights under that la w. A 7-2 majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied to c ontracts executed under state law.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southl and_Corp._v._Keating SUMMARY:⚖️ Southland Corp. v. Keating END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:ncaa-v-board-of-regents-of-the-university-of-oklahoma DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840627 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840628 DESCRIPTION:The NCAA's television plan of college football games violated t he Sherman Antitrust Act\, allowing the universities to negotiate televisi on contracts.\n\nDecided June 27\, 1984 (argued March 20\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: John Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/ events/john-paul-stevens\nDissenting: White.\nTopic: Businesses/Corporatio ns/Contracts.\n\nNCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma\, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)\, was a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCA A) television plan violated the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts\, which were designed to prohibit group actions that restrained open competition and trade.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NCAA_v._Board_of_Regents_of_th e_University_of_Oklahoma SUMMARY:⚖️ NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:mitsubishi-motors-corp-v-soler-chrysler-plymouth-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850702 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850703 DESCRIPTION:Statutory claims as well as contractual ones are arbitrable und er the FAA.\n\nDecided July 2\, 1985 (argued March 18\, 1985).\nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events /harry-blackmun\nDissenting: Stevens.\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Cont racts.\n\nMitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth\, Inc.\, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)\, is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning arb itration of antitrust claims. The Court heard the case on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit\, which had ruled tha t the arbitration clause in a Puerto Rican car dealer's franchise agreemen t was broad enough to reach its antitrust claim. By a 5–3 margin it uphe ld the lower court\, requiring that the dealer arbitrate its claim before a panel in Tokyo\, as stipulated in the contract.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Mitsubishi_Motors_Corp._v._Soler_Chrysler-Plymouth%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:at-t-mobility-llc-v-concepcion DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20110427 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20110428 DESCRIPTION:The FAA pre-empts state laws prohibiting contracts from barring class-action arbitration.\n\nDecided April 27\, 2011 (argued November 9\, 2010).\nOpinion of the Court: Antonin Scalia /travel/calendars/supreme-co urt-justices/events/antonin-scalia\nDissenting: Breyer.\nTopic: Businesses /Corporations/Contracts.\n\nAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion\, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)\, is a case that was decided by the United States Supreme Court. O n April 27\, 2011\, the Court ruled\, by a 5–4 margin\, that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration\, such as the law previously upheld by the California Supreme Court in the case of Discover Bank v. Superior Cour t. As a result\, businesses that include arbitration agreements with class action waivers can require consumers to bring claims only in individual a rbitrations\, rather than in court as part of a class action.\n\nhttps://e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T_Mobility_LLC_v._Concepcion SUMMARY:⚖️ AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:national-collegiate-athletic-association-v-alston DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210621 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210622 DESCRIPTION:The NCAA's restrictions on providing college athletes with non- cash compensation for academic-related purposes violated the Sherman Antit rust Act.\n\nDecided June 21\, 2021 (argued March 31\, 2021).\nOpinion of the Court: Neil Gorsuch /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/ne il-gorsuch\nTopic: Businesses/Corporations/Contracts.\n\nNational Collegia te Athletic Association v. Alston\, 594 U.S. 69 (2021)\, was a United Stat es Supreme Court case concerning the compensation of collegiate athletes w ithin the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). It followed fro m a previous case\, O'Bannon v. NCAA\, in which it was found that the NCAA was profiting from the namesake and likenesses of college athletes. The c ase dealt with the NCAA's restrictions on providing college athletes with non-cash compensation for academic-related purposes\, such as computers an d internships\, which the NCAA maintained was to prevent the appearance th at the student athletes were being paid to play or treated as professional athletes. Lower courts had ruled that these restrictions violated antitru st law\, which the Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous ruling in June 20 21.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Collegiate_Athletic_Associat ion_v._Alston SUMMARY:⚖️ National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:burrow-giles-lithographic-co-v-sarony DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18840317 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18840318 DESCRIPTION:Congress's extension of copyright to cover photography was with in constitutional limits.\n\nDecided March 17\, 1884.\nOpinion of the Cour t: Samuel Freeman Miller /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/s amuel-freeman-miller\nTopic: Copyright/Patents.\n\nBurrow-Giles Lithograph ic Co. v. Sarony\, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)\, was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that upheld the power of Congress to extend cop yright protection to photography.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burrow- Giles_Lithographic_Co._v._Sarony SUMMARY:⚖️ Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:bleistein-v-donaldson-lithographing-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19030202 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19030203 DESCRIPTION:Advertisements are copyrightable despite their fundamentally co mmercial nature.\n\nDecided February 2\, 1903.\nOpinion of the Court: Oliv er Wendell Holmes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/oliver-w endell-holmes\nDissenting: Harlan.\nTopic: Copyright/Patents.\n\nBleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company\, 188 U.S. 239 (1903)\, is a case in w hich the United States Supreme Court found that advertisements were protec ted by copyright. The case is now cited for the proposition that commercia l speech can be protected by copyright.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B leistein_v._Donaldson_Lithographing_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:diamond-v-chakrabarty DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19800616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19800617 DESCRIPTION:Genetically modified organisms can be patented. According to th e court a living\, man-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter as a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of the Pate nt Act of 1952.\n\nDecided June 16\, 1980 (argued March 17\, 1980).\nOpini on of the Court: Warren E. Burger /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/warren-e-burger-chief-justice\nDissenting: Brennan.\nTopic: Copyri ght/Patents.\n\nDiamond v. Chakrabarty\, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)\, was a Unite d States Supreme Court case dealing with whether living organisms can be p atented. Writing for a five-justice majority\, Chief Justice Warren E. Bur ger held that human-made bacteria could be patented under the patent laws of the United States because such an invention constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter". Justice William J. Brennan Jr.\, along with J ustices Byron White\, Thurgood Marshall\, and Lewis F. Powell Jr.\, dissen ted from the Court's ruling\, arguing that because Congress had not expres sly authorized the patenting of biological organisms\, the Court should no t extend patent law to cover them.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diamon d_v._Chakrabarty SUMMARY:⚖️ Diamond v. Chakrabarty END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:sony-corp-of-america-v-universal-city-studios-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19840117 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19840118 DESCRIPTION:Manufacturers of home video recording machines cannot be liable for contributory copyright infringement for the potential uses by their p urchasers because the devices are sold for legitimate purposes and have su bstantial non-infringing uses. Personal use of the machines to record broa dcast television programs for later viewing constitutes fair use.\n\nDecid ed January 17\, 1984 (argued January 18\, 1983).\nOpinion of the Court: Jo hn Paul Stevens /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/john-paul- stevens\nDissenting: Blackmun.\nTopic: Copyright/Patents.\n\nSony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios\, Inc.\, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)\, also kno wn as the "Betamax case"\, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the Unite d States which ruled that the making of individual copies of complete tele vision shows for purposes of time shifting does not constitute copyright i nfringement\, but can instead be defended as fair use. The court also rule d that the manufacturers of home video recording devices\, such as Betamax or other VCRs\, cannot be liable for contributory infringement. The case was a boon to the home video market\, as it created a legal safe harbor fo r the technology.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v ._Universal_City_Studios%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:harper-row-v-nation-enterprises DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19850520 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19850521 DESCRIPTION:The first copyright case to reach the Court involving fair use after the Copyright Act of 1976 codified it into law. The Court thus provi ded guidance in how to apply the four-factor test for fair use.\n\nDecided May 20\, 1985 (argued November 6\, 1984).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra D ay O'Connor /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-c onnor\nDissenting: Brennan.\nApplied: the First Amendment /travel/calendar s/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-1\nTopic: Copyright/Patent s.\n\nHarper & Row v. Nation Enterprises\, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)\, was a Uni ted States Supreme Court decision in which public interest in learning abo ut a historical figure's impressions of a historic event was held not to b e sufficient to show fair use of material otherwise protected by copyright . Defendant\, The Nation\, had summarized and quoted substantially from A Time to Heal\, President Gerald Ford's forthcoming memoir of his decision to pardon former president Richard Nixon. When Harper & Row\, who held the rights to A Time to Heal\, brought suit\, The Nation asserted that its us e of the book was protected under the doctrine of fair use\, because of th e great public interest in a historical figure's account of a historic inc ident. The Court rejected this argument holding that the right of first pu blication was important enough to find in favor of Harper.\n\nhttps://en.w ikipedia.org/wiki/Harper_%26_Row_v._Nation_Enterprises SUMMARY:⚖️ Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:feist-v-rural DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19910327 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19910328 DESCRIPTION:Originality\, not sweat of the brow\, is required for a work to obtain copyright protection.\n\nDecided March 27\, 1991 (argued January 9 \, 1991).\nOpinion of the Court: Sandra Day O'Connor /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/sandra-day-o-connor\nTopic: Copyright/Patents.\ n\nFeist Publications\, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.\, 499 U.S. 340 (1991)\, was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United State s establishing that information alone without a minimum of original creati vity cannot be protected by copyright. In the case appealed\, Feist had co pied information from Rural's telephone listings to include in its own\, a fter Rural had refused to license the information. Rural sued for copyrigh t infringement. The Court ruled that information contained in Rural's phon e directory was not copyrightable and that therefore no infringement exist ed.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feist_v._Rural SUMMARY:⚖️ Feist v. Rural END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:campbell-v-acuff-rose-music-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19940307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19940308 DESCRIPTION:Parody qualifies as fair use under copyright law. With this cas e the Court accepted transformative use as part of a fair-use defense agai nst infringement.\n\nDecided March 7\, 1994 (argued November 9\, 1993).\nO pinion of the Court: David Souter /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices /events/david-souter\nTopic: Copyright/Patents.\n\nCampbell v. Acuff-Rose Music\, Inc.\, 510 U.S. 569 (1994)\, was a United States Supreme Court cop yright law case that established that a commercial parody can qualify as f air use. This case established that the fact that money is made by a work does not make it impossible for fair use to apply\; it is merely one of th e components of a fair use analysis.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp bell_v._Acuff-Rose_Music%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:association-for-molecular-pathology-v-myriad-genetics-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20130613 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20130614 DESCRIPTION:Naturally occurring DNA sequences\, even when isolated from the body\, cannot be patented\, but artificially created DNA is patent eligib le because it is not naturally occurring.\n\nDecided June 13\, 2013 (argue d April 15\, 2013).\nOpinion of the Court: Clarence Thomas /travel/calenda rs/supreme-court-justices/events/clarence-thomas\nTopic: Copyright/Patents .\n\nAssociation for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics\, Inc.\, 569 U .S. 576 (2013)\, was a Supreme Court case\, which decided that "a naturall y occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible mer ely because it has been isolated." However\, the Court allowed patenting o f complementary DNA\, which contains exactly the same protein-coding base pair sequence as the natural DNA\, albeit with introns removed.\n\nhttps:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_for_Molecular_Pathology_v._Myriad_Genet ics%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics\, Inc . END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:alice-corp-v-cls-bank-international DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140619 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140620 DESCRIPTION:Software that merely uses generic computing hardware to perform a pre-existing abstract idea is not patent eligible.\n\nDecided June 19\, 2014 (argued March 31\, 2014).\nOpinion of the Court: Clarence Thomas /tr avel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/clarence-thomas\nTopic: Copyr ight/Patents.\n\nAlice Corp. v. CLS Bank International\, 573 U.S. 208 (201 4)\, was a 2014 United States Supreme Court decision about patent eligibil ity of business method patents. The issue in the case was whether certain patent claims for a computer-implemented\, electronic escrow service cover ed abstract ideas\, which would make the claims ineligible for patent prot ection. The patents were held to be invalid\, because the claims were draw n to an abstract idea\, and implementing those claims on a computer was no t enough to transform that abstract idea into patentable subject matter.\n \nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_Corp._v._CLS_Bank_International SUMMARY:⚖️ Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:swift-v-tyson DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18420125 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18420126 DESCRIPTION:Federal courts hearing cases were bound to follow the statutory laws of states that they were asked to enforce\, but not the state's comm on law. The goal was to encourage the development of a federal common law. (Overruled by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938))\n\nDecided January 25 \, 1842.\nOpinion of the Court: Joseph Story /travel/calendars/supreme-cou rt-justices/events/joseph-story\nOverruled by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkin s (1938). /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-decisions/events/erie-r ailroad-co-v-tompkins\nTopic: Other.\n\nSwift v. Tyson\, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)\ , was a case brought in diversity in the Circuit Court for the Southern Di strict of New York on a bill of exchange accepted in New York in which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that United States federal courts that heard cases brought under their diversity jurisdiction under t he Judiciary Act of 1789 must apply statutory state laws when the state le gislatures in question had spoken on the issue\, but did not have to apply the state's common law if the state legislatures had not spoken on the is sue.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swift_v._Tyson SUMMARY:⚖️ Swift v. Tyson END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:luther-v-borden DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:18490103 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:18490104 DESCRIPTION:Established the political question doctrine in controversies ar ising under the Guarantee Clause of Article Four of the United States Cons titution.\n\nDecided January 3\, 1849 (argued 1849).\nOpinion of the Court : Roger B. Taney /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/roger-b-t aney-chief-justice\nDissenting: Woodbury.\nTopic: Other.\n\nLuther v. Bord en\, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the Unite d States established the political question doctrine in controversies aris ing under the Guarantee Clause of Article Four of the United States Consti tution .\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luther_v._Borden SUMMARY:⚖️ Luther v. Borden END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:selective-draft-law-cases DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19180107 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19180108 DESCRIPTION:The Selective Service Act of 1917 and\, more generally\, conscr iption do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntar y servitude or the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of thought. \n\nDecided January 7\, 1918 (argued 1917).\nOpinion of the Court: White\n Topic: Other.\n\nArver v. United States\, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)\, also known as the Selective Draft Law Cases\, was a series of United States Supreme Court decisions united under the Arver name which upheld the Selective Ser vice Act of 1917\, and more generally upheld conscription in the United St ates. The Supreme Court held that conscription did not violate the Thirtee nth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude or the First Amendmen t's protection of freedom of conscience.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Selective_Draft_Law_Cases SUMMARY:⚖️ Selective Draft Law Cases END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:dillon-v-gloss DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19210516 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19210517 DESCRIPTION:Congress may set a deadline for the ratification of a new const itutional amendment if it wishes to do so.\n\nDecided May 16\, 1921 (argue d March 22\, 1921).\nOpinion of the Court: Willis Van Devanter /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/willis-van-devanter\nOverruled by Col eman v. Miller (1939) (in part) /travel/calendars/landmark-supreme-court-d ecisions/events/coleman-v-miller\nTopic: Other.\n\nDillon v. Gloss\, 256 U .S. 368 (1921)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United State s held that Congress\, when proposing a constitutional amendment under the authority given to it by Article V of the Constitution\, may fix a defini te period for its ratification\, and further\, that a seven-year period\, such as that fixed by Congress in the resolution proposing the Eighteenth Amendment\, is reasonable.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dillon_v._Glos s SUMMARY:⚖️ Dillon v. Gloss END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:connally-v-general-construction-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19260104 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19260105 DESCRIPTION:The U.S. Supreme Court established the vagueness doctrine where by a statute is void for vagueness and unenforceable if it is too vague fo r the average citizen to understand or if a term cannot be strictly define d and is not defined anywhere in such law.\n\nDecided January 4\, 1926 (ar gued 1925).\nOpinion of the Court: George Sutherland /travel/calendars/sup reme-court-justices/events/george-sutherland\nDissenting: Van Devanter\, M cReynolds\, Butler.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Amendment /travel/calendars/u s-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\nTopic: Other.\n\nConnally v. General Construction Co.\, 269 U.S. 385 (1926)\, was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court expanded and established key constructs of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process doctrine along with establishing the vagueness doctrine. It defined necessary requirements tha t are fundamental to any law\, which\, when lacking\, are to be deemed voi d. The case was a dispute regarding Oklahoma state statutes\, which\, in e ssence vaguely required businesses to pay workers not less than the "curre nt rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed". Th e ruling determined that the standards set in place were unconstitutionall y vague.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connally_v._General_Construction _Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Connally v. General Construction Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:village-of-euclid-v-ambler-realty-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19261122 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19261123 DESCRIPTION:Zoning laws are not an unreasonable extension of local police p ower and do not have the character of arbitrary fiat.\n\nDecided November 22\, 1926 (argued January 27\, 1926).\nOpinion of the Court: George Suther land /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/george-sutherland\nDi ssenting: Van Devanter\, McReynolds\, Butler.\nApplied: the Fourteenth Ame ndment /travel/calendars/us-constitutional-amendments/events/amendment-14\ nTopic: Other.\n\nVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.\, 272 U.S. 365 (1 926)\, commonly known as Euclid v. Ambler\, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court found that local ord inance-style zoning was a valid exercise of the police power. It was the f irst significant case regarding the relatively new practice of zoning\, an d bolstered zoning in the United States and influenced other countries.\n\ nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_of_Euclid_v._Ambler_Realty_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:erie-railroad-co-v-tompkins DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19380425 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19380426 DESCRIPTION:Federal courts in diversity jurisdiction cases must apply the l aw of the states in which they sit\, including the judicial doctrine of th e state's highest court\, where it does not conflict with federal law. The re is no general federal common law.\n\nDecided April 25\, 1938 (argued Ja nuary 31\, 1938).\nOpinion of the Court: Louis Brandeis /travel/calendars/ supreme-court-justices/events/louis-brandeis\nDissenting: Butler.\nTopic: Other.\n\nErie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins\, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)\, is a landma rk decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the United States does not have a general federal common law and that U.S. fed eral courts must apply state law\, not federal law\, to any lawsuit betwee n parties from different states that does not involve federal questions. T he Court's decision overturned nearly a century of case law on federal civ il procedure and established the foundation of the modern law of diversity jurisdiction.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erie_Railroad_Co._v._Tompk ins SUMMARY:⚖️ Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:coleman-v-miller DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19390605 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19390606 DESCRIPTION:A proposed amendment to the Constitution is considered pending before the states indefinitely unless Congress establishes a deadline by w hich the states must act. Furthermore\, Congress—not the courts—is res ponsible for deciding whether an amendment has been validly ratified.\n\nD ecided June 5\, 1939 (argued October 10\, 1938).\nOpinion of the Court: Ch arles Evans Hughes /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/charles -evans-hughes-chief-justice\nDissenting: Butler.\nTopic: Other.\n\nColeman v. Miller\, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)\, is a landmark decision of the United St ates Supreme Court which clarified that when proposing for the ratificatio n of an amendment to the United States Constitution\, pursuant to Article V thereof\, if the Congress of the United States chooses not to set a dead line by which the proposed amendment must be acted upon by the requisite t hree-fourths of state legislatures or state ratifying conventions\, then t he proposed amendment remains pending business before the state legislatur es. The case centered on the Child Labor Amendment\, which was proposed fo r ratification by Congress in 1924.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colem an_v._Miller SUMMARY:⚖️ Coleman v. Miller END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:burford-v-sun-oil-co DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19430524 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19430525 DESCRIPTION:Created a new abstention doctrine\, under which federal courts in a diversity jurisdiction can let state courts hear cases under certain circumstances.\n\nDecided May 24\, 1943 (argued 1943).\nOpinion of the Cou rt: Hugo Black /travel/calendars/supreme-court-justices/events/hugo-black\ nDissenting: Frankfurter.\nTopic: Other.\n\nBurford v. Sun Oil Co.\, 319 U .S. 315 (1943)\, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court created a new doctrine of abstention.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bu rford_v._Sun_Oil_Co. SUMMARY:⚖️ Burford v. Sun Oil Co. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:gravel-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19720629 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19720630 DESCRIPTION:The privileges of the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause en joyed by members of Congress also extend to Congressional aides\, but not to activity outside the legislative process.\n\nDecided June 29\, 1972 (ar gued 1972).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/calendars/supreme-c ourt-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Stewart (in part)\, Douglas\ , Brennan.\nTopic: Other.\n\nGravel v. United States\, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) \, was a case regarding the protections offered by the Speech or Debate Cl ause of the United States Constitution. In the case\, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the privileges and immunities of the Constitu tion's Speech or Debate Clause enjoyed by members of Congress also extend to Congressional aides\, but not to activity outside the legislative proce ss.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravel_v._United_States SUMMARY:⚖️ Gravel v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:colorado-river-water-conservation-district-v-united-states DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19760324 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19760325 DESCRIPTION:Greatly revised and extended the circumstances under which the abstention doctrine\, whereby federal courts can decline jurisdiction they would otherwise assert\, applies.\n\nDecided March 24\, 1976 (argued Janu ary 14\, 1976).\nOpinion of the Court: William J. Brennan /travel/calendar s/supreme-court-justices/events/william-j-brennan\nDissenting: Stewart\, S tevens.\nTopic: Other.\n\nColorado River Water Conservation District v. Un ited States\, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)\, was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States extensively refined the abstention doctrine to preven t duplicative litigation between state and federal courts.\n\nhttps://en.w ikipedia.org/wiki/Colorado_River_Water_Conservation_District_v._United_Sta tes SUMMARY:⚖️ Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:anderson-v-liberty-lobby-inc DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19860625 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19860626 DESCRIPTION:Set the standard for what parties must establish in evidence to be granted summary judgement in federal civil cases and how courts should evaluate those motions. Since such motions are extremely common\, Anderso n has become the most-cited Supreme Court case.\n\nDecided June 25\, 1986 (argued December 3\, 1985).\nOpinion of the Court: Byron White /travel/cal endars/supreme-court-justices/events/byron-white\nDissenting: Brennan\, Re hnquist.\nTopic: Other.\n\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby\, Inc.\, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)\, is a United States Supreme Court case articulating the standard for a trial court to grant summary judgment. Summary judgment will lie whe n\, taking all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor\, there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the movant deserves judgment a s a matter of law. Because courts almost always cite Liberty Lobby in thei r opinions for the standard regarding motions for summary judgment\, Liber ty Lobby is the most cited Supreme Court case.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Anderson_v._Liberty_Lobby%2C_Inc. SUMMARY:⚖️ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby\, Inc. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261017T013648Z UID:daubert-v-merrell-dow-pharmaceuticals DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:19930628 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:19930629 DESCRIPTION:Scientific evidence that is admitted in federal court must be v alid and relevant to the case at hand.\n\nDecided June 28\, 1993 (argued M arch 30\, 1993).\nOpinion of the Court: Harry Blackmun /travel/calendars/s upreme-court-justices/events/harry-blackmun\nTopic: Other.\n\nDaubert v. M errell Dow Pharmaceuticals\, Inc.\, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)\, is a United Stat es Supreme Court case determining the standard for admitting expert testim ony in federal courts. In Daubert\, the Court held that the enactment of t he Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly overturned the Frye standard\; the standard that the Court articulated is referred to as the Daubert standar d.\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_v._Merrell_Dow_Pharmaceuticals SUMMARY:⚖️ Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR